

Chapter 8

The Burundi Leadership Training Program

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Introduction

The Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP) was proposed in late 2002 “to increase the ability of the country’s ethnically polarized leadership to work together in consolidating its post-war transition and advancing Burundi’s post-war economic reconstruction.”¹ It was conceived by Howard Wolpe, the former US Special Envoy to the African Great Lakes Region, during his tenure at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (WWICS). It was funded for eighteen months by the World Bank’s Post-Conflict Fund, with ad-hoc contributions by the US Agency for International Development, the European Union (EU), and the UK Department for International Development. The authors evaluated the BLTP for the World Bank’s Post-Conflict Fund in 2004.

The BLTP appeared two years into Burundi’s five-year transitional administration, which started with the August 2000 signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement and formally ended with the August

2005 election of Burundi's current president, Pierre Nkurunziza. During this unstable period, in which international and regional actors pressured Burundi's transitional leadership to implement the Arusha agreement, the BLTP offered a more empowering alternative. Rather than criticizing Burundi's new leadership for failing to implement the complex reforms outlined in the agreement, the BLTP aimed to strengthen its capacity to take on the difficult tasks of peace consolidation and institutional transformation.

The BLTP was broadly successful. It helped former enemies learn how to relate better to one another. In some instances, these improved relationships contributed to important breakthroughs in Burundi's ongoing peace process and supported reforms in key national institutions. The program's experience shows that well-targeted leadership programming can support the transformation of both individual leaders and the institutions that they govern. But the implementation of the BLTP in Burundi also emphasizes the importance of the *fit* between activities and their context. The program's successes were a result of *how* it navigated Burundi's complex and changing political dynamics. It was able to negotiate this difficult environment because of the identities of its staff, their relationship with key players in Burundi, and their specific skill sets. These staff were well placed to take advantage of a key opportunity in Burundi's postwar transition: the existence of a transitional power-sharing government that was both open to and in need of support.

This chapter begins by providing an analysis of the nature and course of Burundi's conflict until the initiation of the BLTP, identifying the primary factors affecting individual and institutional transformation. It then outlines the nature of the BLTP's activities and presents an assessment of the program's impact. Next, it teases out the internal and external factors that contributed to the program's impact, and concludes with an analysis of the program's potential replicability.²

Nature and Course of the Conflict

The Years of Conflict

Burundi is a very poor, highly populated, small landlocked country in east-central Africa. Its hilly terrain is home to 7.8 million people: a large Hutu majority, a small Tutsi minority, and an additional 1 percent of Twa. As in neighboring Rwanda, these groups share the same language and culture,

having occupied different roles in a complex traditional social hierarchy in which social mobility within and between groups was common. Contrary to common assumptions about the primordial nature of the Burundian conflict, an examination of Burundi's precolonial history does not reveal an ancient ethnic conflict that compelled neighbors to kill one another.

During the three decades between Burundi's independence from Belgium in 1962 and the outbreak of its civil war in 1993, the competition for control of the Burundian state became increasingly ethnic and violent in nature. During most of this time, the country was ruled by a small Tutsi oligarchy from Bururi province.³ This clique derived its power from control over the higher echelons of the army, the key levers of the state (and, consequently, the fruits of the foreign aid enterprise), and the business sector. Under their rule, Hutu could hold only low-level positions in the state and army. Dissent was held down through acute and structural violence, including the "partial genocide" of 1972, when almost all educated Hutu of any social class were murdered. Over time, the Burundian political scene came to represent what some authors have referred to as the "ethnic security dilemma."⁴ The Tutsi population feared that the Hutu masses would develop their own violent discriminatory state in Rwanda's image, while the Hutu masses feared a repeat of the 1972 massacres and were continually reminded of the Tutsi oligarchy's willingness to use violence and oppression.

After taking power in a bloodless coup d'état in 1987, Major Pierre Buyoya began to institute a series of political and economic reforms. He launched these reforms partly in response to international pressure following the massacre of approximately 3,000 Tutsis and 15,000 Hutus in 1988, and partly in response to pressure from within the Burundian elite to enlarge the circle of the state. Buyoya's reforms culminated in the first democratic presidential elections in the summer of 1993, which resulted in a loss for his party, UPRONA (National Party of Union and Progress), which had been the vehicle of Tutsi political control for decades. Melchior Ndadaye, president of the newly formed FRODEBU (Burundian Democratic Front), won the 1993 elections and became Burundi's first democratically elected Hutu president. The elections transferred control of the state, down to the lowest levels, to Hutu, but the army remained in Tutsi hands. Some of those Tutsi frustrated with this sudden loss of power reacted with a coup d'état in October 1993, during which the new president and many in his entourage were killed.

Immediately following the death of President Ndadaye, widespread popular anger and violence, often directed toward ordinary Tutsi in the hills, broke out in many parts of the country. The violence was organized by

extremist Hutu counterelites, mostly affiliated with FRODEBU, and claimed the lives of many Tutsi to such an extent that many Tutsi consider this violence to be genocidal. The national army, still controlled by Tutsi, responded as it always had—with great brutality. For thirty years, political competition in Burundi had become increasingly violent and ethnic in nature: now, the floodgates were open and an ethnic civil war had begun. As no side managed to acquire the upper hand, a decade of violence-marred stalemate began. The civil war and ensuing genocide in neighboring Rwanda in 1994 only served to deepen the ethnic dimension of Burundi's civil war.

Hutu rebel groups emerged, split, regrouped, and attacked from locations across the Tanzanian and Democratic Republic of Congo borders, the latter of which was also imploding into violence and lawlessness. Burundi's formal political processes remained deadlocked as presidents came and went, chaos reigned, and violence prevailed everywhere. Hundreds of thousands of Burundians fled their homes, with Tutsi predominantly fleeing to safer havens close to the communal administration and military garrisons; and Hutu fleeing to internally displaced persons camps in the hills or abroad, especially to Tanzania. During the decade of Burundi's civil war, it is estimated that 250,000 to 300,000 died from the violence, not to mention the lives lost to malnutrition and disease.

The Peace Process

International and regional efforts to broker peace in Burundi began immediately after the outbreak of the war in late 1993. These efforts were stepped up after the 1994 Rwandan genocide, with the aim of preventing Burundi from going down the same path. The international and regional response included “a UN [United Nations] and several other special envoys, a UN commission of inquiry, an OAU [Organisation of African Unity] military observer mission, regional summits and negotiations, several high-level fact-finding and jawboning delegations, a number of initiatives by nongovernmental organizations, an ongoing Washington policy forum, and ultimately, regional economic sanctions.”⁵ According to Michael Lund, Barnett Rubin, and Fabienne Hara, the level of response was “out of proportion to the significance in traditional strategic or economic terms of this Maryland-sized country.”⁶

The BLTP was certainly not the first dialogue or training activity in Burundi. Between 1993 and 1998, no fewer than thirty-six governmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were implementing some type

of dialogue, facilitation, or other conflict management program in Burundi.⁷ These activities worked with many of the same people that the BLTP later engaged. Unlike the BLTP, however, the peacebuilding programs of the 1990s occurred during a time of conflict escalation, making such efforts more dangerous and challenging for both the facilitators and the participants. As this chapter will show, the effect of the BLTP may have resulted as much from its ability to bring together a particular group of people at a critical and propitious time for peace as from the particular training approach that it employed.

