

**A FRAMEWORK FOR  
RESPONSIBLE AID TO BURUNDI**

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## A FRAMEWORK FOR RESPONSIBLE AID TO BURUNDI

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Within the last two months, thanks to the active engagement of the facilitation team, Burundi's peace process has exceeded expectations. Momentum has never been so strong since the civil war began ten years ago. On 3 December 2002, the transitional government led by President Buyoya signed a landmark ceasefire agreement with the *Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie – Forces de défense de la démocratie* (CNDD-FDD) of Jean-Pierre Nkurunziza. This complemented the ceasefire reached two months earlier with two minor rebel groups (the CNDD-FDD faction led by Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL faction led by Alain Mugabarabona). On 27 January 2003, the government and the three rebel groups signed an additional memorandum of understanding establishing a Joint Ceasefire Commission and setting a date for the return of Mugabarabona and Ndayikengurukiye to Burundi. An African Union force with South African, Ethiopian and Mozambican troops is to be deployed in the next few weeks.

For months the absence of a ceasefire was used by the international community as an excuse not to resume aid and by the transitional government to justify not implementing the reforms demanded by the Arusha peace accords signed in August 2000. Donors have also demanded progress in Arusha implementation to release aid, while the government has claimed it needs money to carry out the political reforms. Now that a ceasefire is in place, most donors argue that they first want to see a complete stop of the violence and the changeover from President Buyoya to Vice President Ndayizeye go as scheduled on 1 May 2003 before they open their purses. This prudence, however, has become counter-productive.

True, Burundi is not yet stable. The transitional government has not implemented the Arusha reforms; the PALIPEHUTU-FNL of Agathon Rwasa still

rejects the talks; a comprehensive reform of the security sector remains to be agreed upon, and the disarmament and cantonment process has not yet started. Marginal violence by Hutu rebels and resistance to change among the Tutsi oligarchy will likely remain strong even with a comprehensive ceasefire. But ICG believes that now is the time for donors to play their essential role in building peace. The delivery of peace dividends will signal their commitment to the process, give the CNDD-FDD fighters an incentive to accept the disarmament and reintegration process (DDRRR) and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL an incentive to negotiate. It will also give donors the necessary leverage to pressure the transitional government on reforms. Political support for the May presidential changeover and responsible, well-controlled and coordinated aid can isolate spoilers, help consolidate the credibility of the transitional government, and fuel positive change.

The Burundian people, economy, and state structures have suffered heavily from a decade of fighting, a three-year embargo, drought, the abandonment of much of the population by the state, and a 66 per cent decrease in international aid. GDP fell by 20 per cent in this period and is third from the bottom in the 2002 UN human development index; primary school enrolment dropped in the same period from 70 per cent to 28 per cent, and infant mortality is back to its 1960 level. The end of the war requires the reintegration into a traumatised and disorganised society of 70,000 ex-combatants, the cost of which the World Bank estimates at U.S.\$90 million, as well as of 1.2 million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

That more national donor cooperation is feasible at this stage has been demonstrated by the success of substantial community development and reconstruction programs (schools, health centres, homes, water sources) run by UNDP, the World

Bank, and the EU. The UN and the transitional government are preparing plans for reconstruction and the reintegration of refugees, and some early peacebuilding programs are expanding rapidly. The EU funded distribution of food to the rebels in December 2002 so that they would stop preying on civilians – a specific example of how the international community can directly advance the peace process. Reform-minded individuals within the transitional government need international support to push change forward. Burundians are desperate for resources and are likely to accept the structural reforms necessary to receive this assistance if it is tangible and at hand. In return donors should demand a reduction in military expenditure and an immediate cessation of speculation on coffee income and monetary exchange.

A donor coordination unit should be established in Burundi to liaise with the transitional government in developing a joint strategy for implementing Protocol IV of the Arusha Agreement, which provides a roadmap for economic aspects of the post-conflict period.

Nelson Mandela said, at the first donors conference in December 2000, that “It must be possible for the people of Burundi to materially distinguish between the destructiveness of conflict and the benefits of peace.” It is time to pick up the leadership mantle that Mandela passed to donors and the UN. As the facilitator of the new ceasefire accord, Jacob Zuma, said in December 2002, “Regional efforts had achieved much progress in Burundi, but a complete peace could not be achieved without the full support of the international community”.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

### **A. Priority Actions**

#### **To Donors:**

1. Provide immediately the resources necessary for:
  - (a) the deployment of the African Observer Mission, as requested by the UN Security Council on 30 January 2003;
  - (b) the work of the ceasefire implementation commission; and
  - (c) the sustainability and expansion of food distributions to rebel groups.
2. Give the Burundi chapter of the Great Lakes Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program (MDRP) the resources needed for the demobilisation and reintegration of over 70,000 former combatants.
3. Provide resources for reintegrating 1.2 million refugees and IDPs and increase the capacity of the transitional government, UN, and NGO to monitor the integration.
4. Monitor military expenditures, speculation on coffee revenue and on monetary exchange.
5. Establish a taskforce of Burundian and international economists to outline steps for restructuring and opening the economy, including:
  - (a) privatisation of state assets;
  - (b) jobs creation through micro-credit programs, high-intensity manual labour, and reconstruction projects;
  - (c) new accountability structures in the state through fiscal reform; and
  - (d) support for the role of private business and entrepreneurs in national reconstruction.
6. Support immediate reconstruction in all areas where security permits, making critical use of the transitional government’s National Reconstruction Program.
7. Develop a realistic decentralisation plan that integrates all efforts underway.
8. Harmonise World Bank, EU and UNDP community-based reconstruction programs to reinforce decentralisation mechanisms and insist on true community involvement in identifying priorities.
9. Support immediate reconstruction of the education system, including correction of imbalances in access to primary, secondary and higher education, and provide support for the education costs of disadvantaged children.
10. Develop training programs and schools for professionals such as public servants, teachers, medical staff, and accountants.
11. Support comprehensive reform of the judicial system.
12. Ensure equal ethnic opportunities for local subcontractors and positions in NGOs and UN agencies.

## **B. Actions to Create a Framework for Improving Assistance Cooperation with Burundi**

### **To Donors:**

13. Develop a donor coordination unit, with a secretariat to:
  - (a) create a joint strategy for the transition period based on the objectives of Protocol IV of the Arusha Agreement;
  - (b) integrate the existing donor programs (World Bank, IMF, EU, UN, national) and strategies under this framework;
  - (c) work with the government to revise its interim Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan (IPRSP) in accordance with the overall donor strategy and Protocol IV;
  - (d) analyse jointly with the transitional government the capacity of UN agencies, NGOs, and communities to implement the strategy;
  - (e) monitor implementation of the joint strategy and the Arusha Agreement;
  - (f) act as interlocutor for the Inter-Ministerial Monitoring Commission for Economic and Social Policy (CIPES) that the government has created to replace the Reconstruction and Development Unit outlined in Protocol IV.
  - (g) develop and monitor “aid-for-peace bargains” with the transitional government based on specific objectives of the Arusha Agreement;
  - (h) institute a regular conflict impact assessment mechanism as part of the program monitoring system;
  - (i) keep the transitional government informed of what money will be available, when, and what it must do to receive it; and
  - (j) evaluate the transitional government’s capacity to carry out the National Reconstruction Program, and the Interim Strategy for Economic Expansion and

Poverty Reduction, presented at the Donor Roundtable 27-28 November 2002 and support their implementation in all possible areas.

### **To the Transitional Government:**

14. Strengthen the Inter-Ministerial Monitoring Commission for Economic and Social Policy so that it can be an effective interlocutor for the donor coordination unit and the UN Reintegration Unit.
15. Develop all plans listed in Protocol IV, including reintegration of IDPs and economic and political reconstruction during the transitional, medium and long-term periods.
16. Establish immediately the National Commission for the Reintegration of Sinistrés (IDPs) and the sub-commission on land, clarify the terms of the Ministry for Reconstruction, Reintegration and Repatriation’s supervision, entrench good governance and transparency mechanisms in its operational structures and clarify the division in responsibilities between it and the Inter-Ministerial Commission for the Monitoring and Economic and Social Policy.
17. Develop a reintegration policy to protect the rights of all Burundians, both refugees and internally displaced, as well as of the communities that will receive them.

### **To the Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC) and UN Agencies:**

18. Develop a joint UN strategy to support implementation of the Arusha Agreement.
19. Request technical support from donors and other UN agencies to strengthen the IMC’s capacity to fulfil its mandate to “follow up, monitor, supervise, coordinate and ensure the effective implementation of all the provisions of the Agreement”.

**Nairobi/Brussels, 21 February 2003**

## A FRAMEWORK FOR RESPONSIBLE AID TO BURUNDI

### I. INTRODUCTION

*The signing of a peace accord can mark a watershed in the transition from war to peace, or merely a brief respite from violent conflict. External aid cannot guarantee a lasting peace, but it can help to make this outcome more likely. How well aid serves this purpose depends not only on its quantity but also on its qualities: what types of aid are provided, to whom, and what conditions are attached.*

James K. Boyce<sup>1</sup>

The international community's complete engagement is desperately needed to move Burundi from war to peace. The country must not lose the opportunity created by the landmark ceasefire agreement of 3 December 2002 between the government and the *Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie – Forces de défense de la démocratie* (CNDD-FDD) of Jean-Pierre Nkurunziza, and the memorandum of understanding on the implementation of the ceasefire concluded on 27 January 2003 between the government and the three rebel groups that have thus far entered the peace process. South Africa, Mozambique and Ethiopia have committed troops to the African Union observer force that is expected to be deployed in the next few weeks. A ceasefire agreement with the last rebel group (the PALIPEHUTU-FNL of Agathon Rwasa) is the final piece necessary to allow the full implementation of the Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation signed on 28 August 2000.<sup>2</sup>

The international community must support these landmark steps with the release of all promised

assistance and its commitment to break the cycles of violence and desperation by reconstructing a functioning state. The reluctance of the transitional government and the donor community alike to move from these agreements (peace-making) to their full implementation (peacebuilding) threatens to disintegrate the entire peace process.<sup>3</sup>

Ceasefire accords with the major rebel groups have made full implementation of Arusha even more urgent. Visible peace dividends will provide an essential incentive for the rebels to maintain the ceasefire. A large influx of money is needed to prepare for the reintegration of former combatants, refugees, and internally displaced persons, financially support the formation of a broader government coalition and begin reconstruction of the social and economic infrastructure of a country that has greatly suffered from nearly a decade of civil war.

Yet, it is necessary to make sure that the resumption of aid becomes a second engine of the peace process, not an alternative to reforms. Before the war, Burundi was the darling of international financial institutions thanks to its superficial democratisation process. This time around, mistakes should not be repeated. The objective of the peace process is not to replace one rent-seeking oligarchy by another. It is to change the system of governance that led to the war and of which aid programs were a key component. The physical and human reconstruction of the state is a necessity. But in reconstructing its capacities, aid must also be used to create a state that serves its people and not only its rulers, old or new, and that breaks from practices that led to violence in the past. Old habits die hard, and donors together with the Burundian government have much to do to set-up a system of good governance.

<sup>1</sup> James K. Boyce, *Investing in Peace: Aid and Conditionality after Civil Wars*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 351 (London, September 2002), p. 73.

<sup>2</sup> For discussion of the Burundian rebel movements, see ICG Africa Briefing, *The Burundi Rebellion and the Ceasefire Negotiations*, 6 August 2002.

<sup>3</sup> It contradicts the spirit of the Cotonou Agreement signed in June 2000 between African, Caribbean and Pacific countries and the EU that ensures a stronger link between development and conflict prevention, management and resolution (see Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement).