In August 2000, the multitude of peacemaking efforts culminated in the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. This agreement was comprehensive in terms of political and social reforms, but the two principal armed groups were absent from the Arusha process, which meant that the final agreement lacked the crucial element of a cease-fire. In addition, many of the most contentious issues in the peace process—the interim presidency, composition of the military, transitional justice, electoral law, and the constitution—were left for the parties to the agreement to negotiate during the transitional period, which was initially set at three years.

The Implementation Monitoring Committee was given the responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the Arusha agreement. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Burundi, Berhanu Dinka, headed the committee, which was composed of signatories of the agreement.⁸ Unfortunately, even though the committee held regular meetings and followed key events, it did not have the leadership or leverage necessary to ensure that the agreement was implemented. Even the committee's own executive committee lamented its incompetence: "It is deplorable that the [Implementation Monitoring Committee], which should have been the driving force behind the campaign to educate the population and garner support for the accord, should be reduced to the mere role of spectator."⁹

Building on Nelson Mandela's role as the mediator of the Arusha agreement, South Africa took the lead in pushing forward negotiations with the rebel groups, the National Liberation Front and the Forces for the Defense of Democracy, the largest rebel movement by far. In October 2003, they reached a cease-fire agreement with the Forces for the Defense of Democracy called the Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defense, and Security Power-sharing in Burundi. The Arusha and Pretoria agreements marked the beginning of the transition out of civil war and presented a roadmap for the development of new institutions designed to support and maintain peace, integrate the army,

adopt a new constitution, organize elections, and kick-start development—a typical package applied in all postconflict countries. The National Liberation Front, however, remained largely outside of the peace process for several more years, and only joined the state institutions in 2009.

The Beginnings of the BLTP

The BLTP was initiated in March 2003, when Burundi still faced significant military, political, economic, and sociopsychological challenges. Indeed, the most likely outcome of the peace process predicted at that time by knowledgeable observers was that it would not hold. The implementation of the peace agreement and the transformation of Burundi's governing and social institutions faced at least four major challenges. First and foremost, the security situation needed to be stabilized. To move the Arusha and Pretoria agreements from paper to reality, soldiers and rebels had to lay down arms and be integrated into the national army or demobilized and reintegrated in their communities; rebels who had not signed the agreements had to be brought into the fold; and police and army structures needed to be reformed and trained, with their leadership and "rank and file" made more multiethnic.

Second, a viable system of guarantees had to be created to ensure that ethnic exclusion and destruction would not return, neither against Hutu nor Tutsi. While the initial conflict in Burundi was clearly rooted in the competition for political power, in the previous thirty years—and especially the previous decade—ethnicity had taken on a life of its own. The social and physical separation between people had grown. A sense of victimization prevailed, as both sides charged the other with genocide, and fear and distrust along ethnic lines was shared by all. The power-sharing arrangements outlined in the Arusha agreement were a response to this ethnic polarization, but they would not work if they did not have minimal backing of Burundian society.

Third, the old clique controlling power had to retreat from commanding the state, army, and economy, and make space to include new entrants in these spheres of power. In Burundi, as in so many extremely poor African countries with almost no private sector, an individual who ceased being a general, a parliamentarian, or a minister did not often have another interesting and well-paid job waiting in the wings, but risked losing all economic security and falling from social grace.

Fourth, the challenge of Burundi's institutional transformation took place against a system of unimaginable poverty and social exclusion of most ordinary Burundians. The rural poor, whether Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa, were killed and abused by all sides. Their land was stolen. Their food, credit, and aid were skimmed off. Their children died from preventable diseases at a rate that was one of the world's three highest. Few of those in power or vying for it, regardless of their party affiliation, were deeply connected to the poor or seemed to have their interests foremost at heart. There was a real risk that peace in Burundi would be established without improving the conditions of the poor, the rural, the farmers, or the young. In the longer run, this would remain an explosive situation.

In sum, although the Arusha and Pretoria processes culminated in wide-ranging and general agreements, many of the key issues were left unresolved, precisely during the years that the BLTP was active. Although South Africa and several of Burundi's neighbors (Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda) continued to press for and conduct high-level negotiations, their attention was focused almost exclusively on achieving a cease-fire with the National Liberation Front. The Implementation Monitoring Committee, charged with overseeing the implementation of the Arusha agreement, failed to live up to its responsibility. At the same time, Burundi's transitional leaders seemed reluctant to implement the reforms outlined in the Arusha and Pretoria agreements, in part because they knew these reforms would lead to their removal from office. The international community's main political response to the slow progress was to withhold promised aid disbursements until the transitional government got on with its work.¹⁰

*The BLTP Empowerment Alternative:
Building Trust in Individuals and Institutions*

In contrast to the often tense rapport between the transitional government and the international community, the BLTP was designed to add an entirely different dynamic for transitional change, using processes focused on empowering individuals rather than on applying conditionality to the entire government. The program sought to contribute to Burundi's transition (and, after the elections, to its consolidation) by investing in the people in charge of creating the post-transition institutions. It sought to provide key individuals with the attitudes, skills, and relations that it hoped would help them to conduct complex daily negotiations about institutional reform. It

also tried to make this process more inclusive by including key civil society leaders. In short, the BLTP sought to create an additional path to solve the Burundian crisis, in combination with the efforts of the UN mission, South African facilitation, pressure from donors, and other unofficial dialogue processes in the past and present.

To empower Burundian leaders to solve their own problems, the BLTP aimed to address several deficits that it identified in the peace process: the zero-sum, winner-take-all wartime mindset; the mistrust between key leaders of different ethnic groups; the lack of consensus on the rules of power-sharing and public decision-making; and the need to reestablish lines of communication and understanding between Burundian elites, which had become broken by years of war.¹¹ Although all of these factors existed before the war, the conflict had made them more pronounced. The aim of the BLTP was to transform those individuals who were in a position to transform Burundi's institutions.

Burundi presented a stunningly difficult context for institutional and individual transformation. Burundi's leaders were not a group of committed professionals negotiating to solve a difficult problem, but a group of distrustful, hurt, insecure, and often unrepresentative people who had used any tool, under conditions of near-Hobbesian institutional anarchy, to assure themselves of a seat at the table and a piece of an increasingly smaller pie. It is these leaders that the BLTP sought to assist in transforming Burundi. All of the program's efforts occurred against a backdrop of violence, unpredictability, profound institutional weakness, deep poverty and risk, and regional instability.

The BLTP developed three different types of workshops to address these complex dynamics: the Ngozi workshops, the followup workshops, and the targeted workshops. These workshops combined conflict resolution training and third-party-facilitated dialogue tools. Using training tools, the program sought to transmit specific communications and conflict resolution skills to its participants.¹² Using dialogue tools within the workshop exercises, it sought to put select Burundian leaders in a context in which they were likely to develop an increased understanding of and relationship to one another. The dialogue component of the BLTP contained some elements of interactive problem-solving workshops, which, according to Herbert Kelman, aim to "facilitate a kind of interaction that differs from the way parties in conflict usually interact—if they interact at all."¹³ Nonetheless, the program's specific combination of training and apolitical dialogue represented a new

type of intervention, potentially resulting in different outcomes from other initiatives that focus on training or on dialogue exclusively.

Initial Ngozi Workshops

The signature products of the BLTP were the three Ngozi workshops that took place in 2003 and 2004 and were named for the town in which they were held. The BLTP described these intensive six-day workshops, each of which involved about thirty people, as “interactive workshops in communications, negotiating skills, visioning, group problem-solving, and strategic planning [that] are designed to assist in the restoration of trust and confidence among Burundian leaders and to encourage participatory and collaborative decision-making.”¹⁴ The workshops were designed to help participants recognize that their self-interest could be more effectively advanced through collaboration and inclusive political processes; restore trust in one another and rebuild personal relationships; build consensus on the ground rules for sharing state power and making public decisions; increase mutual understanding so that they could stop blaming each other for the war and the political violence; develop a discourse that encourages problem-solving rather than confrontation; and recognize the interdependence among the society’s constituent parts.¹⁵

Over the six days of the workshop, the participants were sequestered in the rather remote northern town of Ngozi. They actively participated in the long workshop sessions and then ate and drank together at night. The structure was designed to create relationships and break down barriers, since part of the BLTP’s powerful initial aim was to create an environment in which “participants are able to see each other as ‘whole’ persons, not simply as stereotypic reflections of their ethnic and political categories.” The change in participants’ attitudes toward one another was the first crucial step. The BLTP hoped that this new way of thinking would help the participants identify their common interests and build consensus on the new rules of the postwar game, such as power arrangements, decision-making procedures, and other behavior patterns.

To select the initial group of “leaders” for the Ngozi workshops, the BLTP team conducted an informal poll of the most influential people from across the political spectrum in Burundi. They requested lists of influential people from key informants, and from these and other names selected a representative group of individuals, taking into account ethnicity, region,

political affiliation, gender, and professional background. This eclectic process of participant selection was necessary to ensure that all parties to the conflict were represented at all of the workshops, which was crucial for the program's credibility and impact.

Followup Workshops

To reinforce the attitude change achieved with the ninety-five leaders trained at the three initial Ngozi workshops, in 2003 and 2004 the BLTP organized nine followup workshops, each of which usually lasted two days. The followup workshops were an important innovation in the BLTP design, which the BLTP had included in response to a common criticism of both training and dialogue programs—namely, that there was no opportunity to reinforce the skills or relationships gained in the initial sessions.

The initial followup workshops after Ngozi I and Ngozi II, both of which took place in 2003, were focused on the design of development projects, proposal writing, and negotiation/mediation skills. By the time of the Ngozi III followup workshop in June 2004, the BLTP had reoriented the workshops' focus away from economic development projects and concentrated on developing the leadership competencies and capacities of the participants, reinforcing the network, and discussing issues of current political importance. From June 2004 on, the BLTP team largely responded to requests of the Ngozi participants themselves when designing followup workshops. In April 2005, the participants decided to create a steering committee composed of the members of the BLTP network, which was made up of participants from all three Ngozi workshops, to help convene and guide the direction of the network.

Targeted Workshops

At the suggestion of some of the high-level military officers who attended the first Ngozi workshop in March 2003, the BLTP began to organize trainings specifically for the security sector. The objective of these targeted workshops was to help unblock negotiations regarding the integration of the rebel and national armies in line with the Arusha and Pretoria agreements. Once the negotiations were unblocked, partly through BLTP efforts, the program continued these security sector trainings with the goal of increasing communication between former rebels and the national army that now together constituted the Burundian Armed Forces. Between November 2003 and the elections in summer 2005, the BLTP organized three training sessions with

army and rebel commanders to prepare for the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and to plan the integration of the Burundian Army (the Joint Ceasefire Commission and the *Etat-Majeur Général Intégré*); two workshops with the Joint Liaison Teams of the UN Office in Burundi (ONUB), composed of the Burundian Army, the rebel groups, and ONUB staff; and two sessions for the newly integrated command of the new Burundian Police Force.

Soon after the August 2005 election of Pierre Nkurunziza, Burundi's post-transitional president, the BLTP trained the entire new Burundian government—including the president, two vice presidents, twenty cabinet ministers, the appointed secretary general of the government, military and civilian chiefs of staff, and several senior advisors to ministries. The willingness of the country's top officials to spend five days in this "training session" testifies to the credibility that the BLTP had acquired. Firmly in power for five years to come, these people hardly needed to have BLTP's seal of approval in order to claim control of the state and interact with the international community. All the same, they both asked for and participated in the full workshop. There was no followup to this workshop (understandable for a new and busy government) but it is probably no exaggeration to state that no leadership training project has ever encompassed such a high political level. The BLTP's primary spin-off project, the Community-Based Leadership Program (CBLP), trained twenty Burundian "master trainers" to do similar but less structured conflict resolution and dialogue work at the grassroots level in two provinces.

Impacts

It is not easy to evaluate projects like the BLTP. As with so many of the most important things in social life, measurement and attribution problems are extremely severe; basic concepts such as social capital, trust, and respect are deeply contested; the dynamics at stake are chaotic, unpredictable, multidimensional, ambiguous, and complicated; and the disjuncture between the long-term objectives and the short-term project cycle is even greater than usual. Peacebuilding and development is a young field, and solidly established methodologies for project evaluation had only begun to be developed when the BLTP project was implemented. Even now, project managers and donors invest too little in baseline data, monitoring, and evaluation systems—and this project was no exception.

Table 8.1. Burundi Leadership Training Program Outputs, Expected Outcomes, and Indicators

	BLTP actions (outputs)	Expected outcomes	Indicators (identified by BLTP team)
<i>Direct impact on individuals</i>	Initial workshops	Changes in relations between participants	Participants lose their fear and speak honestly. Participants understand, and respect, that other participants see the world differently than they do. Participants understand not only how the other feels, but also that if they had been born in different circumstances, they also could be in that situation. Participants come out of their boxes, think and act as individuals, and see others as individuals. Participants build new relationships among themselves.
	Followup workshops		
<i>Indirect impact on social processes</i>	Support for participant activities	Changes in relations between participants and others	Participants change their perception of other people/groups. Participants use their new knowledge, perspective, and tools to build relationships with others outside the group.
	Support for elaboration of development projects	Changes in participants' immediate environment	Participants have an improved capacity to work collaboratively.
	Impact on other donors' projects (e.g., CBLP)		Participants create new patterns of relationship and behavior outside of their formal group structure. Participants are able to accept that different views of history are possible, which should allow them to live with their community.
	Selection of participants	Indirect impact on national institutions	No specific criteria mentioned.
	New, targeted BLTP projects or network activities		

This evaluation of the BLTP uses elements of both a “theory-based evaluation” model and an assisted internal evaluation practice. A theory-based evaluation approach breaks down the intervention into its component activity parts, trying to hypothesize the working assumptions that connect each activity to its desired outcome. Within conflict resolution and peacebuilding, the theory that guides the intervention is often referred to as the *theory of change*, or the project’s hypothesis about factors that will contribute to building peace or deescalating conflict.¹⁶ The BLTP theory of change was that improved relationships, greater understanding, and the development of a common vision among Burundi’s leaders would enable them to collaboratively transform Burundi’s institutions into institutions that guarantee peace. In other words, the BLTP was based on the belief that the main stumbling blocks to peace involved personal (vision, understanding) and interpersonal (trust) factors, which inhibit the creation of sustainable institutions for peace.

Following from the overall theory of change, the causal chain of results describes each step in the assumed connection between the project’s entry point (i.e., conflict resolution training) and its desired influence on the cause of peace identified in the theory of change (i.e., transforming state institutions into guarantors of sustainable peace). This process resembles a scenario-building exercise in which the project staff describes the predicted causal chain between their entry point and desired outcome(s).¹⁷ The data collected from this process identify how well each step in the chain is borne out. Table 8.1 presents the relationships among the theory of change, outputs, expected outcomes, and indicators identified during discussions with the BLTP team.