ICG proposes a Framework for Responsible Aid and outlines a conditionality strategy to give momentum to the reform process and help Burundi out of war into peace.

## **II. THE NEED FOR RESPONSIBLE AID**

*Rather than a definitive end to war, an accord should be seen as a tentative step towards peace. It marks the beginning of a new stage in the war-to-peace transition typically referred to as 'peacebuilding'. The peace accord is at best a rough blueprint, with the final outcome uncertain. Whether a lasting peace will be constructed depends crucially on what happens next.*

James K. Boyce<sup>4</sup>

### **A. AN URGENT ENGAGEMENT FOR PEACE**

The 3 December 2002 agreement between the government and the CNDD-FDD was Burundi's first real step toward peace since the Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation two years earlier and established a framework and plan for transition from war to peace. The transitional government, established on 1 November 2001, had been very slow to implement Arusha, waiting instead for a ceasefire and international assistance. The recent agreement, therefore, has opened a critical window of opportunity. The ball is now in the international community's court to give the financial and political support necessary to move the peace process forward.

#### **1. On the edge of peace or peace on the edge?**

Peace has remained elusive because the Arusha accord did not include the rebel groups. Signature of ceasefire agreements with three of the four rebel factions marks very important movement, therefore. The agreement between Buyoya and Nkurunziza established that a truce would be effective within 72 hours of the signature, and within 30 days all rebel troops would be moved to barracks, facilitated by security corridors. Thirty days were given to negotiate all issues leading to the integration of the CNDD-FDD into the governance, security and development aspects of Arusha, and provision was made for an African Observer Mission to verify and help maintain the ceasefire. The agreement was endorsed by the heads of state of the neighbouring countries.

The truce has generally been respected, although some fighting surrounded the first food distributions to rebels who were still carrying arms and were

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<sup>4</sup> Boyce, op. cit., p. 7.

suspected by the army of using the distribution as cover for infiltrating new territory. On 24 and 27 January 2003 meetings between President Buyoya and the rebel groups in Pretoria created the Joint Ceasefire Commission and agreed on deployment of an African mission. Key issues relating to cantonment and the integration of the former rebels into the army, and their inclusion in the transitional government have yet to be addressed. In addition, the oldest rebel group, the FNL headed by Agathon Rwasa, remains outside the peace process and is still fighting.

The ceasefire agreements are a very positive development in what has been a dragging peace process. The transitional government has allocated political posts and established legislative institutions but there have been few signs that a genuine transition from war to peace is beginning.<sup>5</sup> The government has blamed the slow start on the absence of a ceasefire and the delayed delivery of promised international aid.

Domitien Ndayizeye, the vice-president of the Front for Democracy in Burundi FRODEBU, is scheduled to take over the presidency from Pierre Buyoya on 1 May 2003. Some members of the army already argue that this must be delayed until the Arusha agreement and the ceasefire agreement are both fully implemented since, they say, a FRODEBU President would not be trusted to oversee the reform of the security services.<sup>6</sup> Similarly UPRONA, the former ruling party that supports President Buyoya, has also launched an international campaign to question the changeover. It claims that an unwritten condition was completion of the ceasefire implementation and that it would be unacceptable for the bulk of the reforms, including army reform, to be made the responsibility of a FRODEBU presidency.<sup>7</sup>

Yet, there is no other option. Buyoya has to leave power on 1 May. True, this will leave the peace process in a risky situation. It would certainly have been better for the ceasefire and the Arusha reforms to be implemented fully under his presidency. However, there is still no compelling reason for the changeover to be delayed. First, even a delay would need a constitutional amendment, requiring a four-

fifths majority in the National Assembly and the Senate. This would be impossible without FRODEBU support. Even if FRODEBU gave in – more than highly unlikely – rival Tutsi parties to Buyoya's UPRONA would not. An unconstitutional delay in handover would be equivalent to a third coup by the president<sup>8</sup> and collapse the peace process. Pierre Buyoya himself is unlikely to support such a scenario in view of the regional and international condemnation that it would generate.

Secondly, all countries of the region involved in the process except possibly Rwanda would be likely to strongly oppose a delay. Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa want to see Burundian leaders respect their words and make a success out of the Arusha agreement. Thirdly, one aim of the peace process is to build institutions and fight the personalisation of politics. Buyoya himself represents no guarantee for reform of the security services. His personal authority over the army and hardline opponents of reforms is likely to wither as the date of the changeover approaches. Deployment of the African Mission as well as a strong Joint Ceasefire Commission are better guarantees to implementation than the personal authority of any individual. Finally, the best way to stop the war is to address its root causes.

The international community should speak with one voice and strongly support the changeover in order to lessen the risks to the best chance Burundi has had for peace since the war started. Momentum must be created to push forward the ceasefire negotiations and to implement the Arusha as much as possible by 1 May. The engagement of the international community must include provision of financial aid, but it must not be limited to this. It must keep implementation on track and ensure that the changeover takes place as scheduled.

Even the rebel movements are requesting sustained international engagement. "We request Burundians and the international community to support the process and accompany it until a mechanism leading to peace, democracy and integral development is established", stated the CNDD-FDD Secretary General at a press conference on 5 December 2002.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> For an early analysis of the transition, see ICG Africa Report N°46, *Burundi: After Six months of Transition: Continuing the War or Winning the Peace?*, 24 May 2002.

<sup>6</sup> ICG interviews, officers of the Burundian army, Bujumbura January 2003.

<sup>7</sup> ICG interview, UPRONA President, Bujumbura, January 2003.

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<sup>8</sup> Pierre Buyoya took over power in military coups in 1987 and 1996.

<sup>9</sup> Agence France-Presse, 5 December 2002.



## 2. The return of former fighters and refugees to a desperate situation

The signature of the ceasefire agreement is only the beginning of a process. The end to the war requires the reintegration of an estimated 70,000 former combatants and 1.2 million Burundians who have taken refuge in other countries or in Burundi itself. The program for reforming the army outlined in the Arusha Accord requires the disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, resettlement or repatriation (DDRRR) of rebels and soldiers alike. The World Bank estimates that the disarmament and reintegration of combatants will cost \$90 million over four years, most of which is needed in the first year and a half.<sup>10</sup> In addition, immediate measures are also essential to create jobs and build infrastructure. The Secretary General of the CNDD-FDD expressed his concern for the demobilisation of what he said were 85,000 soldiers, militia and armed rebels: "These people must be helped, otherwise Burundi will emerge from civil war into a nation with a very high level of crime and insecurity".<sup>11</sup> The money is not yet available, and the programs have not been adequately prepared.

In addition to the former combatants, communities will have to take in approximately 1.2 million citizens who have been displaced from their homes. Over 693,000 have fled to neighbouring countries, 388,000 live in camps inside Burundi, and some 200,000 have taken refuge in other villages or homes.<sup>12</sup> Even during the heavier fighting in 2002, almost 53,000 refugees returned to Burundi to resettle. Although the transitional government and UNHCR have established systems to reintegrate those who have already returned, these are not robust enough to accommodate all refugees, or monitor their reintegration. In addition, there are no significant government structures to reintegrate or support the almost 600,000 who are internally displaced.

While the returning combatants, refugees and IDPs need special assistance to help them reintegrate into society, their survival fundamentally depends on the social and economic development of their

communities and the state itself. Economic and social infrastructure has dramatically eroded, with the destruction of an estimated 391 primary schools (28 percent), 32 secondary schools, and 88 health centres (42 percent) since 1993.<sup>13</sup> The direct impact on welfare has been disastrous. Burundi ranks only above Sierra Leone and Niger in the 2002 United Nations human development index, for example, while 233 out of 1,000 children die before the age of five. The public infrastructure that does exist or has been reconstructed is concentrated in eight provinces where 45 per cent of the population lives, leaving those that have suffered the most violence, destruction, and displacement with the fewest resources.

Between 1993 and 2001 the country's real GDP fell by 20 percent. The world price of coffee, traditionally 90 per cent of Burundi's export revenues, fell from U.S.\$3,460 in the 1980s to U.S.\$1,370 in 2001.<sup>14</sup> Burundi's annual production of the commodity fell to 18,000 tons in 2000 from 36,800 a year between 1992 and 1996.<sup>15</sup> Foreign exchange decreased dramatically from U.S.\$300 million in 1993 to U.S.\$48 million in 1999 – only enough to cover one month of imports in 2002. Over 30 per cent of the state's resources went to defence in 2001.<sup>16</sup>

In 2002, an increased war effort, steadily decreasing foreign exchange reserves, external debt servicing that equaled 99 per cent of state export revenues, a 20 per cent fall in coffee production, and high inflation compounded by a 20 per cent devaluation of the Burundian Franc left the economy in a desperate situation and the state unable to pay public servants.<sup>17</sup> In mid-2002, a nation-wide strike of primary and secondary school teachers was followed

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<sup>10</sup> Country Department 9, Environmental, Rural and Social Development Department, Africa Region, "Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration", The World Bank (Washington, D.C., 25 March 2002), p. 54.

<sup>11</sup> Agence France-Presse, 5 December 2002.

<sup>12</sup> Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Burundi (S/2002/1259).

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<sup>13</sup> Ministry of Planning, Development and Reconstruction, "National Reconstruction Program by the Burundian Government", October 2002.

<sup>14</sup> Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Burundi (S/2002/1259).

<sup>15</sup> International Development Association, "Program Document for a Proposed Economic Rehabilitation Credit in the Amount of SDR 40.8 Million to the Republic of Burundi", The World Bank (Washington, D.C., August 2002), p. 6.

<sup>16</sup> Statement by the IMF Staff Representative, Donor Conference on Burundi, Geneva, 27-28 November 2002.

<sup>17</sup> See report by the Government of the Republic of Burundi, "Recent Economic Situation and Reforms for Stabilization and Economic Recovery", presented at the Roundtable Conference, Geneva, 27-28 November 2002. The cost of external debt financing was 99.4 per cent of goods and non-factor services (GNFS) exports in 2002.

by riots by out-of-school students, and strike threats from other public service sectors.

The people have also suffered extreme physical and psychological trauma from both sides in the conflict. In the second half of 2002, there was a marked increase in civilian massacres committed by the army, with more than 173 killed in just one incident in Itaba commune on 9 September. At the same time, rebels have killed dozens of civilians through “attacks, ambushes, and assassinations of local officials”, while looting homes, destroying crops and public infrastructure, firing mortar shells into major cities, and forcibly recruiting children.<sup>18</sup> The UN Secretary General warned in his 2002 report on Burundi: “These abuses have the capacity to undermine the entire peace process and to ignite more vicious, ethnic based violence.”<sup>19</sup>

### 3. The risks of international disengagement

What if Burundi’s fragile peace process succumbs to the chaos and doubt surrounding it? What if donors decide that they will not support a peace that “Burundians themselves don’t seem to want,” as one member of the donor community said.<sup>20</sup> It is true that some Burundians do not want peace, since they benefit from the *status quo*, including the war. Yet, the fact that there is dissent to the peace process is not a viable excuse for disengagement. After a negotiated ending to a civil war, domestic opinion often is divided between supporters and hardliners who would prefer a return to armed conflict.<sup>21</sup>

It does not take much imagination to see that failure of the peace process could be catastrophic. Following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, international attention focused on preventing the same disaster in Burundi – a hypothesis to which George W. Bush reportedly responded, “Not on my watch”.<sup>22</sup> Much more likely, however, would be a scenario in which the war continued to erode the already weakened state and escalated to a full-blown conflict with repercussions for the entire Great Lakes Region, including even greater suffering in Burundi.