To understand the relationship between the program and the evolving context, this evaluation is grounded in the sociopolitical dynamics of Burundi. It assesses both the accuracy of the BLTP’s theory of change for the Burundian context and the impacts that the BLTP’s activities had on its predicted causal chain of results. By putting the intervention in the context of its long-term social and political dynamics and its specific place and time, the evaluation seeks to understand the BLTP’s specific relevance and contribution.¹⁸

The Ngozi Workshops

POSITIVE EFFECTS

The three Ngozi workshops had noticeable positive effects. At the level of *individual attitude change*, both the authors’ observations and interviews

with dozens of participants and observers indicate that the BLTP workshops did effect a personal transformation in the way people perceive themselves in relation to the other participants. People humanized and individualized each other in ways they often had not done before. They began questioning their own attitudes and modes of behavior, and broke through some of the stereotypes that they may have carried for years: an “a-ha moment” of initial change.

The degree of attitude change during the workshop depended on the previous experiences and mindset of each individual. Some “extremists”—people who were entirely defined by one single issue from which they could not budge—underwent a real transformation in their capacity to see others as people rather than as categories of “opponents” and “evil.” Other participants had spent years fighting in the bush, living in camps, or simply living abroad. They came to the BLTP with prejudices and stereotypes that had been hardened by a long-standing lack of interaction with “different” groups. Having normal conversations with a broad range of people created a new sense of possibility for them and allowed them to break through the fixed categories that had dominated their lives. This change illustrates once again the importance of including people who represented the “tough cases” in dialogue and training processes, rather than working only with the “progressives.”

Most participants also cited the *relationships* that they built at the workshops as an important impact. Even though there was more open collaboration and dialogue during the workshops than during the war, making the job of pulling all of these people together easier, there was still a real threat that division and violence would erupt again. The BLTP provided a venue for decision-makers to come together informally and relate relatively openly with one another; however, it is not clear if and how this social capital persisted beyond the workshop (see below).

In general, the participants were pleased with the *skills, tools, and methods* learned in the BLTP training. The workshops were successful at helping to build better communication among participants, but much less successful at bringing the participants to a level that allowed them to use these skills in their professional work. Although there was a clear demand for more such professionally relevant training, the BLTP provided only a minimal degree of conflict resolution training to the participants. The BLTP’s aim was *not* to train professional negotiators, mediators, analysts, or trainers (until later on), and therefore it is not surprising that this was not a prime contribution of the program. Subsequently, twenty Burundians involved in the BLTP

received in-depth training in running BLTP workshops. It is unclear if a stronger focus on building participants' conflict resolution skills would have been relevant to the program's main aims.

The Ngozi workshops managed to create an environment propitious to attitude change and relationship building by being apolitical—not dealing directly with the political context in Burundi (and certainly not with the difficult issues), remaining closed to the public, being nondirective, and acting as if there was shared goodwill among all participants. All of this occurred in a place outside of most of the participants' normal context of life, helping them to interact as individuals over a six-day period. This approach was a sensible strategic choice on the part of the BLTP team. It helped to create a protective bubble that favored the sort of human interaction and individual change that the program sought to achieve. According to the BLTP team, "Everything is done to establish the workshop as a 'safe' environment in which individuals feel comfortable taking certain risks, opening up to each other, exploring new ways of relating to one another."¹⁹

Of course, in real life, none of the BLTP workshop conditions prevailed. The great challenge then was to ensure that the gains from the workshop were not temporary (not lasting beyond one's trip home), limited (applying only between those who personally participated in the workshop), or theoretical (creating no concrete engagements under more difficult conditions). To avoid these outcomes, a good followup dynamic was needed, and the participants were aware of this need. Indeed, while they raved about the success of the BLTP methodology in helping them to better understand themselves, their environment, and their interaction with others, they also constantly asked for support in translating this theory into practice, whether through activities, more training, or discussions of Burundi's most pressing issues.

MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

In spite of these successes and impacts, the BLTP missed two primary opportunities: the workshop hardly dealt with the concrete issues in Burundi, and the tools taught in the workshop trainings were not modified for the Burundian context. The program ought to have invested more time, in terms of both methodologies and substance, to focus on the concrete challenges prevailing in Burundi, going beyond the feel-good factor of helping the participants to get along with one another.²⁰

When presented with this critique, the BLTP team's main counterargument was that bringing up these complicated and divisive issues too soon

risked creating interpersonal conflict and defensiveness that would have undermined the success of the workshop. This was a valid point. Equally clearly, there was no fixed answer to this debate. Even if it is important for discussions to remain apolitical to encourage a de-escalation of tensions during the initial days of the workshop, it also seems important that participants eventually address the tough issues in the same atmosphere of confidence and quiet. Only then might people learn how to begin resolving these same issues outside the workshop, in the real world. The question is the speed with which to introduce such issues, and through which methods.

The Followup Workshops

The followup workshops were intended to increase the impact of the Ngozi workshops: reinforcing the initial attitude change, solidifying relationships among the participants, and increasing their capacity as individuals and as a group to influence national institutions. The proportion of initial participants who attended the followup workshops was high—more than three-quarters came to the first followup workshop immediately after their Ngozi workshop. Although there was a natural decline in attendance, significant numbers continued to attend subsequent ones: even several years later, occasional followup workshops attracted as many as forty participants.

Nonetheless, the development of a group of persons who felt at ease with one another did not easily or directly translate into a cohesive, sustainable network of people who worked across lines of ethnic and political division to create institutional change. The real difficulty facing the BLTP was how to transfer the impact and reach of the workshops beyond the immediate participants—the transfer effect: “If interventions are to make a difference, there needs to be transfer of knowledge, attitude change and resources to people beyond those directly participating in the project.”²¹ Creating this change, and documenting it, was a crucial challenge.

As the BLTP project progressed, attempts were made to move more toward collective action, away from the initial approach that focused more on the climate of trust and camaraderie between the participants. This shift toward collective action was hard to make: the followup workshops did not manage to go beyond general, noncommittal discussions on issues of contemporary political importance, such as justice and disarmament. Few other concrete actions came out of the Ngozi groups: they produced a development

project in one province, and a new training for Muslims. This part of the project had the least impact. Moreover, the absence of concrete commitments or a space to discuss pressing current issues among people from different backgrounds proved to be a major limitation when, in subsequent years, the political space in Burundi started narrowing and polarizing.

The Targeted Workshops

The targeted workshops produced the BLTP's most concrete results. They were different from the Ngozi workshops in that they trained people within the same organization who shared a professional environment and negotiated with one another on a regular basis, rather than a cross-section of Burundian society. Additionally, these organizations faced concrete challenges that people working for them wanted to solve, creating an incentive for them to apply the new conflict resolution and dialogue approaches that the BLTP offered. The transfer effect from the interpersonal effect to the institutional effect was, therefore, immediate.

The targeted workshops represent what John Paul Lederach calls the "conjunctural response capacity," which refers to a project's ability to respond flexibly to emerging opportunities and challenges while still maintaining a long-term vision.²² Although the targeted workshops were not part of the BLTP's original project proposal, they did fit the BLTP's vision, and the BLTP team was quick to respond when Ngozi participants requested them. They were also flexibly designed, allowing workshop content to be adapted to the new aims, and rapidly implemented, enabling them to respond while the need was still felt. With hindsight, they may well have been the BLTP's most influential activities, although they would not have taken place without the prior occurrence of the Ngozi workshops, which convinced key leaders that the BLTP methods could be useful in other arenas.