“Personally, I would venture that Burundi today is the most preoccupying country in the Great Lakes region in terms of insecurity”, World Bank spokesman Raymond Toyé told reporters when he announced a U.S.\$54 million economic rehabilitation loan. “Therefore it is of the greatest concern to all parties to get the region back to civilian business and peaceful economic development”.<sup>23</sup> A failure would certainly affect the peace process in the neighbouring Congo, for example by destroying the prospect of sustainable DDRRR and local reconciliation programs for armed groups (Congolese, Rwandan and Burundian alike) operating on DRC territory.

### B. WHY IS ‘RESPONSIBLE’ AID NECESSARY?

Since the early 1970s, a small Tutsi elite has controlled economic, political, and military power in Burundi. Until the late 1980s, the international community turned a blind eye to the violent and discriminatory tactics it used to govern. But donors began to change their strategies toward the end of the Cold War, testing out sanctions and incentives. Following a spate of ethnic killings in 1988, continued non-humanitarian assistance was made contingent upon political and economic reforms. Although these reforms led to democratic elections in 1993, rushed and superficial implementation elicited a backlash from those interested in maintaining the status quo. Massive ethnic violence and chaos ensued after army officers assassinated the elected Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye on 21 October 1993.

In 1996, after the second coup staged by Pierre Buyoya, Burundi’s neighbours instituted economic sanctions aimed at pushing the country toward peace. International aid was reduced by two-thirds, from an average of U.S.\$247 million between 1981 and 1995 to U.S.\$76 million between 1996 and 2000. The resumption of international cooperation at earlier levels was promised as an incentive for peace.

Bilateral and multilateral donors, the United Nations, and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are powerful actors in Burundi. They have had both a positive and negative impact and in some instances become enmeshed in the conflict. They must not repeat their mistakes. They must do away with the “on again, off again” approach employed

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<sup>18</sup> Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, “Burundi: Escalating Violence Demands Attention”, November 2002.

<sup>19</sup> Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Burundi (S/2002/1259).

<sup>20</sup> ICG interviews, U.S. State Department, Washington, December 2002.

<sup>21</sup> Boyce, op. cit., p. 32.

<sup>22</sup> ICG interviews, U.S. State Department, Washington, December 2002.

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<sup>23</sup> IRIN Great Lakes News, “Burundi: World Bank loan for economic rehabilitation”, 4 September 2002.

during the past 30 years in Burundi.<sup>24</sup> A significant increase in development and reconstruction aid must not support consolidation of a violent discriminatory state or superficial reforms.

### 1. The violent discriminatory state

International aid failed to significantly challenge one of the primary tools of state discrimination in Burundi – the monopolisation of access to aid and its dividends by urban Tutsis in general and the ruling elite in particular. For most of the past 30 years, Burundi has been governed by a small group of Tutsi elite from a single commune (Rutovu), a single region (Bururi), and a single clan (Hima – Tutsi).<sup>25</sup> The mechanisms for maintaining power were the control of state subsidies, the coffee market and other key imports and the military. During the 1980s President Bagaza put in place education policies to ensure his supporters access to education, which opened the door to high-level military and political positions, and blatant discrimination against the Hutu masses. These policies were blindly supported by international aid. Military-financial networks were established to ensure that those in power maintained their hold on the state's resources. No business or bank could be created unless it was sponsored by Mwaro Province (money), Bururi (political power) and Ijenda (technocrats).

Violence was used by the state to maintain control, and by both Hutus and Tutsis fighting against the state. Hundreds of thousands, mainly Hutus, died in the massacres of 1965, 1969, 1972 and 1988. Tens of thousands of Tutsis paid with their lives for the assassination of the Hutu president Ndadaye in 1993. Over 250,000 people have been killed in the civil war.

Until the late 1980s, the grants and loans that accounted for over 80 per cent of total investment were disbursed with few conditions.<sup>26</sup> As the Cold

War ended, donors began to use Burundi as a test case to see how international assistance could be applied as both a carrot and a stick to promote change. In 1988, ethnic killing broke out in Kirundo Province, leaving over 15,000 dead, the majority at the hands of Tutsi-dominated government forces. For the first time, the international community threatened to withdraw financial assistance if substantial political and military reforms were not implemented. A statement by the U.S. House of Representatives urged “the President and Secretary of State to conduct a comprehensive reassessment of the United States’ bilateral relationship with the Government of Burundi with a view toward the immediate suspension of US assistance (other than humanitarian aid) unless...” a series of reforms were carried out.<sup>27</sup>

The donor community used its combined financial and political influence to push for political reforms that would include Hutus in government and hold the military more accountable. President Buyoya, who had come to power in a coup only one year earlier, proved a willing partner. He immediately announced a policy of “national unity” and began including Hutus in the government and administration. He even appointed a Hutu prime minister. Yet these were superficial reforms. He did not attempt the structural changes that would ensure their success.

Scholars have observed that:

International actors unanimously supported the rushed pseudo-democratisation of the country without attention to the security issues that majoritarian elections under universal suffrage would pose for a divided society like Burundi. They seemed to assume that holding democratic elections would produce democratic politics... The elections rapidly and officially weakened the established means for regulating

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<sup>24</sup> Boyce, op. cit., p. 9, states that “[T]he pledges of aid after a peace accord are conditional from their very inception: the signing of the accord itself is a precondition for the aid. The subsequent disbursement of aid is also inherently conditional, insofar as a resumption of progress toward peace would jeopardize new aid commitments. The aim of peace conditionality is to move beyond these limited choices, in which the aid tap is either ‘on’ or ‘off’, and to link the flow of aid more closely to movement towards a lasting peace”.

<sup>25</sup> See ICG Central Africa Report, N°13, *The Mandela Effect: Prospects for Peace in Burundi*, 18 April 2000.

<sup>26</sup> See ICG Burundi Report, N°4, *Burundi: Proposals for the Resumption of Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation*, 4 May 1999.

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<sup>27</sup> Quoted in Lemarchand, *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide* (Cambridge, 1994) pp. 129-130. The conditions listed by the U.S. House of Representatives were: “(a) an impartial enquiry...has been initiated to determine the causes of the outbreaks of violence; (b) the Government of Burundi has taken steps to investigate and prosecute those military and administrative officials and private individuals responsible for the recent atrocities...(c) the Government of Burundi has made substantial progress in promoting the safe return to their homes of Burundi refugee populations...(d) the Government of Burundi continues to assure foreign journalists and international humanitarian relief organisations free access to the areas affected by recent violence”. Official Development Assistance from the United States Government increased from U.S.\$ 4 million in 1988 to U.S.\$ 22 million in 1990.

the ways by which Burundi politics, as well as economic and social opportunities, could be pursued.<sup>28</sup>

On 21 October 1993, less than five months after he was democratically elected, Burundi's first Hutu president was murdered.

In addition to the push for democracy, donors attempted to open up Burundi's closed economy. Within the framework of the World Bank's Structural Adjustment Programs, financial support was made contingent upon reforms to strengthen the currency, privatise state enterprises, and diversify exports beyond tea and coffee.<sup>29</sup> Resistance to change by the economic and military elite and the outbreak of violence in 1993 left these reforms incomplete. Prices and import policies were liberalised, but the structure of the economy did not change, and the pool of people who benefited from the state's resources was not significantly deepened.

In an attempt to remove political and economic power from the hands of the elite, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Zaire and Ethiopia imposed an embargo on Burundi in July 1996. Unfortunately, it did not achieve its intended objectives, but resulted instead in the further consolidation of the economy in the hands of the oligarchy. The three-year embargo (1996-1999) stimulated development of a strong illicit economy benefiting those with access to political power and military protection. The distinction between public and private resources was increasingly difficult to make. Corruption and embezzlement became the norm. The licit economy deteriorated badly, harming the poorest the most.

More Hutus are in high-level government positions as a result of the various reforms but the *status quo* has not significantly changed. Hutus are still prohibited from occupying high-level posts in the military, and those that do have access to political or financial power have made few changes to the established system. However, with increased political power sharing, it has become clear that the Burundian conflict is primarily between those who have access to state power and all its benefits, and those who do not, a distinction not solely of ethnicity.

## 2. Powerful international actors

The international community has not exercised its full strength in the face of Burundi's tragedy. Much bilateral and budgetary support has not been based on a solid assessment of its impact. The UN has lost much of its independence in the country and is unable to effectively protect the rights of the people. International NGOs have saved many lives but also weakened the capacity of communities and the state.

*Bilateral and budgetary support – out of touch with reality.* Despite the steady increase in international aid until the early 1990s, per capita income remained static. The financial and technical assistance provided by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and such bilateral donors as France, Belgium, Germany, the U.S. and EU should have led to a higher growth rate and wider distribution of state revenue, but in real terms the population saw little benefit, and the oligarchy gained more power.

World Bank and IMF policies, for the most part backed by other bilateral donors, emphasised macro-economic growth. They were not accompanied by complementary efforts to increase the productivity of the population, or assess their effect on the livelihood of Burundi's people. The state-managed coffee industry, heavily supported by all donors as the primary source of foreign exchange, was viewed by many peasants as a crop that they were forced to farm while receiving only 30 per cent of the profits from the state company OCIBU. Budgetary and project support allocated directly through the government was not backed by adequate mechanisms to assess the need for budgetary allocations, monitor implementation, or evaluate results.

By dealing solely with the state, international aid reinforced state control over the economy and indirectly supported the unbalanced distribution of resources and discriminatory policies that consolidated power in the hands of the elite. To support the transition from war to peace, bilateral donors and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) must challenge their traditional top-down development programming and free market doctrine and institute programs suited to Burundi. These must focus on redistributing aid benefits and consider the impact on political and social stability, not only the economy. Bilateral and multilateral donors must also take on the responsibility of overseeing implementation through targeted peace conditionality – “formal peace criteria or informal policy dialogue that make aid conditional on efforts by recipients to

<sup>28</sup> Lund, Rubin and Hara, “Learning from Burundi's Failed Democratic Transition, 1993-1996”, in *Cases and Strategies for Preventive Action*, Twentieth Century Fund/Council on Foreign Relations (New York, 1998), pp. 63, 80.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 61.

implement peace accords and consolidate the peace”.<sup>30</sup>

It is no longer appropriate to use aid as a blanket sanction or incentive. A more nuanced approach must be developed. Donors need to honour their commitments to Burundi, at the same time as they demand that the government honours its commitments in the peace accords.

*United Nations – Loss of independence.* The UN agencies have continued to support Burundi throughout the war. They provided technical assistance and staff to help to keep the government functioning, often seeming to take on more responsibility for the functioning of the country than the government did. The UN and international NGOs also ensured that emergency assistance was delivered directly to the people and carried out limited advocacy for their protection.

In order to function during the war, the UN also relinquished much of its independence, becoming dependent on the government for security and staff survival. The head offices of all international organisations are in Bujumbura, which the army heavily protects from the rebels who encircle the city. In response to the murder of staff members in 1999, all UN field missions are now accompanied by army escorts, a sight that does not comfort a population that has greatly suffered at the hands of the military. The UN and international NGOs have employed a remarkable number of local staff (heavily Tutsi), with very close, often familial, links to the government. Within most agencies there are links to what can be likened to a Burundian mafia, the same group that has run the country for 30 years.

Combined with broader confusion among staff and UN Member States as to whether the role of the UN is to protect the state or its people, these close alliances with the government and the dependence on the army have hindered the UN’s capacity to hold the government accountable for guarding its citizens’ rights. The UN agencies have also had very minimal contact with the rebel groups, even after the beginning of ceasefire talks, creating a clear impression of partiality in the conflict. In a context of increased international aid, the imbalances of the past threaten to twist UN efforts again into an agent of conflict.

To support Burundi’s transition from war to peace, UN agencies must decrease their reliance on the government for security and consult all belligerents to design their programs, strengthen their capacity to support and monitor the implementation of the peace accords, advocate openly and strongly for protection of the Burundian people, and link operational and political approaches together through the development of a common analysis and a common voice.

*International NGOs – Weakening the state and the community.* International non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have represented the sole direct and constant point of contact between the international community and the Burundian population. During the past ten years of violence, while government energy has been focused on fighting a war, international NGOs have taken increasing responsibility for providing social services and have become the primary implementers of bilateral donor and UN programs.

The majority of the 57 international NGOs operating in Burundi are humanitarian in mandate and approach, placing their emphasis on the delivery of immediate assistance to communities rather than building capacity of either the people or the government. Humanitarian assistance has undoubtedly been necessary but the absence of community development or capacity building has had the adverse effect of creating a population accustomed to handouts and steadily losing its ability to care for itself in deteriorating circumstances.

Some humanitarian NGOs have begun to implement more sustainable programs but these are rarely accompanied by sufficient planning or capacity building. Although the strategy of using international NGOs to bypass the government and deliver assistance directly to the population has saved many lives, a chaotic situation now exists on the ground. A plethora of overlapping and uncoordinated interventions do not necessarily respond to real needs. As one international worker commented, “After ten years of this, we are beginning to do some harm”.<sup>31</sup>

To support Burundi’s transition from war to peace, international NGOs must openly acknowledge when they have the capacity to implement programs and when they do not. Humanitarian NGOs should not be charged with implementing community capacity building and reconstruction programs simply

<sup>30</sup> Boyce, op. cit., p. 71.

<sup>31</sup> ICG interview, Bujumbura, July 2002.

because there is no one else. In general, humanitarian intervention cannot make up for the absence of more sustainable programs, and an attempt to do this may lead to failure. International NGOs must give up some autonomy and begin to feed into the development and reconstruction programs that are being prepared by the government and UN agencies. In addition, a more unified NGO community would be able to defend itself against mounting attacks by the government, which believes that NGOs are taking away its money.

### III. FROM PEACE-MAKING TO PEACEBUILDING: THE KEY INTERNATIONAL ROLE

*We stressed that the long history of inter-communal conflict was due to a fierce competition over very scarce resources that were accessible mainly through control of state power... Our commitment to seeing this conference come about is due to our belief that the political progress needs to be accompanied and reinforced by social and economic progress. It must be made possible for the people of Burundi to materially distinguish between the destructiveness of conflict and the benefits of peace.*

Nelson Mandela<sup>32</sup>

Each stage of Burundi's recent history has been simultaneously pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict; requiring actions oriented toward prevention of future conflict, peacemaking oriented toward the present conflict, and peacebuilding aimed at preventing the re-emergence of past conflict and ensuring the success of the peace processes underway.<sup>33</sup> A multi-dimensional program is therefore necessary for successful transition from war to peace. A 1998 UN Appeal for constructive donor engagement in Burundi cited a meeting of the UN Economic and Social Council that:

...recognised that the phases of relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development are generally not consecutive, but occur simultaneously. The Council recommended that a comprehensive approach be developed for countries in crisis, in which key aspects of recovery, peacebuilding, human rights, economic growth and sustainable development are included.<sup>34</sup>

The negotiators of the Arusha Agreement understood this comprehensive approach. Based on a solid analysis of the conflict, summarised by Protocol I, Arusha outlines measures to address the past causes through social and economic reforms; end the current

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<sup>32</sup> Nelson Mandela, Donors Conference on Burundi, Paris, 6-7 December 2000.

<sup>33</sup> Barnett R. Rubin, *Blood on the Doorstep: The Politics of Preventive Action* (New York, 2002) p. 133.

<sup>34</sup> Referring to a July 1998 meeting of the Economic and Social Council in "Choosing Hope: The Case for Constructive Engagement in Burundi", United Nations Resident Coordinator System in Burundi, p. 19.

violence and chaos through a ceasefire and political and institutional reforms; and reconstruct the physical and social fabric of the country through reconciliation, reintegration of war-affected populations and reconstruction of infrastructure. Protocol IV on Reconstruction and Development combines these actions into a comprehensive framework to make the peace agreement's "principles and fundamental ideas operational and concrete".<sup>35</sup> The former include equal distribution of the state's resources and creation a government that can protect the rights of its people through decentralised governance and respect for human rights. Protocol IV outlines coordination and decision-making mechanisms to allow the necessary diplomatic, institutional reform, humanitarian, reconstruction, and development efforts to take place simultaneously, with the strong support of the international community.<sup>36</sup>

Although the transitional government has used Protocol IV as a guideline for its recent programs, the international community has largely ignored it. At the Geneva Donors Conference in December 2001, the Canadian representative appealed for its use as the basis for reconstruction and development – "Months were spent negotiating the principles found therein and it is important that we ensure that Protocol IV is implemented".<sup>37</sup>

The international community is charged with overseeing Arusha's implementation under the UN-led Implementation Monitoring Committee. Donors committed to rebuilding Burundi prior to signature of the agreement in 2000, and reconfirmed their commitment with a pledge of U.S.\$1.1 billion during three subsequent conferences. By November 2002, however, Burundi reported that donors had released only 20 per cent of the promised resources. Donors in turn have expressed their disillusionment with the peace process and a transitional government that is reluctant to implement the agreement that put it in power.

## A. PROMISES OF AID

The international community has been instrumental in pushing the peace process forward. It urged

President Buyoya's national unity policy following the outbreak of ethnic violence in 1988. After the assassination of President Ndadaye in 1993, it threatened to withdraw aid if the army officers responsible did not relinquish power. Under the leadership of the Secretary General's Special Representative, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, it negotiated a power sharing agreement (the Convention of Government) in 1994 that failed as violence increased along with mounting Hutu and Tutsi extremism. The effort at dialogue nonetheless continued.<sup>38</sup>

The peace process was officially turned over to the regional heads of state<sup>39</sup> led by Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere, at the Cairo Summit in 1995, though the international community continued to support the ensuing negotiation process financially and provide political pressure behind the scenes. When regional states imposed an embargo in 1996, the international community followed and responded to escalating violence by reducing aid from U.S.\$242 million in 1995 to \$51 in 1997. As noted the embargo stifled the normal economy but created a strong illicit economy that strengthened already rich businessmen connected to the regime.

When Nelson Mandela took over as facilitator of the peace process in January 1999, he emphasised the importance of unified regional and international support. Donors had to commit the resources necessary to rebuild the country once an agreement was reached since the conflict was essentially rooted in social and economic inequality and desperation. At the beginning of his negotiation, he reminded the Security Council, "the failure of those responsible to provide conditions of security and social development to the people of Burundi does not represent some errant occurrence on the periphery. This hits at the heart of our common human obligation".<sup>40</sup> At the February 2000 summit in Arusha, high-level leaders of the U.S., France, Belgium and the UK pledged to support economic and social reconstruction once

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<sup>35</sup> Austrian Delegation, Donors Conference on Burundi, Geneva, 2001.

<sup>36</sup> See Appendix B for a summary of the contents of Protocol IV.

<sup>37</sup> Declaration of the Canadian Delegation, Donors Conference on Burundi, Geneva, 6-7 December 2001.

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<sup>38</sup> See ICG Africa Report N°23, *Burundi: les enjeux du débat. Partis politiques, liberté de la presse et prisonniers politiques*, 12 July 2000.

<sup>39</sup> Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Zambia, Cameroon, Zimbabwe, and South Africa.

<sup>40</sup> Speech by Nelson Mandela to the Security Council, 19 January 2000.

there was a peace agreement.<sup>41</sup>

Many of the parties, including the government, felt that they were forced to the negotiating table. The disintegrating economy and the promise of aid once a viable peace agreement was reached left them with no choice. They believed that their reward would come when promised almost U.S.\$450 million at the Paris donors conference in December 2000, a few months after the Arusha Agreement. But the transitional government has been very disappointed in the slow delivery of the money. In the three roundtables held since the signature of the Arusha Agreement, the donors have pledged a total of U.S.\$1.1 billion, but only one-fifth has actually been delivered, according to government figures.<sup>42</sup>

The donor community liked the idea of peace and was willing to provide pressure to push the process forward but is now reluctant to fully support implementation of the peace agreement. “We wanted to believe it could be done but we can’t be forced to believe it anymore”, said one donor referring to peace in Burundi.<sup>43</sup> This is mainly due to the continuation of fighting, the fact that the transition government has not been implementing the reforms in the agreement and evidence of corruption in the government of transition. The level of donor representation has steadily decreased with each roundtable. Donors do not seem fully willing or certain how to honour their commitments.

Since the signature of the ceasefire agreement, there have been a multitude of appeals from the transitional government, the Security Council, and the regional countries, among others, for donors to release the promised funds, but the deadlock has yet to be broken.

## **B. THE DEADLOCK BETWEEN THE DONOR COMMUNITY AND THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT**

Obvious tension has resulted between a donor community that seems to be waiting for progress in order to support peace, and a government that is waiting for money in order to make progress:

The government is angry that the international community has not yet released the promised funds. Mandela pushed them to sign the Arusha Agreement with the understanding and the promise that they would receive the money. Now they are angry because the funds haven’t come through and the economy is falling apart, and they do not know how to hold together the transitional government or the state without this money.<sup>44</sup>

### **1. Can unclear promises be broken?**

The first Donor Roundtable was held in Paris in December 2000, the second in Geneva in 2001. At both the transitional government presented plans it hoped donors would fund: a Priority Program for the Transitional Period (2001-2003) for U.S.\$ 1,454 billion, the National Action Plan for the Fight against HIV/AIDS (2002-2006) for U.S.\$233 million, and the plan for national debt relief (2001-2005) for U.S.\$307.7 million. This added up to a total request of almost U.S.\$2 billion, significantly more than the U.S.\$ 832 million donors promised. At the third conference, in Geneva, 27-28 November 2002, the government produced an emergency social program for U.S.\$982 million, U.S.\$100 million over the amount already promised, in hopes that donors would at least release what they had already pledged.

The U.S.\$832 million pledged at the first two conferences included only a few contributions in line with government programs. The majority were for humanitarian assistance already earmarked for Burundi, unfrozen development aid or other projects not included in the government’s plans, such as DDRRR and support for the South African Protection Force. The government had also hoped that the increased assistance would be allocated directly to budgetary assistance, as it had been before the war. Although some direct budgetary assistance was promised, most pledges were to go through international NGOs or UN agencies.

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<sup>41</sup> See ICG Central Africa Report, N°13, *The Mandela Effect: Prospects for Peace in Burundi*, 18 April 2000.

<sup>42</sup> Between the first two conferences in 2000 and 2001, U.S.\$832 million was pledged, only 20 per cent of which, the government said, had been received at the time of the third donors conference in November 2002. At that conference, donors committed to a total of U.S.\$905 million, the vast majority of which was money pledges at the previous two conferences but not yet released.

<sup>43</sup> ICG interviews, Nairobi, November 2002.

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<sup>44</sup> ICG interview, Bujumbura, July 2002.



At the donor conference in November 2002, the government asserted that only 20 percent of the pledges promised had actually been received but no one is certain of the accuracy of the amounts either pledged or received. The absence of a uniform budget and proper accounting mechanisms has meant that the government has no way of assuring that all humanitarian assistance provided by donors directly to NGOs is actually included in its calculations. Donor pledges gave little indication of their time frame for disbursement or specific programs that would be supported.