The training of the Integrated Military Chiefs of Staff (Etat-Majeur Général Intégré; EMGI) in Gitega in May 2004 delivered the most significant results. Workshop participants and observers unanimously agreed that the breakthrough on one of the questions that blocked the integration of the army—the question of the "status of combatants"—was the direct result of the BLTP training that the EMGI received. However, the success of the BLTP EMGI training cannot be attributed to the training alone. There were clear signals from military leaders that an agreement was desirable. The BLTP increased the trust and communication between the EMGI members

and gave them the confidence that they could resolve these difficult problems themselves. Following the BLTP training, they went back to work and reached an agreement.

The success of the EMGI's agreement can be compared to earlier BLTP trainings of the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC), which was also charged with negotiating key issues relating to the integration of the army. The JCC received the same training session as the EMGI, and the participants were equally appreciative, but the negotiations still remained deadlocked. What accounts for the difference in outcome? The JCC remained deadlocked because the participants lacked the incentives to reach an agreement. They received high per diems during the training sessions and meetings, and thus were not anxious for these meetings to come to an end. More important, they were instructed by their political leaders not to reach a final agreement. The relationship- and confidence-building provided by the BLTP training could not surpass these institutional and political barriers. The degree of effect of the targeted BLTP workshops was therefore partly determined by the incentives within the target institution or organization to use the BLTP's methods, an aspect referred to as "institutional ripeness."

The targeted workshops, by their nature, overcame three challenges faced by the Ngozi workshop. First, the interpersonal impact automatically translated into an institutional impact, once a critical mass within an institution had been trained. Second, the choice of "leaders" was also much easier: it was predetermined by the targeted institutions. Finally, even though the BLTP might have kept its targeted trainings relatively apolitical, the participants were familiar with the tough substantive issues they would have to deal with in their institutions, and could thus begin addressing them right away.

Beyond the Workshops

It is easy to document the positive impact of the Ngozi and targeted workshops on the participants while the workshops are in process. The much harder task is to document and analyze the impact beyond the workshop: did the social relations developed at the workshop last outside, in the real world? Did the participants apply the tools they learned at the workshop? Even harder: did they behave differently in their professional worlds, or toward nonworkshop participants? Did they change their overall behavior in the political, social, or economic realms? And finally, the hardest question of all: did this all have an impact on the dynamics of peace and transition in Burundi?

Interviews with participants suggest that outside of the follow-up workshops, there were an increased number of occasions in which participants interacted—certainly, there were a number of sometimes heartwarming stories to this effect. But this impact was limited: it was mainly social and was by no means universal. Indeed, some other participants’ stories went along the lines of “he is my neighbor, but he never greets me outside of the workshop.”

Did participants use the tools learned outside of the workshop? As discussed above, the targeted workshops that focused on a single organization were very different from the Ngozi workshops, which comprised participants from diverse sectors and organizations. Participants and observers widely agreed that the targeted workshops facilitated significant breakthroughs in “ripe” institutions. As for the Ngozi workshops, many participants reported that they had applied their new conflict resolution tools to their immediate family environments. The BLTP staff also cited instances in which participants used tools taught in the workshops in professional spheres—foremost by teachers and professional trainers, sometimes in general workplace management, and a few times in real negotiations. This effect is important, albeit diffuse and difficult to verify.

On the one hand, many of the Ngozi participants were important people in their parties, armies, or organizations during both the transitional and postelection periods. They were not the very top leaders, but rather the ones just below that level. If these people used the attitudes and skills acquired at the workshops in their professional spheres—as they extensively said they did—this outcome is of importance. Given the relative importance of the Ngozi participants, something real must have been happening as a result. On the other hand, it is hard to gauge precisely what this “real” effect would look like. Conflict resolution and dialogue approaches can be used in the service of both good and bad ends. Furthermore, the BLTP’s “leaders” were active in so many spheres of life that it is hard to develop a clear understanding of concrete institutional impacts. In addition, these are all self-reported cases (unlike the EMGI), of which no independent confirmation exists.

Contributing Factors: Organization and Context

This section discusses two factors that were essential to the BLTP’s contribution: the BLTP’s organizational performance—who the team was and

how it designed, launched, and implemented the project—and the context in which the BLTP was implemented.

Organizational Structure

The political standing and skills of the BLTP team played a major role in its success. The BLTP was led by Howard Wolpe, the former Special Envoy of the United States to the Great Lakes Region of Africa during the Clinton administration and a former seven-term US congressman. Wolpe, who was still referred to by his former title of “Ambassador” by almost all Burundians, carried great prestige. He had the political connections and diplomatic skills necessary to bring Burundi’s leaders to the table, and the contextual knowledge to know who they were and how their game was played. The credibility and political clout of Eugene Nindorera, the former Minister of Human Rights and one of Burundi’s most widely respected citizens, was very important as well, as was the networking of the core program administrator, Fabien Nsengimana. Without these people, the BLTP could not have started with such high-level participants or had such a high degree of credibility and access. For this type of politically sensitive project, having the right people on board is absolutely crucial.

That said, there is more to the success of the BLTP than simply having good people: a good startup process is crucial as well. The BLTP was extremely well prepared. Hundreds of preparatory conversations were held with all parties to the conflict, foremost in Burundi, but also in Dar es Salaam, Pretoria, and Brussels. The authors have seldom seen a project for which the preparation was so complete and thorough, the buy-in so widespread, and the understanding of the challenge so nuanced. The BLTP maintained and expanded the buy-in that it received during the preparatory phase by systematically documenting and distributing information on its successes and by continuously giving personal updates to the most important national and international players. This was smart politics.

The process for selecting participants was also crucial to establishing a sense of prestige at the workshops. Many participants and nonparticipants questioned why one “leader” had been chosen over another. Nonetheless, according to most informants, it was a successful process. People who were invited felt honored to be seen by their peers as leaders. As a result, especially after the first workshop, the BLTP had little difficulty getting its invitees to attend.

Contextual Coherence

The impacts of the BLTP should not be seen in isolation from other initiatives and policies but must be understood as a complement and an additional input to them. When the BLTP began its work in 2002, a number of factors had come into play that pushed Burundi in the direction of peace. Most Burundians were sick of the war and knew that no one could win. Burundi was in a “mutually hurting stalemate,” and thus, grudgingly but unavoidably, the politics of compromise was taking over from the politics of military victory.²³ Moreover, the economic cost of the war was clear to all. With the exception of the very few who profited from the war and the sanctions, Burundians from all walks of life—poor and nonpoor, urban and rural—had been much better off before the war. All Burundians were eager for a more prosperous life.

The peace process also created considerable support for collaboration and compromise. The internationally mediated Arusha agreement meant that Hutu rebel groups, extremist Tutsi parties, and the most radical people within the bigger parties were all losing their capacity to single-handedly derail the process. The exclusion of certain Hutu rebel groups from the Arusha peace process, the adoption of the Arusha agreement by the majority of Burundi’s political parties, and the inclusion of Burundi’s largest rebel faction in Burundi’s transitional government in 2003 marginalized Burundi’s remaining radical political parties and armed groups. It was not certain, of course, that this dynamic of collaboration and compromise would last forever, nor was it the only game in town. Still, it was a central part of the landscape. The BLTP supported this collaborative movement by giving people opportunities, self-understanding, and a few skills to enable them to work more effectively within this new dynamic.

The BLTP came at a crucial and unprecedented time in Burundi’s transition, when leaders of different political, ethnic, and socioeconomic groups found themselves running a transitional government together. Leaders were trying to figure out which allegiances would assure them future power and prosperity, and they knew that they were required to make compromises that they might not have been willing to make in the past. The BLTP came in at the right time and helped people to adopt new attitudes and build new relationships that could enable them to more effectively navigate this new terrain.

The alignment between the BLTP’s approach and the needs of the Burundian context was not accidental. The BLTP proved to be able to learn from

its environment and adapt its approach to new and emerging opportunities. This contextual “coherence”—how well a project fits within the overall political, military, economic, and aid components of the international community’s actions—requires organizational flexibility. The degree of coherence of the BLTP was high, for it was explicitly and intelligently designed to complement the already existing approaches of the UN mission, the South African facilitation, and bilateral donors. Thus, an important factor in the BLTP’s success was this high “conjunctural” and “transformative capacity responsiveness,” referring to its capacity to respond flexibly to opportunities and challenges as they emerged while still maintaining a sense of the longer term—a vision of transformation.²⁴ The BLTP was a flexible, learning-oriented project, in constant communication with other players, and willing to question and change its own approach. The unplanned but especially relevant targeted military workshops of the EMGI were an important example of this “conjunctural response capacity.”

In a broader perspective, the BLTP achieved great relevance, contextual coherence, and flexibility with little in the way of formalized conflict-sensitive systems. Granted, it did not conduct cutting-edge conflict assessments, it did not systematically question and evaluate the relevance of its approach, and it did not produce good monitoring data at all—its written reports are relentlessly upbeat and un-self-critical. And yet its organizational systems clearly worked well, suggesting that a clear vision and a willingness to adapt to reach this vision, rather than highly developed analytical procedures, explain its success. This runs counter to much of the specialized literature on conflict sensitivity, which is characterized by an ever-growing quest for analysis, programming, and monitoring systems.²⁵

Two factors may help explain the BLTP’s contextual relevance. First, the BLTP team was small and made up of high-caliber people who were willing to learn and make quick changes once better approaches were identified. Second, there was the personality of Howard Wolpe, which had deep imprints on the BLTP’s functioning: he acted both as an idealistic believer—to the point of looking almost naïve at times—and as a hard-headed realist, patient and well versed in the games of politics. This demeanor allowed him constantly to remain open to people, take them at their word, welcome them with open arms, and remain enthusiastic, while at the same time avoid being rapidly disappointed or easily tricked. Indeed, Wolpe’s combination of trust and knowledge may have substituted for well-developed program design and monitoring systems. The role that the knowledge, approach, and skill-set of the BLTP team played in its success questions the value of the conflict

analysis and assessment tools that peacebuilding organizations are encouraged to use. The BLTP case shows that these assessment and analysis tools cannot substitute for deep professional experience and political sensitivity.

Policy Implications: Changing People and Institutions

The design and contribution of the BLTP may have significant implications for similar projects in other countries. A full assessment of these policy implications requires a discussion of the complexity of trust-building, the debate as to whether institutional or individual transformation must come first, the importance of contextual ripeness for the success of BLTP-type projects, the positives and negatives of an apolitical approach, and general lessons for other projects that aim to replicate the program's approach and contribution.

Building Trust: No Magic Solution

The BLTP sought to deal with the problem of mistrust during Burundi's transitional period. As table 8.2 (developed in discussion with BLTP staff) shows, there are many causes of mistrust in Burundian society. The BLTP could not and did not address many of these factors, as key variables that condition the changes it sought to promote were outside of its control. The participants may have made progress in overcoming some of the causes of mistrust, but as the other causes could still have been in place, major counterpressures remained at work. In addition, participants may have built greater trust between themselves, but not toward others outside the workshop. The new incentives for collaboration and compromise during Burundi's transitional phase tried to address some of the other variables affecting trust (especially the "lack of knowledge" and "impunity" causes shown in table 8.2), but neglected the ones that the program directly addressed.

In short, one could argue that the BLTP covered a neglected yet important area in the transitional process of Burundi. It could not control all relevant variables, but neither could other projects or actions. Its contribution was important and necessary, although insufficient by itself—a fact that is also true for most other activities and projects. Since the initial implementation of the BLTP, this type of leadership-dialogue training has been replicated in several other countries that are emerging from war. The BLTP experience suggests that the effectiveness of these BLTP-type projects depends in part

Table 8.2. Aspects of Mistrust in Burundian Society

Cause of mistrust	Relation to the war	Entry points and possible solutions
Stereotypes and misperceptions	Predate, but significantly worsened by war	Attitude change; education system and reconciliation mechanisms
Lack of interaction	Mainly created by the war	Communication and shared resources
Cultural differences	Long predate war	Long-term and hardly programmable, although education, spirituality, and sensitization are important
Past wrongs	Predate, but significantly worsened by war	The past cannot be undone, but transitional justice may contribute to acceptance
Lack of knowledge	Precedes, but significantly worsened by war	Media, improved governance, truth commission
Impunity	Precedes, but may be worsened by war	Justice, rule of law, improved governance

on how these new projects address the particular causes of mistrust among individuals in each of these countries.

Institutions and Individuals: Beyond the Chicken and the Egg

The BLTP's approach situates it within an important debate about the relative importance of individuals and institutions in initiating change. In the case of the program's targeted workshops, the willingness of individuals to transform institutions depended on the incentives for change that existed within a particular institution. The BLTP's contribution to organizational or institutional change was much weaker for organizations where the incentives were not stacked to encourage cooperation and compromise (as with the Joint Ceasefire Commission) or where there was not an important organizational platform (the Ngozi I–III followup workshops). The incentives for change may have been particularly evident within Burundi's military institution. Once it was clear that the peace process was progressing, many high-level members of the military saw the integration of the army as a way to secure a seat in power by ensuring that they had a position in Burundi's strongest governmental institution. The same opportunity did not exist under a purely representative system, which could result in a complete reshuffling of

the military and the exclusion of many of the Tutsi who had previously dominated this institution. In other transitional institutions, such as the Burundian Parliament and the political parties, the incentives for change were much weaker because progress (such as elections) would mean the eventual loss of power of many individuals within these institutions.

In the chicken-and-egg debate about whether institutional change or individual change must occur first for peace to take hold, it seems that both need to occur more or less simultaneously. Individual change can only be undertaken in a sustained and active manner when the institutions that they belong to begin creating credible new incentives; the former will strengthen the latter, and vice versa. Individuals establish a new organizational structure and then learn how to function differently within that structure.²⁶ In this way, they strengthen each other, push each other further, and iteratively create solid foundations for lasting change. The new institutions and organizations become more solid because they are created and transformed by people who believe in them. Changes in people's attitudes and beliefs are more durable since they are congruent with and reinforced by institutions and organizations.

The BLTP facilitated increased cooperation and understanding between individuals with incentives to do so. It did not cause the cooperation, but took an environment conducive to cooperation and helped it to happen by showing that a win-win approach was possible with the right tools and attitude. This gave old and new players in the Burundian political game new confidence. This is not to say that the BLTP was not of major importance. At best, it acted as a catalyst for change, allowing people to overcome individual and social barriers that could have undermined fragile institutional change. In doing so, it strengthened and substantiated these nascent institutional changes, making them less fragile, allowing them to move on.

Ripeness for Cooperation and Compromise

Institutional ripeness—at the level of the conflict and peace process and at the level of specific organizations—mattered for the BLTP's success. Our concept of “institutional ripeness” builds on I. William Zartman's concept of conflict ripeness—the moment when key decision-makers that are party to a conflict become ready to negotiate.²⁷ It refers to an institution's readiness for a particular type of peacebuilding intervention. One can assess the degree of ripeness by assessing the *fit* between the characteristics of peacebuilding intervention and the characteristics of the target institution.

Generally, Burundi was entering a phase where a military stalemate, and the economic pain inflicted on almost all people, rich or poor, meant that the overwhelming majority of people were ready for change. The Arusha and Pretoria agreements, and the constant international pressure to implement them, created a climate that was strongly in favor of compromise and collaboration—if only people had the tools to work together more effectively. This was very different from Rwanda a decade earlier, where both major sides to the conflict, the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the National Revolutionary Movement for Development, believed that war would serve them best and that total victory was possible. In Burundi, war had been tried for ten long and miserable years, and it was clear to all that the military option had been a costly failure. In this ripe climate, people were interested in participating in the process that the BLTP offered.

Still, even in this favorable context, a major gap remained between individual change—no matter how profound—and the creation of macropolitical change. For this reason, the impact of the Ngozi (I–III) workshops is hard to demonstrate. That said, it seems that more was possible here, both in pushing for macropolitical change and in documenting it. For this reason, some of the targeted workshops were most successful because they were microclimates of ripeness, allowing the macropolitical change to take place immediately. As a result, apart from the quality of the workshops, three factors explain the success of the targeted workshops. First, institutional and organizational incentives favored compromise. Second, important and highly specific problems needed to be addressed within the targeted organizations. Third, most of the important people who needed to address these problems could be trained. Once these factors were addressed, major progress was made—institutional transformation was promoted—which created enthusiasm and confidence for more of the same. Thus, country-, institution-, and organization-specific ripeness was instrumental in the success of the targeted workshops.

Replicability

Can the success of the BLTP be replicated in other countries and contexts? It will depend on how the new context and program design aligns with the major factors that led to the program's successes: the staff; the contextual, organizational, and institutional ripeness; and the political receptivity of the country to the BLTP team and its supporters.

It should be reiterated that the political clout and credibility of Howard Wolpe and Eugene Nindorera were crucial in getting the BLTP off to a good start. Indeed, a key factor in the program's success was the presence of two well-known, widely respected, experienced, and committed political leaders who were able to negotiate political buy-in, seek institutional opportunities that were ripe for the BLTP process, and maintain credibility in the eyes of all of the leaders.

Contextual, organizational, and institutional ripeness also matter. Several BLTP participants said that the program would have been useful prior to and during the Arusha peace negotiations because of the poor negotiation and communication skills of the people around the table. Indeed, the BLTP could have been an effective tool in prenegotiation processes, particularly if it had trained everyone who would be present at the negotiation table. Nonetheless, the dynamic of the workshops' impact likely would have been different during this prenegotiation phase when the incentives were not in favor of cooperation and compromise. It is unlikely that the participants would have been so open to the BLTP approach or that it would have resonated so clearly with them. The dialogue sessions that took place during the war, such as International Alert's CAP (Compagnie des Apôtres de la Paix), were surrounded by much more secrecy than the BLTP and took much longer to achieve the interpersonal results that the BLTP facilitated in a relatively short time.

Finally, the home country of the program staff and the identities of the major donors matter. One aspect of the BLTP that contributed to its success was its perceived neutrality. It was able to bring a politically and ethnically diverse group of people together without too much suspicion about ulterior motives (although there is always some talk). The credibility of the BLTP staff greatly enabled this difficult task, but the relationship between Burundi and the staff members' home countries also improved its outcome. A group of Americans running a BLTP-like program in Iraq or Afghanistan would have a very different experience; the project would likely have a much narrower degree of success. This international political context should be taken into consideration when deciding whether a BLTP-type program could be applied to other countries and contexts.

Future leadership training initiatives can learn an enormous amount from the BLTP. The abovementioned evidence shows that individual transformation can lead to institutional transformation under the right conditions. Open communication between former enemies can have a profound effect

not only in the moment but also in the future. An empowerment alternative can provide critical support and encouragement to embattled transitional leaders charged with seemingly impossible political tasks. Yet so much of the BLTP's contribution depended on *how* it navigated the complex political context in Burundi. The specific training and dialogue tools and techniques were of secondary importance to the program team's understanding of the needs and concerns of the leaders of Burundi's transition, and their ability to reach out to these leaders. The BLTP's contribution derives from how it situated itself within Burundi's dynamic political context, built on earlier lessons learned, and brought Burundi's leadership together with courage and determination.

With a successful project, the risk is that the real lessons that should be learned will be lost in the effort to replicate its successes in other locales. Others could be tempted to duplicate the BLTP's program directly. The lessons to be drawn from the BLTP are the importance of a deep understanding of the political situation in the country; the need to learn from feedback about the project and changes in this situation; and contextual, institutional, and organizational ripeness. There is also the risk of falling into the traps of either overattribution or cynicism. The BLTP did not build peace in Burundi. It did not transform all of Burundi's leaders into peace-loving, cooperative individuals. At the same time, it was not a waste of time and money. It helped several leaders build relationships and gain tools that, in conducive institutional and organizational contexts, helped to achieve significant breakthroughs and increase understanding and confidence. If this nuanced understanding of the factors that contributed to the BLTP's success, and what that success entailed, can be conveyed to others seeking to roll out similar initiatives, then these initiatives may have a chance to make an important contribution to another country's difficult emergence from war.

Followup and Conclusion

Since the evaluation that this chapter is based on was completed, the BLTP's influence has diminished. After Pierre Nkurunzia was elected president in 2005, the Burundian government, attempting to establish its hegemony, was no longer receptive to being "trained" by the BLTP team or receiving advice from other international actors.²⁸ Over the subsequent ten years, a tug-of-war ensued between authoritarian practices and democratic dialogue, with the former gradually winning out.²⁹ During this period, the BLTP offered

crucial support to dialogue efforts organized by the UN and international NGOs but did not lead its own high-level consultations or workshops.³⁰ Now a national NGO, the BLTP has become a conflict resolution training organization, stepping away from the specific role it played as “the” convener of Burundi’s political class in 2003 and 2004. The BLTP team no longer has the influence it once had, and the Burundian government is no longer as open to international dialogue efforts as it once was. As the BLTP never developed a space where Burundi’s leaders could address the real issues undergirding the country’s political conflict, it has not had the capacity to mitigate the growing polarization among this political class. The effectiveness of organizations like the BLTP, which aim to transform the nature of political dialogue in war-torn countries, depends in large part on how their team and approach fit with fleeting opportunities in a rapidly changing political landscape.

Notes

1. Howard Wolpe and Steve McDonald, *Proposal for Renewing and Expanding the World Bank/WWICS Partnership in Post-Conflict Burundi*, (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, July 2004), 1

2. In May 2004, the World Bank Post-Conflict Fund contracted Peter Uvin and Susanna Campbell to conduct an independent external evaluation of the Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP). The evaluation—*The Burundi Leadership Training Program: A Prospective Assessment*—was finalized on July 23, 2004. This chapter is based on the evaluation and uses some of the text of the final evaluation report. The report was based on interviews with forty-seven people: the project team, twenty-five participants chosen in proportion to their participation and at random from among their constituent groups (e.g., rebel, government, civil society), and sixteen observers primarily from international organizations. The authors also assisted at the Ngozi III workshop and at two followup workshops. Finally, both of the authors have worked in Burundi for years, and were quite familiar with the challenges the program was seeking to address.

3. The Tutsi-Hima were the lower-class Tutsi. René Lemarchand cites their perception of exclusion and disadvantage as a primary motivating factor for their capture of the postcolonial Burundian state. René Lemarchand, *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 4–5.

4. See Michael S. Lund, Barnett R. Rubin, and Fabienne Hara, “Learning from Burundi’s Failed Democratic Transition, 1993–1996: Did International Initiatives Match the Problem?,” in *Cases and Strategies for Preventive Action*, ed. Barnett R. Rubin, (New York: Century Foundation Press, 1998), 66. See also Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis, “Civil War and the Security Dilemma,” in *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention*, ed. Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 29–30.

5. Lund, Rubin, and Hara, "Learning from Burundi's Failed Democratic Transition," 48. See also Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, *Burundi on the Brink, 1993–95: A UN Special Envoy Reflects on Preventive Diplomacy* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000). A "jawboning delegation" refers to a delegation that aims to use its position and authority to persuade another individual or group to take action.

6. Lund, Rubin, and Hara, "Learning from Burundi's Failed Democratic Transition," 48.

7. *Ibid.*, 73–75. Some of the most notable dialogue and facilitation efforts in Burundi were run by The Carter Center, the Community of Sant'Egidio, International Alert, Accord, International Center for Conflict Resolution, Search for Common Ground, International Crisis Group, Parliamentarians for Global Action, Swedish Agency for International Development Cooperation, United Methodist Church, Synergies Africa, and World Vision. These projects variously aimed to train politicians in the skills and values required by democratic institutions, promote human rights and humanitarian law, train Hutus and Tutsis in conflict resolution, teach a "culture of peace," promote reconciliation by helping people to work together to address common problems, disseminate conflict resolution and interethnic coexistence through radio programs, fund various indigenous NGOs (e.g., women's, peace movement, dialogue groups), encourage dialogue, take selected leaders on trips to study conflict resolution and interethnic or interracial projects in South Africa and the United States, produce educational materials on democracy, coordinate efforts and strategic thinking among the various organizations involved, work with elders to reintegrate displaced and dispersed people into their *collines* ("hills": the units of rural settlement in Burundi and Rwanda), and more.

8. At the time of Ambassador Dinka's appointment as the head of the Implementation Monitoring Committee, he was the Secretary-General's Special Representative and Regional Humanitarian Advisor for the Great Lakes Region. United Nations Information Service, "Biographical Note: Secretary-General Appoints Berhanu Dinka as His Special Representative for Burundi," United Nations, New York, July 24, 2002, <http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2002/sga811.html>.

9. Report by the working group of the Commission de Suivi de l'application de l'Accord d'Arusha/Implementation Monitoring Commission (CSAA/IMC) Executive Committee, together with other transition institutions, pursuant to its charter, 8th Session, April 22–26, 2002, quoted in International Crisis Group, *Burundi after Six Months of Transition: Continuing the War or Winning Peace?*, Africa Report No. 46 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, May 24, 2002), 7, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/burundi/046-burundi-after-six-months-of-transition-continuing-the-war-or-winning-peace.aspx>.

10. See International Crisis Group, *A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi*, Africa Report No. 57 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, February 21, 2003).

11. Howard Wolpe and Steve McDonald, "Burundi's Transition: Training Leaders for Peace," *Journal of Democracy* 17, no. 1 (January 2006): 126–27.

12. "Training is a skill-building exercise to prepare participants to be more effective as they work out their dispute." Eileen F. Babbitt, "Contributions of Training to International Conflict Resolution," in *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*, ed. I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 368.

13. Like Kelman's problem-solving workshops, the BLTP sought to impact political negotiations. Unlike Kelman's problem-solving workshops, the BLTP took place in a

postaccord environment, and did not specifically address political issues or grievances or directly target any ongoing negotiations or specific conflicts. Herbert C. Kelman, "Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner," in *Mediation in International Relations*, ed. Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 75.

14. Wolpe and McDonald, *Proposal for Renewing and Expanding the World Bank/WWICS Partnership*, 2.

15. Wolpe and McDonald, "Burundi's Transition," 126–27, 131.

16. Cheyenne Church and Julie Shouldice, *The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions: Part II: Emerging Practice & Theory* (Londonderry, UK: INCORE, 2003).

17. Further discussion of theory-based evaluation and evaluating the success of peacebuilding programming is found in Johanna D. Birckmayer and Carol Hirschon Weiss, "Theory-Based Evaluation in Practice: What Do We Learn?," *Evaluation Review* 24, no. 4 (August 2000): 407–31; and Thania Paffenholz and Luc Reyhler, "Towards Better Policy and Programme Work in Conflict Zones: Introducing the 'Aid for Peace' Approach," *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 2, no. 2 (2005): 6–23.

18. The challenges of and opportunities for evaluating the impact of unofficial dialogue processes are discussed in Nadim N. Rouhana, "Interactive Conflict Resolution: Issues in Theory, Methodology, and Evaluation" in *International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War*, ed. Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2000), 294–337.

19. Howard Wolpe with Steve McDonald et al., "Rebuilding Peace and State Capacity in War-torn Burundi," *The Round Table* 93, no. 375 (July 2004): 466.

20. As we wrote: "At some point, then (either at the end of the initial workshop or during the follow-up workshops), the BLTP needs to start dealing more explicitly with the concrete level, the compromises and sacrifices and intermediary steps and guarantees required." Peter Uvin and Susanna P. Campbell, *The Burundi Leadership Training Program: A Prospective Assessment* (Washington, DC: World Bank, July 23, 2004), para. 74.

21. Herbert C. Kelman, "Contributions of an Unofficial Conflict Resolution Effort to the Israeli-Palestinian Breakthrough," *Negotiation Journal* 11, no. 1 (January 1995): 19–27.

22. John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 144–46.

23. I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict Resolution in Africa*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); I. William Zartman, "Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond," in Stern and Druckman, *International Conflict Resolution*, 225–50.

24. Lederach, *Building Peace*, 144–46.

25. International Alert, Saferworld, and FEWER, *Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding: A Resource Pack* (London: Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2004).

26. Organizations are recognizable structures that may represent one or more institutions. According to W. Richard Scott, "institutions are multifaceted, durable social structures, made up of symbolic elements, social activities, and material resources." W. Richard Scott, *Institutions and Organizations*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2001), 49. Organizations "are collectives oriented to the pursuit of relatively specific goals and exhibiting relatively highly formalized social structures."

W. Richard Scott and Gerald F. Davis, *Organizations and Organizing: Rational, Natural, and Open System Perspectives* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007), 29.

27. Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution*; Zartman, "Ripeness," in Stern and Druckman, *International Conflict Resolution*, 225–50; Dean G. Pruitt, *Whither Ripeness Theory?*, Working Paper No. 25 (Fairfax, VA: Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, 2005).

28. See Susanna P. Campbell, *Organizational Barriers to Peace: Agency and Structure in International Peacebuilding* (Medford, MA: Tufts University, 2012).

29. Human Rights Watch, *Pursuit of Power: Political Violence and Repression in Burundi* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009).

30. Interview with BLTP staff member (B9).