## **2. Why the delay?**

“The fact that this conference is taking place should also clearly signal to them that progress and development shall not wait for their (the rebels’) approval”, Nelson Mandela reminded the Paris donors conference.<sup>45</sup> Although most donors agreed with this perspective, the reality of applying it has been a different story. One of the few bilateral donors prepared to renew full cooperation, and provide funds directly through the government, commented that it had to cancel two assessment missions in mid-2002 that were necessary for preparation of programs and release of funds because of increased fighting. “We want cooperation with Burundi to resume, but we do not want [our citizens] to get killed in the process”, a senior diplomat commented.<sup>46</sup>

Initially, donors made the release of non-humanitarian funds contingent upon establishment of the transitional government and its participation in ceasefire negotiations. Once the transitional government was established on 1 November 2001, donors who had not already developed their programs began to do so, at which time it became more evident that the government was not prepared to absorb and transparently manage the new influx of funds. The reintegration, reconstruction and development plans outlined in Protocol IV did not exist.

A donor commented:

The government is looking for direct lump sum assistance, and does not want any conditionality. They seem to think that if they keep on asking for it, then the donors will come

around. They won’t come around. There is no other option than to have more accountability.<sup>47</sup>

Although the EU had already released €12 million in budgetary assistance, most donors waited for the IMF to approve a post-conflict program and enforce accompanying monetary and fiscal reforms. They were particularly concerned about controlled exchange rate practices, speculation on coffee income and the increase of military expenditures. The IMF had been reluctant to develop such a program while fighting continued. Targeted lobbying by the Security Council, France, Belgium and Germany, and a choice by the U.S. and other donors not to block the program, led to a change in policy. On 9 October 2002 the IMF Board approved an emergency post-conflict assistance loan of U.S.\$13 million to support balance of payments, giving the green light for disbursement of budgetary assistance by other donors.

In response to the ceasefire agreements, donors have shown increased readiness to support peacebuilding. One important example is the EU donation of €500,000 to distribute food aid to 14,000 CNDD-FDD fighters over a one-month period. This was intended to support ceasefire implementation by guaranteeing that “that the arms of [a] few thousand hungry men do not lead to violence and retribution, which risk jeopardising the peace process”.<sup>48</sup> The first food distribution took place on 29 December 2002, allocated through the World Food Program and distributed by the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ). It shows unprecedented engagement between donors and rebel groups, using aid as incentive for peace.

## **3. Seeking dividends for faking change**

In the year since the transitional government was inaugurated, the political elite has been enlarged to include a representative number of Hutus and Tutsis, who are competing for the state’s resources. The government has concentrated on jockeying for posts, trying to get donors to resume cooperation, and fighting to win a war, not developing or implementing a transitional program. A senior official in the ministry of planning said:

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<sup>47</sup> ICG interview, Bujumbura, July 2002.

<sup>48</sup> Comment by Poul Nielson, European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Assistance, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Burundi, Burundi Humanitarian Update, December 2002, p. 2.

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<sup>45</sup> Nelson Mandela, at the Donors Conference on Burundi, Paris, 11-12 December 2000..

<sup>46</sup> ICG interview, Nairobi, August 2002.

Burundian political parties have no programs. This is the problem. People are more concerned about good jobs rather than building the nation. Political parties are a means for the achievement of individual political ambitions, not for the reconstruction of the country.<sup>49</sup>

Government officials launch unified calls for resumption of international cooperation but compete over who will control the money. A delegation of 40 was sent to Washington in July/August 2002 to negotiate the post-conflict program with the IMF. The Hutu vice president, who oversees the poverty reduction process, was denied his request to attend, eliciting the comment from observers that reconstruction was about building a company called Buyoya Ltd., not about constructing a state.<sup>50</sup>

The new Hutu members of government are waiting to access state resources while the Tutsi oligarchy tries to maintain control. Both groups have a common interest in resisting reforms that would increase accountability or distribute more resources directly to the people. For those in the government who want to implement reforms, there is a sense of disempowerment. A senior official complained that the government was doing nothing on Arusha. The response of one donor was, "You are the government, why aren't you doing anything?"<sup>51</sup>

Burundian public servants have historically been accorded great prestige and respect, if only because of their capacity to employ people and control resources that the vast majority of the population never dreams of accessing. Nonetheless, civil service does not bring with it the obligation to serve the public. This perspective has been increased by the short duration – eighteen months – of appointments in the transitional government. Most officials are primarily concerned with bringing the dividends of peace to themselves, not their people. The recent strike of primary and secondary school teachers was one of the first direct demands placed on the government by a major constituency for delivery of promised benefits. Yet, a prominent Hutu leader expressed frustration that the union had waited until Hutus were in government to demand overdue

salaries, assuming that Hutus would be more able and willing to provide the money.<sup>52</sup>

More recently, concerns have been raised within the Implementation and Monitoring Committee for the Arusha Agreement over the content of the law instituting the National Commission on Refugees and *Sinistrés* (internally displaced persons).<sup>53</sup> The law voted in parliament put the commission (known as the CNRS) under the supervision of the Ministry for Reconstruction instead of guaranteeing its independence as earmarked in the Arusha Agreement, and the exact terms of this supervision as well as the structural organisation and composition of the commission are unclear. The CNRS will preside over allocation of massive financial resources in the process of refugee repatriation and reintegration. It is essential that strong and transparent governance mechanisms are entrenched within it if it is to be trusted both by refugees and donors. The necessary clarifications have to be made urgently by the government.

#### **4. The incapacity of absorption – Nowhere for the money to go?**

The capacity of the government to manage resources and implement effective programs has greatly decreased as a result of the long war, the three years of embargo, the absence of training or capacity building of government employees, and the withdrawal of international cooperation.

As confirmed recently by the Ministry of Good Governance, "Embezzlement and corruption are prevalent".<sup>54</sup> During the embargo, the exceptional practice of allocating the state budget to a separate account needing only a ministerial signature for release became the norm. Businessmen regularly underreported receipts and bribed state accountants. Exchange rate policies were controlled and geared to provide more resources for the well-connected. Intimidation of national and international staff who tried to expose corruption caused many to flee the country.

The government lacks the information and analysis necessary for accurate planning, along with the staff capacity to actually monitor programs or assess

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<sup>49</sup> Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), "Burundi: Focus on Women in Government", 11 September 2002.

<sup>50</sup> ICG interviews, Bujumbura, July/August 2002.

<sup>51</sup> ICG interview, Bujumbura, July 2002.

<sup>52</sup> ICG interview, Bujumbura, July 2002.

<sup>53</sup> ICG interviews, members of the IMC, Bujumbura, January 2002.

<sup>54</sup> Radio et Télévision Nationale de Burundi (RTNB), 12 November 2002.

situations on the ground. In addition, once information is available and plans are developed, there is uncertainty as to who can effectively implement the programs. Although UN agencies and NGOs have taken over much of the government's responsibility, they do not have the human resources, operational capacity, or mandate to reconstruct the state.

The implementation of Protocol IV requires that the international community increase its human and financial resources so that it can build the capacity of the state and people to restore Burundi. The IMF and World Bank have already supported the initiation of fiscal and monetary reforms, including a fiscal regulatory system and training of public accountants. Other donors are supporting the training of administrators and other public servants, as well as reconstruction of the health and education systems. Although these initial efforts are important in showing what can be done, they are not nearly enough in the face of enormous needs.

## 5. How to get to the village?

Over the past three years, donors and the government have begun to support reconstruction through a series of community development projects.<sup>55</sup> All these efforts offer a substantial basis for the reconstruction of Burundi and contradict the argument that it cannot be done while fighting continues. Nonetheless, there is little coordination of planning or implementation. Each organisation pursues different mechanisms for decentralisation and requests different degrees of community participation. The counterpart for many initiatives seems to be the Ministry of Reconstruction, rather than the Ministry of Community Development or the minister charged with planning development and reconstruction. The Ministry of Communal

Development was not even aware of the Communal Development Committees that the World Bank and UNDP projects are centred around.<sup>56</sup>

The central government has shown little interest in strengthening decentralised structures. A few ministries have attempted to create community-based committees that provide services and monitor the situation, but these have received little support or guidance from either the government or the international community.<sup>57</sup> Ministry staff responsible for delivering social services lack the time, will, or resources to do monitoring at the community level.

The capacity of government administrators has been weakened by corruption, the absence of investment in training and the cooption of governmental responsibilities by international agencies and NGOs. Government officials openly admit to the discouragement of staff, a high number of whom have been recruited by international NGOs and UN agencies. "There is not the minimum level of functioning necessary to take on the enormous workload", said one ministerial staffer. Average salaries for high-level staff – not raised in years – reach only U.S.\$ 80 a month.

Few structures in Burundian society demand government accountability. All administrators are appointed by the central government. Taxes collected at the commune level are centralised in Bujumbura, leaving no mechanisms to hold officials accountable for the delivery of services to their constituency. Civil society is weak, and communities are fractured and disorganised, unable to unite or express their demands to the government by peaceful means.

Additionally, the communities are left with little will to provide for themselves, much less place demands on their government. A former official said that the years of NGO handouts have weakened the will to work. "In order to have development, you have to have hope", he said. "Not suffering from your circumstances, but knowing that you can take an action to change them". One NGO reoriented its program to create a community development plan

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<sup>55</sup> The World Bank supports the Emergency Reconstruction Project and *Twitzembere*, a reconstruction project based on community participation, and AGETIP, public works with high intensity manual labor; the European Union has developed the Reconstruction Program for Burundi, and UNDP has developed the Program for Community Support (Programme Cadre d'Appui aux Communautés), which is supported by many bilateral donors who cannot give money directly to the government (Switzerland, the Netherlands, Canada, Japan, Germany, Sweden and Finland, among others). In addition, emergency reconstruction and agricultural development are sponsored by the European Union's ECHO, USAID/OFDA, UNHCR, UNICEF, FIDA (Fonds international de développement agricole) and FENU (Fonds d'équipement des Nations Unies) and implemented by international and national NGOs.

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<sup>56</sup> ICG interview, Bujumbura, August 2002.

<sup>57</sup> The Ministry of Social Action and the Promotion of Women has developed Centres for Family Regroupment in eleven provinces; the Minister of Human Rights has developed Provincial Protection Committees in seventeen provinces, and the Ministry of Planning has established Provincial Planning Centres.

because it realised there was no way to develop a micro-credit program with the level of disintegration prevailing at the community level:

Everyone was so used to working in the hierarchical, top down system that they didn't see how it could work another way. This process has proven that communities can develop themselves and their own development plans, which many people thought couldn't happen. They thought that the community was too stupid and didn't know what it needed.<sup>58</sup>

### C. BREAKING THE DEADLOCK FOR PEACE

The international community should not send mixed signals to Burundi that would allow for manipulation of their potential contradictions. Rather, it should speak consistently and with one voice with respect to the positions it takes and the actions it implements.<sup>59</sup>

#### 1. No unity, no vision, no plan

The Arusha peace negotiations succeeded in unifying the international community behind the facilitator, Nelson Mandela. He encouraged leaders of regional states and major Western powers to voice their support for peace openly and jointly, acknowledging their obligation toward Burundi and without being divided by the various political sides.<sup>60</sup> When Mandela handed the peace process over to the UN and the transitional government on 1 November 2001, this unifying force was lost.

In the transition from peace-making to peacebuilding, the international community has lost its way, and found itself without a vision or a coherent framework. Donors and UN agencies have not been able to transfer the solidarity found at Arusha to the implementation phase inside Burundi. Although most donors agree on overall objectives – reconciliation, democracy and prosperity – each uses different strategies and means. The power of the donor community in general and each donor specifically

has greatly dissipated because of the different messages given in terms of who is supported politically, mechanisms for allocation of assistance<sup>61</sup> and conditionality for renewed bilateral cooperation.

Each donor has developed its own strategic framework, often through bilateral discussions with the government but not based on a common analysis of the situation in Burundi or serious consultation with other donors or implementing partners.<sup>62</sup> Although these strategies are loosely based on the analysis behind the Arusha Agreement, each donor has chosen its solution to the conflict based on its own mandate and priorities. Some solutions are contradictory or repetitious. At a coordination meeting in August 2002, five donors realised that they were supporting the same program to strengthen the parliament.<sup>63</sup> There is also the serious risk that the IMF and World Bank macro-economic programs will work against plans to build micro-capacity and productivity if there is not a careful balancing effort.

This absence of international unity has contributed to the stagnation of the peace process. Individuals within the government who seek to implement the reforms outlined in the Arusha Agreement and know that they face great resistance from those in and outside government who do not want change have requested that the international community apply pressure.

The transitional government has developed its own strategies and plans, all of which require the financial and operational support of donors, UN

<sup>58</sup> ICG interview, Bujumbura, July-August 2002.

<sup>59</sup> Recommendation F-1: Immediate and Urgent measures for Burundi, Chapter 5 (Part II): Overall Findings and Recommendations in *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, edited by Howard Adelman and Astrid Surke, Danida, March 1996.

<sup>60</sup> See ICG Report, *Mandela Effect*, op. cit., pp. 23-24 for more information.

<sup>61</sup> Donors are providing some budgetary assistance directly to the government, co-managing project specific assistance with the government in the areas of health and education, using UN agencies to implement community-based programs, using international NGOs to implement humanitarian and expanded humanitarian programs and supporting civil society organisations. If uncoordinated or not based on a coherent strategy, this number of actors creates a chaotic and often ineffective situation.

<sup>62</sup> Bilateral donors have developed their own transitional strategies, with the U.S. government developing three: one for emergencies (OFDA), one for transitional support (OTI) and one for development (USAID). The World Bank has given several emergency loans, and the IMF has an emergency post-conflict program. The European Union has created its transitional support strategy in line with the latest ACP-EU Partnership Agreement. Each UN agency has developed its strategic plan based on its mandate, is working on the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), and has completed the 2003 Consolidated Interagency Appeal for humanitarian assistance.

<sup>63</sup> ICG interviews, Bujumbura, August 2002.

agencies and NGOs.<sup>64</sup> For presentation at the donor conference in Geneva on 27-28 November 2002, it prepared two important strategic plans identified in Protocol IV: the National Reconstruction Program and the Emergency Social Program for the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan (IPRSP). These plans are much more conceptually integrated than those of the international community. But because their execution is dependent on outside help, their implementation risks being chaotic.

The IPRSP is the closest document to an overall strategy developed with a degree of input from the population.<sup>65</sup> It is also the only strategy developed that echoes many Protocol IV priorities; however, it does not openly address the factors that caused the conflict and shows no linkage between the strategy and the implementation capacity of each ministry. It also does not mention that many of its programs are already being implemented by the international community. It is another example of selective Arusha implementation and leaves out some fundamental mechanisms that would help transform the system that led to the conflict in the first place.<sup>66</sup> It is a basis for strategic coordination but does not replace the need for the donor community to develop a joint political and operational strategy to support the transition.

The current debate among donors around how much they can and should engage in building peace ignores their essential role in determining whether peace is built. Delivery of the promised peace dividends would prove that donors are committed to the process. It would offer an important incentive for the CNDD-FDD to join the Arusha process fully and for the FNL to begin negotiations. It would also give donors the clout necessary to pressure the transitional government to make the reforms committed to at Arusha and enable them to establish peace conditionality mechanisms. Implementation of Protocol IV on reconstruction and development

would prepare the way for the return of former combatants, refugees and IDPs to their communities and help them to become constructive actors in a peaceful state. By creating more economic power that could be shared, it would also facilitate bringing new partners into power positions in the government, administration and military. Finally, it would show Burundians that peace can and will actually benefit them and so give them hope for the future.

## **2. Ineffective coordination**

The absence of an overall international vision or framework for supporting the transition from war to peace has made it especially difficult to coordinate implementation of the numerous strategies that exist.

Donor community coordination meetings are irregular, poorly attended and tend to focus more on information sharing than joint strategy development, planning or problem solving. Although UN agencies hold regular coordination meetings, they often concentrate on the debate between relief and development, specific challenges faced by each development sector or administrative issues rather than effective coordination of their various activities or approaches. There is a particularly large gap between the political and operational approaches, which led the Secretary General to call on the various parts of the UN system to “cooperate closely and coordinate their activities with the Chairman of the IMC”.<sup>67</sup> The newly-established Inter-Agency Cell for Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Reconstruction is supporting better planning and coordination among UN agencies, but there is still important work to be done in linking their activities with those of bilateral and multilateral donors and international NGOs.

The greatest coordination effort has been geared toward the 57 international NGOs.<sup>68</sup> Since 1996, they have been the main implementing partners of donors and UN agencies for delivering assistance directly to the population. The UN and international NGO coordination mechanisms play important roles in the existing void but are also based on information

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<sup>64</sup> The transitional government has developed the transitional constitution, the transitional strategy, and strategies and action plans for each sectoral ministry.

<sup>65</sup> The first IPRSP was presented on 11-12 April 2002 in Bujumbura and elaborated upon seven months later in Geneva. Although there was some input from the population, a major donor criticism was that this was not inclusive enough, focusing on administrators rather than the population itself.

<sup>66</sup> If programs reinforce the hierarchical nature of Burundian society, with no participation or reconciliation at the community level, then they will be ineffective in addressing the root causes of the conflict and will not be appropriated by the Burundians themselves.

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<sup>67</sup> Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Burundi, 2002.

<sup>68</sup> The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) organises weekly coordination meetings in Bujumbura and monthly coordination meetings in the provinces. Each UN agency is responsible for monthly meetings for its sector, all of which bring together UN agencies, NGOs and donors.

sharing rather than strategy or joint planning. The Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal, which is supposed to be the main tool for coordination of UN agencies and NGOs, remains a document rather than a comprehensive coordination process.

The government has few effective coordination mechanisms. In line with Protocol IV, the Ministry of Planning has recently outlined creation of two coordination mechanisms: the Inter-Ministerial Monitoring Commission for Economic and Social Policy (CIPES), which will meet every two months, and a permanent support structure, the Inter-Ministerial Cell for Reconstruction and Development (CIRD).<sup>69</sup> Along with the CNRS, these units represent important steps toward increased coordination within the government. Nonetheless, at this point they wield little power or authority.

Donors, UN agencies, international NGOs, and the government all agree that there are serious problems with joint planning and coordination, at the same time as they express their sense of helplessness to change the situation. Yet, ineffective coordination and joint planning have serious repercussions on the entire reconstruction process, wasting the sparse resources available.

### 3. No leadership means no influence

*Peace conditionality – formal performance criteria or informal policy dialogue that makes aid conditional on efforts by recipients to implement peace accords and consolidate the peace – can strengthen the incentives for ending conflict and discourage a return to war.*

James K. Boyce<sup>70</sup>

At the end of August 2002, the government produced a favourable assessment of Arusha

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<sup>69</sup> The National Reconstruction Program recommends the mobilisation of necessary technical and financial resources, clarification of objectives and areas of operation of the large number of international and national participants in the reconstruction process, improvement of the planning process, better collection of data and circulation of information and reinforcement of decentralised structures. This document also clarifies that the Ministry of Repatriation should be the focal point for humanitarian interventions, each sectoral ministry (health, education, etc.) should be charged with projects in its particular area of expertise and the Ministry of Planning should be charged with planning, fundraising, monitoring and evaluation for the reconstruction plan.

<sup>70</sup> Boyce, op. cit., p. 11.

implementation. Out of 58 measures that had been committed to, thirteen were said to have been achieved, 25 were “being implemented” and approximately twenty were not possible without a ceasefire. Because the international community is not closely monitoring implementation, it paid little attention to the fact that important measures were missing from the list or that some of those underway did not include essential principles of the agreement.

In most other prominent peace processes, a donor coordination unit has been established to make policy and ensure that the process is moved forward. The Arusha Agreement gave the Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC) the responsibility to “follow up, monitor, supervise, coordinate and ensure the effective implementation of all the provisions of the Agreement”.<sup>71</sup> The IMC, however, is run by the United Nations Office in Burundi, and does not regularly communicate with the major donors, or even other UN agencies. Nelson Mandela knew that signature of the agreement and inauguration of the transitional institutions were only the beginning of the process and that the most difficult task would be implementing the peace in such a fractured society. He passed the responsibility on to the UN, the donor community and the transitional government but the ball has been dropped.

The donor community must find its voice and establish mechanisms for closely monitoring the implementation of the Arusha Agreement as well as the recent ceasefire agreement, in coordination with other international actors. Donors have the money and so must lead. They need to use Arusha as a guideline for peace conditionality. This strategy would diverge from the traditional donor tactics of sanctions and incentives. It would be more nuanced and engaged, requiring donors to monitor closely all aspects of the peace agreement. They would need to apply pressure as a unified force and develop a targeted strategy of withholding or providing assistance based on compliance with the specific conditions outlined in the agreement.

This will require dialogue with the transitional government, and regular strategy meetings among themselves. It will also require much stronger coordination mechanisms among the UN, NGOs, and sectoral ministries. James Boyce presents four

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<sup>71</sup> Protocol V: Guarantees on Implementation of the Agreement, Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, August 2000.

strategies for following through on agreed “aid-for-peace” bargains between donors and the transitional government: monitoring compliance, redistributing resources, combating corruption, and inter-donor coordination.<sup>72</sup> Burundi now has the basic framework for implementing each of the Arusha strategies; now the donor community has to show the leadership to implement them.

#### **IV. CONCLUSION**

The Parties shall pursue an active, comprehensive and integrated policy of peacebuilding and conflict prevention and resolution within the framework of the Partnership... In post-conflict situations, the Parties shall take all suitable action to facilitate the return to a non-violent, stable and self-sustainable situation. The Parties shall ensure the creation of the necessary links between emergency measures, rehabilitation and development cooperation.”<sup>73</sup>

To have a positive effect on peace in Burundi, the international community must restructure and consolidate its approach, a process that must be led by donors. A donor coordination unit should be established in Bujumbura, and liaise with the transitional government and the Implementation Monitoring Committee to establish a joint strategy for implementing Protocol IV of the Arusha Agreement. In return for assistance, donors should demand reduction in military expenditures and cessation of speculation on coffee income and on monetary exchange. This new approach and joint strategy will help the international community speak with one voice and hold the government to its commitments as the donors hold themselves accountable to their own.

In addition to humanitarian assistance for specific emergencies, the priority programs should include support for the development of plans and the provision of aid for the demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, and the reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons. There is also an urgent need to implement programs to reform the economy, develop community-level social and economic infrastructure, train civil servants, and implement comprehensive reconciliation and justice programs. More details on all these urgent measures are included in Protocol IV of the Arusha Agreement. Yet much of the effectiveness of these programs will be lost if the donor community, UN agencies, and NGOs do not construct an effective framework for their support, and commit to building peace.

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<sup>72</sup> Boyce, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-23.

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<sup>73</sup> Cotonou Partnership Agreement between the members of the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States and the European Communities (European Union) and its member states, Article 11 on peacebuilding policies, conflict prevention and resolution.

The international community holds part of the solution to the Burundi conflict while its lack of engagement forms part of the problem. Even with a ceasefire, marginal violence will continue, as will resistance to change from the oligarchy. Political leadership from the international community is necessary to get over these barriers. The 1 May 2003 changeover is the most important deadline of the whole peace process, and the international community should mobilise to ensure it goes smoothly, with minimal risk of destabilisation.

Responsible aid would consolidate the credibility of the transitional government and become the engine for the reforms outlined in Protocol IV. It would address the structural causes of the conflict and build peace. If donor countries do not provide the full political and financial support necessary to implement Arusha, they can anticipate having to face the consequences of its collapse.

**Nairobi/Brussels, 21 February 2003**





## APPENDIX B

### SUMMARY OF PROTOCOL IV

Protocol IV is based on the following analysis and proposes the following measures:

Through the Burundi Peace Negotiations at Arusha it has been possible to assess how seriously the political and ethnic crisis that has torn Burundi apart since independence has affected Burundian society. Hundreds of thousands of Burundians are refugees, some of them for more than 25 years. Hundreds of thousands more are forced to live in camps where conditions are appalling. There has been widespread destruction of public infrastructure, homes and rental property, commercial centres, etc... The Burundian economy has been badly damaged and is on the verge of bankruptcy. Burundi's population has grown increasingly poor – the number of people living under the poverty threshold exceeds 60 per cent in both rural and urban areas.

All Burundians are aware that a lasting peace is impossible so long as a definitive solution is not found to the problem of refugees and *sinistrés*.<sup>74</sup> Likewise, peace is impossible so long as the country's wealth is not shared equitably. Burundi cannot help the *sinistrés*, rebuild destroyed property and restore its economy without the assistance of the international community. The international community is waiting for a visible political gesture that will reflect the commitment of Burundians to refrain from ever again destroying their own country and their willingness to build the country together and ensure that equity prevails in the sharing and distribution of the country's resources.<sup>75</sup>

#### **1. Rehabilitation and Resettlement of Refugees and *Sinistrés***

The National Commission for the Reintegration of *Sinistrés*, based on a priority plan and a good reintegration policy, is charged with:

- ❑ ensuring the equal distribution of resources for refugees and *sinistrés*;
- ❑ addressing the issue of land through the creation of a sub-commission;
- ❑ conducting a census of the refugee and *sinistrés* populations;
- ❑ the adoption of policies to ensure that in the short, medium or long term there will no longer be anyone living within camps inside the country;
- ❑ making sure that all returning people receive the necessary material support and have adequate access to social services;
- ❑ promoting the participation of the population in resettlement activities; and
- ❑ creating additional reception committees at the community level to ensure that the refugees and *sinistrés* receive the assistance needed and that their rights are protected.

In preparation for the return, the government must organise information and awareness campaigns on mechanisms for peaceful co-existence and the return to *collines* (hills) of origin.

Other vulnerable groups must be protected and receive assistance with rehabilitation and advancement, although a responsible ministry is not designated.<sup>76</sup>

A National Fund for *Sinistrés* will derive its funding from the national budget, grants from bilateral or multilateral agencies and NGOs.

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<sup>74</sup> *Sinistrés* are defined as the over 1 million Burundians who are displaced, regrouped and dispersed and returnees.

<sup>75</sup> This text is taken directly from the General Conclusions of the Report of Committee IV of the Arusha Agreement, Arusha Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Burundi, August 2000. Committee IV was charged with developing Protocol IV.

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<sup>76</sup> Protocol IV lists the following vulnerable groups: children heads of family, orphans, street children, widows, women heads of family, unaccompanied minors, juvenile delinquents, the physically and mentally disabled as well as traumatized children. It requests that a census be conducted of these groups and that the relevant ministry draw up assistance programs. Relatively adequate statistics on most of these groups have already been pulled together by UNICEF and the Ministry of Social Action and the Promotion of Women.

## **2. Physical and Political Reconstruction**

The Inter-Ministerial Reconstruction and Development Unit is charged with developing an emergency reconstruction plan and a reconstruction plan for the transition period that includes the physical reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure (houses, health centres, schools, water infrastructure) and the development of community capacity to maintain the existing and newly constructed infrastructure.

- These reconstruction plans also include political reconstruction with measures to establish the rule of law, reform the judiciary, promote the advancement of women, support the democratisation of institutions, support parliament and support the development of an independent and competent civil society and media and political parties.
- To ensure that reconstruction and reconciliation take place simultaneously, the reconstruction plans include the development and dissemination of a national reconciliation program,<sup>77</sup> the promotion of human rights and freedoms<sup>78</sup> and the development of a nation-wide program for education for a culture of peace.
- The principles of equal distribution, community participation and ownership, transparency and accountability of fund utilisation and sustainability underlie all proposed reconstruction activities.

The Inter-Ministerial Reconstruction and Development Unit will involve donors in the work of the unit, who may request an international auditing company to monitor all financial operations and accounts established. In addition, all plans developed by this unit are to be submitted to the National Assembly for approval.

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<sup>77</sup> The national reconciliation program outlined in Protocol IV includes the promotion of mutual self-help and teamwork under the housing reconstruction program and other economic and social development programs, psychological care for traumatised children, peace and reconciliation committees and a historical study leading toward a common interpretation of history.

<sup>78</sup> The human rights and freedoms program will be targeted toward political leaders and government officials among others.

## **3. Economic and Social Development**

Protocol IV outlines the basis for a comprehensive economic and social development program that is supposed to be elaborated in medium and long-term development plans prepared by the Inter-Ministerial Reconstruction and Development Unit. With the support of the international agencies, this program shall begin work on remedying the economic situation, reversing the trends resulting from the crisis, particularly the intensification of poverty, and taking up the challenges that impede economic development. This includes:

- work towards macro-economic and financial stabilisation;
- attempts to solve the problem of external and domestic public debt;
- initiation of structural reforms in the social sectors;
- creation of an environment conducive to the expansion of the private sector;
- efforts to create new jobs and compliance with the criteria of equity and transparency in employment;
- ensurance of good governance in the management of public affairs;
- making operational the Court of Audit established under the provisions of Chapter I of Protocol II to the Agreement;
- transformation of the communes into focal points for development and promotion of greater public access to state services by means of a decentralisation policy;
- promotion of the role of women and youth in development, with the aid of specific measures to benefit them;
- initiation of Burundi's integration into the region; and
- equitable apportionment of the benefits of development.

## APPENDIX C

### THE MISSING PIECES OF THE COORDINATION AND STRATEGY FRAMEWORK

#### **Donor Missing Pieces:**

- No strategy
- No effective coordination meetings
- No coordination unit and secretariat
- No unified approach toward government, UN or NGOs
- Insufficient staff capacity

#### **Government Missing Pieces:**

- No National Commission for the Reintegration of Sinistrés (CNRS)
- No complete transitional strategy
- No effective coordination meetings or mechanisms
- Weak Inter-Ministerial Unit
- Insufficient information on population's needs and programs being implemented
- Unclear distinction between CNRS and Inter-Ministerial Unit
- Insufficient staff capacity
- Insufficient financial resources

#### **UN and NGO Missing Pieces:**

- No transitional strategy – poor linkages between various strategies and plans
- No joint planning – focus on sectors rather than big picture
- No joint NGO strategy
- No linkages with the Inter-Ministerial Unit
- Poor linkages with donor reconstruction programs
- Poor coordination between UN agencies and the Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC)

## APPENDIX D

### TABLE OF OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO BURUNDI 1960-2000<sup>79</sup>

Year	Total Loans	Total Grants	Emergency Aid**	Debt Forgiveness Grants**	Total Net
1960	0	44.35	N/A	N/A	44.35
1961	0	42.7	N/A	N/A	42.7
1962	0	61.65	N/A	N/A	61.65
1963	1.6	30.49	N/A	N/A	32.09
1964	11.02	28.78	N/A	N/A	39.8
1965	4.01	19.26	N/A	N/A	23.27
1966	2.56	38.85	N/A	N/A	41.41
1967	2.95	44.71	N/A	N/A	47.66
1968	1.86	61.37	N/A	N/A	63.23
1969	2.92	68.76	N/A	N/A	71.68
1970	2.77	78.54	N/A	N/A	81.31
1971	2.42	89.68	N/A	N/A	92.1
1972	2.11	94.45	N/A	N/A	96.56
1973	0.73	87.46	N/A	N/A	88.19
1974	5.43	106.05	N/A	N/A	111.48
1975	3.45	116.03	N/A	N/A	119.48
1976	3.15	106.56	N/A	N/A	109.71
1977	20.45	82.8	N/A	N/A	103.25
1978	43.72	94.4	N/A	N/A	138.12
1979	51.25	107.05	N/A	N/A	158.3
1980	55.14	123.47	N/A	N/A	178.61
1981	31.52	174.29	N/A	N/A	205.81

<sup>79</sup> OECD Development Assistance Committee, *International Development Statistics (IDS) Online Databases*, (<http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/>).

1982	82.29	136.75	N/A	N/A	219.04
1983	91.13	157.29	N/A	N/A	248.42
1984	95.6	163.99	N/A	N/A	259.59
1985	92.7	163.02	N/A	N/A	255.72
1986	127.23	149.26	N/A	N/A	276.49
1987	139.32	102.27	N/A	N/A	241.59
1988	112.44	117.32	N/A	N/A	229.76
1989	95.49	145.65	N/A	2.39	241.14
1990	72.27	192.41	N/A	10.24	264.68
1991	70.85	179.91	N/A	6.46	250.76
1992	78.64	204.5	N/A	7.04	283.14
1993	47.85	156.42	N/A	7.38	204.27
1994	19.61	265.81	N/A	7.9	285.42
1995	13.61	228.83	19.82	8.64	242.44
1996	9.08	82.8	28.72	9.59	91.88
1997	-6.62	57.69	18.18	0.56	51.07
1998	13.96	57.46	22.93	8.68	71.42
1999	-5.98	76.89	32.84	6.87	70.91
2000	18.18	74.48	28.31	5.63	92.66

\*\*Figures adjusted for inflation not available. Figures are in millions of U.S. dollars. Unless otherwise indicated, all figures have been adjusted to 2000 inflation levels.

## APPENDIX E

### TABLE OF PLEDGES FROM PARIS AND GENEVA DONOR CONFERENCES

Donors	Nature of assistance	Amount Pledged (U.S.\$ million)	
		2000	2001
<b>Austria</b>	Reconstruction, water and sanitation, democracy and human rights, and debt write off	4.0	13.26
<b>Belgium</b>	Security and humanitarian assistance, social sectors, public works and economic management, HIV/AIDS	24.0	25.42
<b>Canada</b>	Peace and humanitarian assistance, DDR	..	2.0
<b>Denmark</b>	Humanitarian assistance	8.35	..
<b>Finland</b>	Security and humanitarian assistance	2.36	1.5
<b>France</b>	Justice and national reconciliation, reinsertion and reintegration, rehabilitation of infrastructure, food security, rural development, public expenditure management, training and technical assistance	6.85	3.98
<b>Germany</b>	Conflict prevention and democracy, water and sanitation, HIV/AIDS	31.36	35.68
<b>Italy</b>	Reinsertion, decentralisation, gender, orphans and HIV/AIDS	2.0	6.4
<b>Japan</b>	Food security and HIV/AIDS	1.24	1.0
<b>Netherlands</b>	Humanitarian, demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration	5.0	..
<b>Norway</b>	Peace and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and DDR	6.0	4.3
<b>OIF</b>	Governance, education through direct support and scholarship	1.5	..
<b>OPEP Fund</b>	Agriculture and rural development	10.0	15
<b>Sweden</b>	Humanitarian assistance and social sectors	4.22	..
<b>Switzerland</b>	Humanitarian assistance and debt relief	5.29	..
<b>UK</b>	HIV/AIDS, debt relief	8	8
<b>U.S.</b>	Humanitarian assistance, agriculture and rural development, social sectors and HIV/AIDS, support to refugees and orphans, promotion of civil society and gender, education and training	70	150
<b>EU</b>	Balance of payments support, food security humanitarian assistance, reinsertion and reintegration, rehabilitation of economic and social infrastructure, agriculture and rural development technical assistance	133.35	242.17

<b>AfDB</b>	Agriculture and rural development, infrastructure, education, social action projects and poverty alleviation, rehabilitation of economic and social infrastructure, post-conflict reconstruction and governance	27.7	78.53
<b>IMF</b>	Emergency post-conflict assistance facility and technical assistance, macroeconomic management	25.0	25.0
<b>UNDP</b>	Donor coordination, food security, rehabilitation, reintegration, governance, HIV/AIDS, technical assistance	20.0	32.0
<b>UNICEF</b>	Rehabilitation of social infrastructure and education	..	31.0
<b>FNUAP</b>	HIV/AIDS reintegration and reinsertion	..	1.5
<b>World Bank</b>	Balance of payments support, DDR, rehabilitation of economic and social infrastructure, public works and roads rehabilitation, education and health, HIV/AIDS and orphans, governance and public expenditure management, poverty monitoring, technical assistance, macroeconomic management.	50.0	156.0
<b>Total pledge Amount</b>		<b>446.24</b>	<b>832.74</b>



## APPENDIX F

### GLOSSARY

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#### Political Parties and Armed Movements\*

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- ABASA:** African Burundi Alliance for Salvation, created in 1993, led by T rence Nsanze (external wing) and Serge Mukamarakiza (internal wing)
- ANADDE:** National Alliance for Law and Economic Development, created in 1993. Headed by Ignace Bankamwabo
- AV-INTWARI:** "Alliance of the Valliant", created 1993, led by Andr  Nkundikije
- CNDD:** National Council for the Defence of Democracy. Founded in 1994 by L onard Nyangoma, one of the founders of FRODEBU and Minister of the Interior in the Ntaryamira government. Led by L onard Nyangoma
- FDD:** Forces For the Defence of Democracy, the armed branch of the CNDD. Power shared between the L onard Nyangoma wing and the Jean Bosco Ndayikengurukiye wing.
- FNL:** National Liberation Forces, armed branch of the Palipehutu. Headed jointly by the Etienne Karatasi wing and the Cossan Kabura wing since 1992
- FRODEBU:** Front for Democracy in Burundi. Became official in 1992 and was the winning party in the first presidential elections organised in Burundi in June 1993. Headed up by Jean Minani (external wing) and Augustin Nzojibwami (internal wing)
- FROLINA:** Front For National Liberation, created during the 80s and led by Joseph Karumba
- INKINZO:** "The Shield", formed in 1993. Political party led by Alphonse Rugambarara
- PALIPEHUTU:** Party for the Liberation of the Hutu people, under Etienne Karatasi.
- PARENA:** Party for National Recovery, created and headed up by Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, ex-president of Burundi, in 1995.
- PIT:** Independent Workers' Party, formed in 1993. Led by Nic pjore Ndimurukundo.
- PL:** Liberal Party, formed in 1993. Its external wing is led by Ga tan Nikobamye and the internal wing by Joseph Ntidendereza.
- PP:** Party of the People, created in 1993. Headed up by Shadrack Niyonkuru (external wing) and S verin Ndikumugongo (internal wing).
- PRP:** Party for the Reconciliation of the People, advocating the return of the monarchy. Created in 1992 and led by Mathias Hitimana (external wing) and Albert Girukwishaka (internal wing).
- PSD:** Part for Social Democracy. Founded in 1993 and led by Godefroid Hakizimana

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\* The Law on Political Parties in Burundi states that leaders of political parties must reside in Burundi. Leaders of so-called "internal wing" parties are generally recognised by the Ministry of Interior.

- RADES:** Rally for Democracy, Social and Economic Development. Formed in 1993 and headed by Joseph Nzeyimana.
- RPB:** Rally for the People of Burundi. Formed in 1993 and under the leadership of Philippe Nzobonariba (internal wing) and Balthazar Bigirimana (external wing).
- UPRONA:** National Union for Progress. Nationalist party created on the eve of independence in 1961 and led by Prince Louis Rwagasore, a hero of the independence who was assassinated in October 1961. UPRONA was the sole party in Burundi between 1966 and 1993. The party has two wings: one headed by Charles Mukasi and the other by Luc Rukingama, the current Minister of Communication.

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### **The G3, G7, G8, G10 and G6 Groups**

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- G3:** Comprises UPRONA, the government and the National Assembly.
- G7:** The group of “Forces for Democratic Change” formed by majority Hutu or exclusively Hutu members: FRODEBU (external wing), CNDD, PALIPEHUTU, FROLINA, PP, RPB and PL.
- G8:** Incorporates all groups known as “small Tutsi-majority parties”: PARENA, PRP, AV-INTWARI, ABASA, PSD, INKINZO, ANADDE, and PIT.
- G6:** The G8 became the G6 on the issue of transition leadership. PARENA and ABASA refuse to back Epitace Bayaganakandi, the candidate for transition leadership chosen by the six other G8 political parties.
- G10:** The G8 changed to the G10 until January 2001 on the ceasefire issue. This allowed UPRONA and the government to align with the smaller Tutsi parties to demand a stop to hostilities before any application of the accord. The coalition later dissolved over the candidacy of Epitace Bayaganakandi.

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### **Other Acronyms**

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- AC** **Génocide “Cirimoso”:** Action Against Genocide “Never Again” organises gatherings every 21<sup>st</sup> day of the month in memory of the massacres of October 1993 in the wake of the assassination of President Ndadaye. Headed up by Venant Bamboneyeho. Other
- CSAA:** Commission for the Monitoring and Application of the Arusha Accord, chaired by the UN Ambassador Berhanu Dinka

## APPENDIX G

### ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

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The International Crisis Group (ICG) is an independent, non-profit, multinational organisation, with over 80 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

ICG's approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, ICG produces regular analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers.

ICG's reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and printed copy to officials in foreign ministries and international organisations and made generally available at the same time via the organisation's Internet site, [www.crisisweb.org](http://www.crisisweb.org). ICG works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The ICG Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring ICG reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. ICG is chaired by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari; and its President and Chief Executive since January 2000 has been former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans.

ICG's international headquarters are in Brussels, with advocacy offices in Washington DC, New York and Paris and a media liaison office in London. The organisation currently operates eleven field

offices (in Amman, Belgrade, Bogotá, Islamabad, Jakarta, Nairobi, Osh, Pristina, Sarajevo, Sierra Leone and Skopje) with analysts working in over 30 crisis-affected countries and territories across four continents.

In *Africa*, those countries include Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone-Liberia-Guinea, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe; in *Asia*, Indonesia, Myanmar, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Kashmir; in *Europe*, Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia; in the *Middle East*, the whole region from North Africa to Iran; and in *Latin America*, Colombia.

ICG raises funds from governments, charitable foundations, companies and individual donors. The following governments currently provide funding: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Foundation and private sector donors include The Atlantic Philanthropies, Carnegie Corporation of New York, Ford Foundation, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, William & Flora Hewlett Foundation, The Henry Luce Foundation, Inc., John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, The John Merck Fund, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Open Society Institute, Ploughshares Fund, The Ruben & Elisabeth Rausing Trust, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and the United States Institute of Peace.

**February 2003**

## APPENDIX H

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\* The Algeria project was transferred from the Africa Program in January 2002.



## APPENDIX I

### ICG BOARD MEMBERS

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**Morton Abramowitz**

*Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador to Turkey*

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*Former U.S. National Security Adviser to the President*

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**Ersin Arioglu**

*Chairman, Yapi Merkezi Group, Turkey*

**Emma Bonino**

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**Zbigniew Brzezinski**

*Former U.S. National Security Adviser to the President*

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*Former South African High Commissioner to the UK; former Secretary General of the ANC*

**Victor Chu**

*Chairman, First Eastern Investment Group, Hong Kong*

**Wesley Clark**

*Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe*

**Uffe Ellemann-Jensen**

*Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Denmark*

**Mark Eyskens**

*Former Prime Minister of Belgium*

**Marika Fahlen**

*Former Swedish Ambassador for Humanitarian Affairs; Director of Social Mobilization and Strategic Information, UNAIDS*

**Yoichi Funabashi**

*Chief Diplomatic Correspondent & Columnist, The Asahi Shimbun, Japan*

**Bronislaw Geremek**

*Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Poland*

**I.K.Gujral**

*Former Prime Minister of India*

**HRH El Hassan bin Talal**

*Chairman, Arab Thought Forum; President, Club of Rome*

**Carla Hills**

*Former U.S. Secretary of Housing; former U.S. Trade Representative*

**Asma Jahangir**

*UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions; Advocate Supreme Court, former Chair Human Rights Commission of Pakistan*

**Ellen Johnson Sirleaf**

*Senior Adviser, Modern Africa Fund Managers; former Liberian Minister of Finance and Director of UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa*

**Mikhail Khodorkovsky**

*Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, YUKOS Oil Company, Russia*

**Elliott F. Kulick**

*Chairman, Pegasus International, U.S.*

**Joanne Leedom-Ackerman**

*Novelist and journalist, U.S.*

**Todung Mulya Lubis**

*Human rights lawyer and author, Indonesia*

**Barbara McDougall**

*Former Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada*

**Mo Mowlam**

*Former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, UK*

**Ayo Obe**

*President, Civil Liberties Organisation, Nigeria*

**Christine Ockrent**

*Journalist and author, France*

**Friedbert Pflüger**

*Foreign Policy Spokesman of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group in the German Bundestag*

**Surin Pitsuwan**

*Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thailand*

**Itamar Rabinovich**

*President of Tel Aviv University; former Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. and Chief Negotiator with Syria*

**Fidel V. Ramos**

*Former President of the Philippines*

**Mohamed Sahnoun**

*Special Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General on Africa*

**Salim A. Salim**

*Former Prime Minister of Tanzania; former Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity*

**Douglas Schoen**

*Founding Partner of Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates, U.S.*

**William Shawcross**

*Journalist and author, UK*

**George Soros**

*Chairman, Open Society Institute*

**Eduardo Stein**

*Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Guatemala*

**Pär Stenbäck**

*Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Finland*

**Thorvald Stoltenberg**

*Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway*

**William O. Taylor**

*Chairman Emeritus, The Boston Globe, U.S.*

**Ed van Thijn**

*Former Netherlands Minister of Interior; former Mayor of Amsterdam*

**Simone Veil**

*Former President of the European Parliament; former Minister for Health, France*

**Shirley Williams**

*Former Secretary of State for Education and Science; Member House of Lords, UK*

**Jaushieh Joseph Wu**

*Deputy Secretary General to the President, Taiwan*

**Grigory Yavlinsky**

*Chairman of Yabloko Party and its Duma faction, Russia*

**Uta Zapf**

*Chairperson of the German Bundestag Subcommittee on Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation*