

Independent External Evaluation

UN Peacebuilding Fund Project Portfolio in Burundi

2007 – 2013



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The UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the PBF Joint Steering Committee (JSC) in Burundi commissioned this independent external evaluation. The Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) at The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva put together the evaluation team, which included: Susanna Campbell (Team Lead), Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva (susanna.campbell@graduateinstitute.ch); Tracy Dexter, Independent Consultant, Bujumbura (tdburundi@yahoo.com); Michael Findley, University of Texas at Austin (mikefindley@austin.utexas.edu); Stephanie Hofmann, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva (stephanie.hofmann@graduateinstitute.ch); Josiah Marineau, University of Texas at Austin (josiah.marineau@utexas.edu); and Daniel Walker, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign (dwalker5@illinois.edu). The CCDP Team also benefitted from the excellent research skills of two independent Burundian evaluators that the UN in Burundi contracted for this evaluation: Anne Marie Bihirabake (abihirabake@yahoo.fr), who carried out the colline-level semi-structured interviews, and René Manirakiza (manirakiza72@yahoo.fr), who managed the household-level survey. Jamie Pring (jamie.pring@graduateinstitute.ch) and Natasha White (natasha.white@graduateinstitute.ch), both from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, provided superb research assistance. Last, but certainly not least, three excellent Burundian surveyors conducted the household-level surveys, Dieudonne Ndayiziga, Ferdinand Niyoyankunze, and James Simbizi.

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Executive Summary

Between 2007 and 2013, the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) allocated US\$ 44 million from their Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility (PRF) and US\$ 5 million from their Immediate Response Facility (IRF) to help consolidate peace in Burundi. This makes Burundi the top recipient of PBF funds out of the 23 countries that the PBF has supported. Burundi was also one of the first two countries, along with Sierra Leone, to receive PBF funding. The duration and magnitude of the PBF's support to Burundi make it an important case to study and understand.

This evaluation is different from the other evaluations that the PBF has commissioned because it assesses the contribution of the PBF support to Burundi's post-war transition for the entire period of PBF support to Burundi (2007 – 2013), which included two tranches of PBF funding (PBF I and PBF II) and the preparation of a third one (PBF III), and draws lessons for the PBF based on its support over this entire period. The same lead evaluator that evaluated the first PBF tranche in 2010 also led this evaluation, enabling the evaluation team to conduct an in-depth comparison of PBF support in different sectors, with different staff, and to different configurations of the UN at the country level.¹ To do this, the evaluation employed an innovative research design that is grounded in a household-level survey of over 250 households from randomly sampled collines with and without PBF involvement, and over 165 semi-structured interviews, 90 of which are drawn from the randomly sampled collines, as well as a detailed document review. A team of thirteen researchers and research assistants conducted this evaluation.

Combined with the efforts of the chair of the Burundi country configuration of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the Representatives of the UN Secretary-Generals in Burundi, the PBF was a powerful tool that helped the UN implement innovative peacebuilding programming. There was no equivalent funding source for the UN to do peacebuilding programming in Burundi. Some of the projects that the PBF funded made a crucial positive contribution to Burundi's peacebuilding process and achieved aspects of the Security Council mandate that would have been difficult to do without PBF funding. It provided crucial inputs that advanced Burundi's ongoing political negotiations, helping to: unblock a deadlock in the Burundian Parliament in 2007; remove the final remaining barrier to the transformation of the FNL rebel group into a political party in 2009; address several critical logistical barriers in the organization of the 2010 elections; calm communities in provinces that received a high number of IDPs and ex-combatants, and had suffered from the high levels of political violence and instability surrounding the 2010 elections; and it supported dialogue workshops in 2013 that made progress toward breaking another deadlock between political parties surrounding the preparation for the 2015 elections.

PBF also supported key institutional reforms in institutions that are considered to be central to the development of a liberal democratic state that can sustain peace, by funding the establishment of the Independent National Commission for Human Rights (CNIDH) and advancing crucial reforms in the Burundian military, both of which catalyzed additional funding for these reforms from other donors and helped to build core national capacity in these institutions. It also supported improved inter-group social cohesion among returning ex-combatants, IDPs, and their host communities in Bujumbura Rural, Bubanza, and Cibitoke. In the survey that we conducted in these three provinces, respondents in the collines where the PBF II activities were implemented reported that participation of individuals in local associations led to an increase in the amount of intergroup social cohesion in their particular collines relative to collines without PBF

¹ Campbell, Susanna P. *Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi*. (New York: United Nations, 2010).

involvement (by about 29%). Because strengthening and working through local associations was a key strategy of the PBF-funded projects, the finding demonstrates that this was a good strategy, and that it contributed to the perception of increased inter-group social cohesion in the areas in which it was implemented (See Annex 3: Table 8).

In spite of these clear successes, there were important weaknesses in some of the projects that the PBF supported in Burundi. During the first tranche (PBF I) of US\$ 35 million, only seven out of eighteen projects were both effective at contributing to their project specific goals and relevant to key peacebuilding priorities in Burundi. In several instances, PBF I projects even had a negative effect on key peacebuilding priorities. During the second tranche (PBF II) of US\$ 9.2 million², many of the activities, as they were implemented, were not infused with a peacebuilding lens and lacked a plan for sustainability and follow-up procedures that threatened to erode the gains made by the PBF activities. In two out of the thirteen collines where we conducted interviews, the activities that the PBF II supported had some negative effects on its intended beneficiaries. While the PBF has supported several ‘high-risk’ projects and peacebuilding activities should never expect to have a 100% success rate, our research shows that the PBF would most likely have made an even greater contribution to Burundi’s war-to-peace transition if it had addressed several systemic issues in relation to the design, implementation, and monitoring of these activities.

The contribution of PBF-funded projects depended on whether they were implemented by teams with political, peacebuilding programming, and monitoring knowledge; whether they were supported by innovative feedback mechanisms from a representative group of stakeholders; and whether they had national partners that were invested in both the idea and the implementation of the activity. This type of politically informed programming was not standard practice for Recipient UN Organizations (RUNOs), who often followed the traditional political and technical divide. Those at the top of the organizational hierarchy focus on political concerns whereas those who implement projects and programs focus on the technical implementation of the project as designed, without necessarily being expected to adjust the project in line with changing circumstances or new revelations about the conflict and peace dynamics.

These weaknesses of the PBF projects are due, in part, to several systemic issues in the UN. As the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) has stated in its own guidelines, “strengthening or rebuilding the foundations of a society that has been torn apart by conflict is not business as usual.”³ Both the 2010 independent evaluation of the PBF support to Burundi and this independent evaluation find that there are important accountability and capacity gaps in the relationship between the PBSO, the Joint Steering Committee (JSC) – the country-based body assigned with overseeing the PBF portfolio – and the RUNOs, which inhibit the effectiveness of the projects that the PBF funds.

To improve the success rates of PBF-funded projects, our assessment of the PBF’s support to Burundi indicates that three systemic problems need to be addressed: the insufficient capacity within RUNOs to design, implement, and monitor this distinctive type of programming which we call “high quality peacebuilding programming”; the insufficient accompaniment and support capacity of the PBSO and RUNOs; and the fact that lessons about processes, practices, and mechanisms that support high quality peacebuilding programming are not transferred from one recipient country to the other, or between country teams in one country. The lessons outlined here should be integrated into the PBF’s new application guidelines, applied to the next round of PBF support to Burundi, and adapted for other countries that receive PBF funding.

² These figures are found at <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/country/BDI>.

³ United Nations, *UN Peacebuilding: An Orientation*, (New York: United Nations, 2010), p. 14.

1. Introduction

The UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) was established in 2006 to “support activities, actions, programs and organizations that seek to build a lasting peace in countries emerging from conflict”.⁴ This report evaluates the first and second tranches of PBF support to Burundi. Carried out by the Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, this evaluation has several different objectives. First, it assesses the impact of the entire PBF envelope from 2007 to 2013 and the associated management and oversight structures, to changes in Burundi’s institutions and socio-economic situation that are related to the causes of its civil war and the prevention of the possible escalation of violent conflict in the future. Second, it assesses the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, catalytic contribution, level of national ownership, and degree of upward and downward accountability of the second tranche of PBF support to Burundi (US\$ 9.2 million), and the projects from PBF I and the Immediate Response Facility (IRF) that carried over beyond the 2010 evaluation. Third, it assesses the PBF management and oversight structures in Burundi and at headquarters, the relationship between the PBF and the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in Burundi, and the relationship between the three different tranches of PBF support to Burundi (PBF I, II, and III).

Unlike most country-based evaluations, this evaluation aims to draw general lessons of the PBF’s engagement with one country over several tranches of funding, between 2007 and 2013. Because Burundi was one of the first two countries to receive PBF Support, and because the team lead of this evaluation was also the team lead of the first evaluation of PBF Support to Burundi, conducted in 2010, this evaluation offers an important opportunity to learn the lessons that the PBF’s engagement with Burundi have to offer for the PBF and the UN Peacebuilding Architecture in general.

1.1 Synthesis of PBF’s involvement in Burundi

At the request of the Burundian government, Burundi was placed on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in 2006, and it has since remained on the PBC’s agenda. The UN subsequently declared the country eligible to receive support from the PBF. In early 2007, the PBF allocated US\$ 35 million to Burundi to fund the first Peacebuilding Priority Plan, which spanned from 2007 to early 2010. The PBF also funded two short-term projects with US\$ 5 million through its Immediate Response Facility, the IRF.

The first Peacebuilding Priority Plan in Burundi covered four key areas:

- 1) Governance and peace, focusing on democratic governance, elections and strengthening of peace and social cohesion through the role of youth and women;
- 2) Rule of law in the security sector, focusing on professionalization of the National Defense Forces, capacity-building for the National Police and disarmament of civil populations;
- 3) Justice, human rights and reconciliation, focusing on strengthening the judiciary, establishing a National Independent Human Rights Commission and the national ownership of the reconciliation process;

⁴ United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, *United Nations Peacebuilding Fund: Who We Are*. Available at: <http://www.unpbf.org/who-we-are/> (Last accessed on December 18, 2013).

- 4) Land issues, with a focus on resettling the returning refugees and resolution of land disputes.

Six Recipient UN Organizations (RUNOs) – OHCHR, UNDP, UNDPKO, UNFPA, UNHCR and UNIFEM – implemented the eighteen projects funded by the first tranche.

The PBF allocated a second tranche of US\$ 9.2 million to Burundi in 2011. Designed primarily for the socio-economic reintegration of populations affected by conflict, such as former combatants, returned refugees, and internally displaced persons, the second tranche of funding focused almost exclusively on the community level. The reintegration program was concentrated in the provinces of Bujumbura Rural, Bubanza, and Cibitoke, and was implemented by four of the same UN entities that implemented the PBF I projects – UNDP, UNHCR, and UN Women - as well as two new ones: FAO and ILO.⁵

1.2 The Purpose of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and the PBF

In 2006, the UN established the UN Peacebuilding Architecture to “help countries build sustainable peace and prevent relapse into violent conflict”.⁶ According to the definition developed by the UN Secretary-General’s Policy Committee in May 2007, peacebuilding includes:

“a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.”⁷

The UN Peacebuilding Architecture is made up of the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). The PBC is the intergovernmental body, which monitors countries on its agenda and provides good offices to these countries through the chairman of each country configuration. The PBSO is the bureaucratic arm of the architecture, charged with supporting the PBC and managing the PBF under the leadership of the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support. The UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) is the funding instrument of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and was established to “support activities, actions, programs and organizations that seek to build a lasting peace in countries emerging from conflict”.⁸

Within this overall aim, the PBF has refined its mandate to support a particular type of peacebuilding programming: that which is short-term, fills existing funding gaps, catalyzes new follow-on peacebuilding programming and funding, is nationally-owned, and has “a direct and

⁵ United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, *Burundi Overview*. Available at: <http://www.unpbf.org/countries/burundi/> (Last accessed on December 18, 2013).

⁶ United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, *United Nations Peacebuilding Fund: Who We Are*. Available at: <http://www.unpbf.org/who-we-are/> (last accessed on December 18, 2013).

⁷ United Nations, *UN Peacebuilding: An Orientation*, (New York: United Nations, 2010), 49.

⁸ United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, *United Nations Peacebuilding Fund: Who We Are*. Available at: <http://www.unpbf.org/who-we-are/> (Last accessed on December 18, 2013).

positive impact on the sustainability of the peacebuilding process".⁹ It has also indicated that it aims to support projects or programs that achieve four peacebuilding outcomes:

1. Remove imminent threats to the peace process, advance the achievement and/or implementation of peace agreements, and encourage political dialogue.¹⁰
2. Build or strengthen national capacities to promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict.¹¹
3. Stimulate economic revitalization and generate peace dividends.
4. Re-establish essential administrative services.

The PBF does not aim to support standard UN programming that could be implemented in the same way in a peaceful country as it would in a post-conflict country. It aims to support programming that pursues one of the above four peacebuilding outcomes and is implemented in a *conflict sensitive* way: "peacebuilding is about "how" things are done as much as about "what" is done."¹² Conflict sensitivity means that activities are based on a solid understanding of the conflict and peace (i.e. political) dynamics that they aim to influence, they gather and internalize regular information about the interaction between their activities and these dynamics, and they adjust their programming in response to this information to improve their peacebuilding contribution.¹³ From this perspective, the separation of the political and operational perspectives does not make sense. An understanding of the political dynamics and how they are infused within the operational reality is a core component of conflict sensitivity and this goes beyond the conflict analysis that was conducted for the PBF in Burundi. Conflict analysis is a necessary but highly insufficient condition for conflict sensitivity. Regular monitoring, consultation with a broad group of stakeholders, and the ongoing adjustment of the activities and, possibly, their aims are also likely to be necessary.¹⁴

To achieve consistently high quality peacebuilding programming, implementing organizations should be highly attuned to the power dynamics of the contexts in which they operate, question their influence on those contexts, and adjust their approach and overall 'theory of change' as the context and its dynamics change.¹⁵ In this evaluation, we assess the degree to which the PBF portfolio achieved its stated peacebuilding aims, the relevance and importance of these aims, and the factors that facilitated or undermined the effect of the PBF-funded activities.

⁹ United Nations General Assembly, *Arrangements for the revision of the terms of reference for the Peacebuilding Fund*, A/63/818, (New York: United Nations, 2009), 5. Available at: <http://www.unpbf.org/document-archives/terms-of-reference/> (Last accessed February 2, 2014).

¹⁰ This is rephrased from the priority area that the PBSO outlined for the PBF, which is "Respond to imminent threats to the peace process, or support peace agreements or political dialogue". We rephrased this statement so that it sounds like a desired outcome rather than categories of projects.

¹¹ The wording of this outcome and the subsequent two outcomes is taken directly from the PBF documents. United Nations General Assembly, *Arrangements for the revision of the terms of reference for the Peacebuilding Fund*, A/63/818, (New York: United Nations, 2009).

¹² United Nations, *UN Peacebuilding: An Orientation*, (New York: United Nations, 2010), p.14.

¹³ United Nations, *UN Peacebuilding: An Orientation*, (New York: United Nations, 2010), pp. 14-16.

¹⁴ Campbell, Susanna P. "When process matters: the potential implications of organizational learning for peacebuilding success." *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 4: 2 (2008) pp. 20-32.

¹⁵ 'Theory of change' refers to the project's theory about how it will influence the likely drivers of conflict and peace that it has identified. See Campbell, Susanna P. "When process matters: the potential implications of organizational learning for peacebuilding success." *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 4: 2 (2008) pp. 20-32, and Campbell, Susanna P. *Organizational Barriers to Peace: Agency and Structure in International Peacebuilding*, Dissertation, Tufts University, 2012.

1.3 Evaluation Criteria, Research Design, and Methodology

The primary difference between peacebuilding evaluations and other types of evaluations is that peacebuilding evaluations should not only assess whether or not the project or program achieved its stated aims, objectives, and indicators. Peacebuilding evaluation should assess the relevance of these aims to the potential drivers of conflict and peace and whether these aims and their related activities remain relevant during the implementation phase.

1.3.1 Evaluation Criteria

The Terms of Reference for this evaluation outlined six criteria for evaluating the overall PBF portfolio and the individual project interventions: Relevance; Effectiveness; Efficiency; Sustainability or Catalytic Effect; National Ownership; and Transparency and Accountability. We have added one additional criterion, outreach with governmental and non-governmental national and international actors, which is necessary for a catalytic effect.

We also have grouped the evaluation criteria into two general categories: those that focus on the desired implementation *means* (Efficiency, National Ownership, Transparency, Accountability, Outreach) and those that focus on the desired *ends* (Relevance, Effectiveness, Catalytic Effect, Sustainability) (these criteria are discussed in detail in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of this report.) The criteria that focus on the means are assumed to be necessary for the achievement of the desired ends of the project. This also allows us to assess the tradeoffs that may come into play between the different criteria that fit within the desired means of implementation. For example, as will be discussed later for PBF II, the efficient delivery of the project within the specified time frame may be at odds with the goal of national ownership. National ownership may require the project to invest a higher degree of time and resources in ensuring that there is both buy-in into the project on behalf of the national partners and that the relevant national capacity has been mobilized to ensure that national actors can participate in the implementation of the project.

1.3.2 Methodology and Research Design

This evaluation employed a multi-method approach, utilizing both qualitative and quantitative data including interviews, surveys, and quantitative data analysis with third-party data. This multi-method approach enabled the evaluation to trace the implementation chain and management of each project and assess whether the project achieved the research goals outlined above (see Annex 2 for a detailed description of the research design and methods, and the Supplemental Annex for the supporting documents.) This method is particularly suited for this evaluation because it allows us to assess the effect of both the PBF I and the PBF II projects, which the UN implemented in the areas where we conducted our surveys and interviews, in addition to other activities. All of the data included in this report are drawn from the approach described here. We only cite specific interviews when we use quotes and triangulate all of our findings. The primary constraint that we faced was time. The evaluation team did all of the research and analysis and wrote the first draft of the report over a 10-week period from mid-October to mid-December 2013.

The research team – composed of 5 Burundians (2 of whom were senior evaluators), 5 international researchers with deep knowledge of Burundi and research methods, and 2 research assistants – collected quantitative data from third-party sources, ISTEERU, and different Burundian Ministries to establish the basic social, economic, and political trends at the colline, commune, provincial, and national level between 2007 and 2013. The evaluation then used statistical matching algorithms to match collines that are similar in all aspects except for the PBF activity, which allowed us to isolate the unique impact of the PBF.

The team conducted a survey in collines with a high density of PBF projects and in comparable collines where there were no PBF projects, which allowed us to assess the effect of the PBF interventions compared to their absence. As an example, our survey documented that about 18% of respondents attributed decreases in discrimination in their community to the involvement of development organizations, while the same was true of only about 8% of non-PBF colline respondents. The survey included over 250 households in 23 collines in the provinces Bujumbura, Cibitoke, and Bubanza.

The team also conducted 75 semi-structured interviews in Bujumbura and 90 at the community level in Bujumbura Rural, Bubanza and Cibitoke. These interviews followed a similar site selection strategy, aiming to provide information about the projects that were implemented in the collines where the surveys took place as well as some collines where surveys did not take place to ensure that there is sufficient coverage of the PBF I and II activities. This report uses the semi-structured interviews to trace the project design and implementation process, assess its general efficiency and effectiveness, and to uncover the interaction between the project and the behaviors and institutions that it sought to influence including the effects or non-effects observed in the initial quantitative analysis (interview questions and protocols as well as survey questionnaires are included in the Supporting Annex, a separate document including these elements as well as the project's inception report, financial report, and PBF Project templates).

1.4 Structure of the Evaluation Report

In Section II of this evaluation, we discuss the overall contribution that the PBF portfolio made to key barriers or opportunities in Burundi's war-to-peace transition between 2007 and 2013. We then discuss the PBF's contribution to the key sectors that it identified as critical peacebuilding priorities in its Peacebuilding Priority Plan and Reintegration Program document. We also assess whether or not these priorities remain relevant. In Section III of this evaluation, we assess the means and the ends of the second tranche (US\$ 9.2 million) of PBF funding to Burundi that was allocated in 2011. The first tranche (US\$ 35 million) of PBF funding to Burundi – termed PBF I – was allocated in 2007 and was evaluated in 2010.¹⁶ In Section IV, we discuss how the PBF mechanisms influenced the effect of the PBF I and the PBF II tranches. Finally, in Section V, we conclude and provide detailed recommendations.

¹⁶ Campbell, Susanna P. *Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi*. (New York: United Nations, 2010).

2. Relevance and Contribution of the PBF Portfolio to Burundi's War-to-Peace Transition

In this section, we first explain the UN's overall institutional environment in Burundi. Then, we assess the ways in which the PBF-supported projects interacted with key trends in Burundi's peacebuilding process between 2007 and 2013. Next, we examine how they contributed to key sectors that were included in the 2007 Peacebuilding Priority Plan and that the academic and policy literature have identified as the core peacebuilding sectors.

2.1 The Context of the PBF in Burundi

The broader institutional environment that the PBF projects operated within had an important, if sometimes indirect, influence on the PBF portfolio. In several ways, the PBF's intervention in Burundi was a test case for PBSO. First, Burundi was one of the initial two countries, along with Sierra Leone, to be selected as focus countries for the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and, as a result, one of the first countries to receive funding from the UN Peacebuilding Fund. The PBF's experience in Burundi provided many of the lessons that were learned during the initial few years of the PBF's existence. The UN's experience with the PBF in Burundi helped the PBSO to figure out the type of guidance and support that UN entities that received PBF funding (Recipient UN Organizations (RUNOs)) needed and helped them to develop and refine PBF rules, procedures, and guidance accordingly.

Second, the first tranche of PBF support to the UN in Burundi (US\$ 35 million provided in 2007) also made it possible for an innovative organizational structure – the UN Integrated Mission in Burundi (BINUB) – to produce some innovative programming that combined the capacities and knowledge of the UN Mission, the UNCT, and the Burundian Government. It allowed the UN Mission to deliver on certain aspects of its Security Council mandate that would have been very difficult to do without the PBF's support. The second tranche of PBF funding to Burundi, US\$ 9.2 million allocated in 2011, supported a much more standard UN structure: the Security Council-mandated Mission¹⁷ focused on high-level political processes and analyses while the UN Country Team¹⁸ focused on managing and overseeing the operational activities. The differences in these organizational structures and the implications that these differences had for the effectiveness of PBF-funded projects provide important potential lessons for PBF support to other countries.

Third, immediately preceding and during the time that the PBF has given funding to Burundi, the Burundian Government put a great deal of pressure on the UN and had a high degree of influence on the form of the UN Mission and, in line with the PBF's decision-making procedures, the content of the PBF project portfolio. While the PBF holds national ownership as a core principle, the situation in Burundi was somewhat unique in terms of the pressure that the Burundian Government placed on the UN in Burundi and the staff of the UN Mission's uncertain as to how long they would remain in Burundi. Since 2006, the Burundian Government has requested that three actual and interim heads of the UN Mission to Burundi quit their positions and leave the country. It has required the UN to reduce the size and scale of its UN mission from a large Peacekeeping Mission, the Office of the UN in Burundi (ONUB) (2004-2006); to a smaller

¹⁷ The UN Integrated Mission in Burundi lasted from 2006 to 2011, at which time the mission ended because its mandate was not extended.

¹⁸ The UN Country Teams (UNCTs) work to bolster coordination and decision-making among UN organizations working within a given country. Headed by the Resident Coordinator, the UNCTs exist in 136 countries and their members include representatives of the UN organizations working in-country.

integrated UN Mission without peacekeepers, the Integrated UN Office in Burundi (BINUB) (2007-2010); to a smaller mission, the Office of the UN in Burundi (BNUB) (2011-2014); to the negotiations between the UN and the Burundian Government in late 2013 and early 2014, where the Government was pushing for the closure of the UN Mission, leaving only the UNCT in the country, which would not have a UN Security Council mandate. These negotiations and the numerous transformations of the UN Mission in Burundi have formed the subtext, at times, of discussions between UN and Government officials, including those that took place in the Joint Steering Committee (JSC).

2.2 Relevance of the PBF Portfolio to Key Conflict and Peace Trends in Burundi between 2007 and 2013

Below, we provide an analysis of how the PBF Portfolio responded to key drivers of conflict and peace during four different stages of Burundi's transition between 2007 and 2013.

2.2.1 Period I – Deadlock in Parliament

The first dialogue project funded by the PBF, entitled the *Cadre de Dialogue*, was a strategic entry point for the PBF and created space for dialogue among key political actors. The CNDD-FDD has been the governing party in Burundi since winning both the presidency and a majority in the National Assembly in the 2005 elections. The president of CNDD-FDD, Pierre Nkurunziza, became the first democratically elected president of Burundi since 1993, and only the second in the country's history. However, internal divisions within the CNDD-FDD led to a split in the party in 2007. The CNDD-FDD's loss of the majority in parliament led to a deadlock for much of 2007. The *Cadre de Dialogue* project contributed to unblocking the deadlock in the Burundian parliament in 2007 that was delaying legislation necessary for key governmental reforms.

2.2.2 Period II – Deadlock in Negotiations with the FNL

The PBF contributed to the completion of the peace process with the FNL in 2009. The FNL was the last rebel group to enter negotiations with the government of Burundi and, up until 2009, had failed to implement a 2006 ceasefire agreement. The FNL suffered considerable military setbacks during the fighting in early 2008 and rejoined the negotiating table by June of that year.¹⁹ The PBF helped to unblock a 2009 deadlock in the negotiations with the FNL by supporting facilitation efforts, and funding the demobilization of 11,000 “adults associated with the movement” who were not part of the official demobilization program. The demobilization of these ‘associated adults’ allowed the FNL to transform into a political party and participate in the 2010 elections.

2.2.3 Period III – 2010 election period

The PBF constructively contributed to the period surrounding the 2010 election, in part, by promoting national dialogue. In particular, it helped to establish the Permanent Forum for Political Parties, an offshoot of the *Cadre de Dialogue* project. It also supported the organization of the 2010 elections by providing urgent assistance through its IRF. Despite the demobilization of the FNL, political violence between FNL and CNDD-FDD supporters continued.²⁰ In particular, youth wings of the parties contributed to growing political violence.²¹ Some individuals accuse the youth wing of the CNDD-FDD, *Imbonerakure*, of intimidating and


¹⁹ International Crisis Group, *Burundi: Restarting Political Dialogue*, Africa Report No. 131 (Nairobi/Brussels, 2008), p. 10.

²⁰ Human Rights Watch. *Pursuit of Power: Political Violence and Repression in Burundi*. (New York, NY, 2009).

²¹ International Crisis Group. *Burundi: Ensuring Credible Elections*. Africa Report No. 155. (Nairobi/Brussels 2010), pp. 17-18; Human Rights Watch. “*We’ll Tie You Up and Shoot You*”: *Lack of Accountability for Political Violence in Burundi*. (New York, NY, 2010); United Nations Security Council, *Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Burundi*. S/2010/608, (New York: United Nations, 2010), pp. 1-2.

threatening opposition groups, at times with the assistance of state intelligence services. Figure 1, below, shows the evolution of violence in Burundi between 2002 and 2012 in the three of the provinces most affected by violence: Bubanza, Bujumbura Rural, and Cibitoke. These are also the provinces where the PBF II implemented its activities. The figure below shows that since 2007, there has been a relatively steady rise in both conflicts and fatalities in these three provinces and that there was a big spike in violence in Bubanza around the time of the 2010 elections.

Figure 1



Notes: This figure was compiled using conflict and fatality data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED).

The PBF funded the creation of the National Independent Commission for Human Rights (CNIDH), which carries out human rights investigations throughout the country, including of extrajudicial executions. This institution, which exists in its current form in large part because of the tough persistence of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Burundi, provided an important response to rising political violence.

2.2.4 Period IV – The consolidation of political power in the post-2010 phase

Rather than deepening liberal democracy, the CNDD-FDD victory in the 2010 elections has led to three developments that may threaten the consolidation of democracy in the country. First, most of the opposition is absent from government, and several opposition leaders fled the country in order to avoid arrest.²² Second, political violence has continued in the country, including an egregious act of violence with possible political origins – the September 2011 attack on a bar in Gatumba during which over 30 individuals were killed. Finally, the CNDD-FDD submitted a new draft constitution bill in late 2013, which threatens to undermine the power sharing provisions of the constitution.²³

The CNDD-FDD’s consolidation of power and increases the increases in violence shown in Table

²² International Crisis Group. *Burundi: From Electoral Boycott to Political Impasse*. Africa Report No. 169. (Nairobi/Brussels 2011), p. 3.

²³ Esdras Ndikumana. “Burundi constitution change risks opening ethnic wounds.” AFP. Published December 1st, 2013. Available at: http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jX14Amcc32cxgsVPE43e_i7QQE9Q?docId=0c8ff1ca-759d-4be5-9df6-bf2b6451515f, (December 3, 2013).

1, coincide with the disbursement of the second tranche of PBF funding to Burundi in 2011. Unlike the first tranche, which focused primarily on political, security, legal, and human rights institutions based in Bujumbura, the PBF's second tranche sought to help integrate former combatants, refugees, and IDPs at the community level in three provinces that had been hardest hit by the war and community-based violence. Our surveys and interviews revealed that, in many cases, the PBF II activities contributed to a calming effect in these provinces, even though it did not directly address some of the most important sources of the current violence and community-based conflict, such as the youth gangs and infidelity (see Survey Findings, Annex 3).

2.3 The Contribution of PBF I and II to Peace Consolidation in Burundi by Sector

As discussed above, several PBF-funded projects made important contributions to the advancement of Burundi's peacebuilding process by injecting timely and targeted support to address roadblocks inhibiting the advancement of key institutional reforms; creating a space for political dialogue, including for women, a politically marginalized group in Burundi; initiating important reforms in crucial institutions; and catalyzing improved relationships between returning ex-combatants, people displaced by the war, and returning refugees and their economic opportunities. Above, we briefly described the PBF's responsiveness to critical changes in Burundi's peacebuilding context from 2007 to 2013. Here, we discuss the PBF's relevance and contribution to the PBF's five core peacebuilding priority areas in Burundi.

2.3.1 Democracy and good governance

Projects that fall under the sector of democracy and good governance faced a challenging context. The National Assembly was blocked, the world economic crisis reduced Burundi's purchasing power and donor contributions, and corruption reached new heights. According to the Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index, Burundi was rated 172 of 177 countries surveyed, and our survey findings showed that 50% of all respondents noted considerable corruption in their local communities. In addition, the last fighting group, the FNL, signed a ceasefire agreement and thus the Burundian political elite needed to make space for an additional political actor – an actor that needed to familiarize itself with the political situation.

The PBF's strongest contributions to the area of democracy and good governance came in the form of its involvement in pushing for dialogue among Burundi's political parties, its timely interventions to support the organization of the 2010 elections, and the demobilization of groups associated with the FNL. The first dialogue project funded by the PBF, entitled the *Cadre de Dialogue*, contributed to unblocking the deadlock in the Burundian parliament in 2007 that was holding back legislation necessary for governmental reforms. Building on the numerous negotiation and mediation efforts led by various states, the UN, different individuals, and non-governmental organizations since the outbreak of Burundi's war in 1996, the *Cadre de Dialogue* encouraged a culture of dialogue among political actors and civil society. Nonetheless, particularly in the aftermath of the 2010 elections, the Burundian government sought to reduce the space for political dialogue and the open expression of the media. In spite of these dialogue efforts, and many others, our interviews and surveys revealed that Burundians consider the behavior of the political class, and its manipulation of susceptible youth, to be one of the greatest threats to their security and the main potential cause of future violence.

Through the Immediate Response Facility (IRF), the PBF provided crucial support to the organization of the 2010 elections, which enabled the distribution of ballots and the provision of ID cards to women. This permitted the participation of many women in the elections and ensured that high quality ballots were distributed to all areas of the country. The IRF also filled a crucial

funding gap for the implementation of Phase I of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of the FNL. It helped to unblock the deadlock in the 2009 negotiations with the FNL by funding the demobilization of individuals that accompanied them, but were not part of the official demobilization program, enabling the FNL to be converted into a political party and participate in the 2010 elections.

While the 2010 elections were seen as free and fair to observers, the opposition parties disputed their fairness and boycotted the presidential and parliamentary elections. As a result, after the 2010 elections the Parliament was almost completely controlled by the CNDD-FDD. Many of the same opposition actors also boycotted the Permanent Forum for Political Parties which emanated from the *Cadre de Dialogue* project, claiming that this was not a forum for inclusive dialogue and in response, early in 2013, the UN contributed to breaking what had become a political impasse by organizing a workshop around preparations for the 2015 elections and supporting a follow-up workshop a few months later.

In spite of these timely and targeted interventions, which helped to advance Burundi's peacebuilding process, the other governance initiatives that the PBF supported were less well targeted, less timely, and some were poorly implemented. The anti-corruption project failed to address the main legal barriers to the good functioning of anti-corruption and judicial institutions. This was largely because the government was not ready to address these larger legal issues. As a result, the project could not make a significant contribution to the achievement of its aims, which depended on a legal framework that the government was not willing to put in place. Our survey shows that people perceive corruption as a big problem at the colline level (that may be increasing), especially in those collines that received PBF funding. In fact, these collines were about 21% more likely to cite corruption when compared to collines where there was not significant PBF support (see Annex 3: "Corruption"). The results from our survey show that, in the collines surveyed, local administrative officials and the police are perceived as the main sources of corruption: 73% of respondents mentioned the role in corruption played by local administrative officials, while 70% said that police contributed to corruption (see Annex 3: Figure 14).

The youth project, women's project, and the small business project were plagued by implementation problems and did not make an obvious contribution to the socio-economic situation in the target groups, often contributing to 'peace disappointments' rather than 'peace dividends' (see 2010 Evaluation). Staff and partners implementing the youth and women's projects argued that the timeframe they were given was far too short for them to spend the large budgets allocated to these projects. Partly as a result, the quality of the program suffered. Furthermore, the method that they employed to identify youth and women who would benefit from these projects was not transparent and led to claims of corruption and favoritism. The women's project, which distributed micro-credit loans, also had serious problems recuperating some of the micro-credit loans in part because of manipulation of the project by local-level political officials. The link between the small enterprise project and peacebuilding was always unclear and, in the end, it was not able to identify a market for its beneficiaries' goods, which was a primary strategy for the success of these small businesses.

The project that focused on strengthening the capacity of communal level offices made an important contribution to their smooth functioning in some cases. In others, however, it did not follow up with all of the promised trainings nor did it ensure that the capacity existed to use and maintain all of the computers and other equipment that it provided.

2.3.2 Security sector

The support that the PBF provided to support the rule of law in the reform of the security sector followed a similar pattern. It was not based on an overall strategy to support the security sector, but was a compilation of several projects, some of which were strategic and others of which were not. When the projects were drafted and implemented, the peacebuilders faced a challenging political context. The FNL was about to transform into a political actor (as mentioned above), military forces lived among the population and in some instances abused their power, the police and intelligence services were linked to politically motivated killings and torture, and some ex-combatants (especially younger ones) had become politically-militarily organized.

Several of the security projects were highly relevant in addressing these structural problems and were even catalytic, while several others were not very relevant to the key peacebuilding needs, well-targeted, or well-implemented. The PBF support to the Burundian Armed Forces (FDN) was based on a clear strategy that was developed by the FDN and included three PBF projects. These three projects – the Military Barracks Project, the Morale Building Project, and the Displaced Families Project – all targeted critical areas of reform for the military. In particular, they helped to reduce incidents of violence and increase inter-group social cohesion in the Burundian military, which had recently integrated former rebels into its ranks. Our survey revealed that the population feels much more secure than it did prior to the PBF interventions,²⁴ 95% of respondents affirmed that they feel safer than six years ago (see Annex 3: “Security and human rights”), and did not cite any particular threat that they faced from the military institutions. Among the households surveyed, 62% noted that the decrease in the number of active combatants in the communities contributed to the creation of a greater sense of security (see Annex 3: Figure 15).

Because the projects focused on the Burundian military were narrow in focus and also manageable, they not only largely succeeded in their goals but have also become catalytic, both in terms of creating additional national and regional capacities, and in cooperating with additional partners. First, they reinforced command and control, the foundation on which the functioning of the military rests. Second, the training sessions not only formed future educators by training trainers but it also provided the Burundian military with the know-how that is crucial for contributing to multilateral operations, such as the African Union’s intervention in Somalia. Third, in the process of rebuilding the military forces, a penal military court was established, with an office in each military barrack. Fourth, the building of new barracks supported the inclusion of gender mainstreaming as they addressed the numerous issues that arose in relations between the military and the population, the particular needs of women in the military, and the situation of the families who would no longer be living in the barracks. Fifth, once the barracks were occupied, a policy was developed that would secure the soldiers’ weapons and move them out of the civilian sphere.

The interventions to support the reform of the National Intelligence Service (SNR) and the Police project were less successful. The project that focused on training of the National Intelligence Service succeeded in creating temporary openness and accountability in the SNR, which is infamous for torture and other human rights abuses, but did not initiate any sustainable reform in this institution. The Police project attempted to increase the positive visibility and professionalism of the police and build their capacity, but then distributed poor quality uniforms to the police, which led to a great deal of negative publicity and public accusations of corruption. The project eventually procured new high quality uniforms, which were considered important for the ongoing efforts to professionalize the police, but much of the equipment (e.g. cars and radios) provided by the project has since fallen into disrepair. In spite of the efforts of the project to

²⁴ This increased sense of security cannot of course be attributed only to reforms in the Burundian Armed Forces.

professionalize the police, there remain significant problems with the force. Our survey revealed that Burundians view the police as a potential threat to their personal security, rather than a clear guarantor of it.

2.3.3 Justice and the promotion of human rights

The national and local courts have been inundated with land cases. Human rights violations, particularly against political opposition groups, including killings that the UN deemed extrajudicial executions, were characteristic of the political situation on the ground during the implementation of PBF. While the UN tried to address some of these issues, the justice sector continued to be challenged with cases of alleged crimes committed by state agents for which no charges were ever pursued or for which trials were seemingly flawed, such as the killings of 39 people in Gatumba in 2011.

Just as in the previous two sectors, there was no overarching strategy for the PBF support to the areas of justice and human rights. Nonetheless, there were a couple of highly catalytic projects that it funded in this area. The PBF supported the creation of the National Independent Commission for Human Rights (CNIDH). But, rather than simply providing the physical infrastructure and cars that the CNIDH needed, it withheld funding from the government until it passed a law that would allow the CNIDH to function as a truly independent commission. The CNIDH was set up in 2011 and carries out human rights investigations throughout the country, including of extrajudicial executions.

Extrajudicial executions in Burundi, which numbered over 60 in 2011, were drastically reduced after denunciation by human rights groups, the CNIDH, the UN and the international community. Our survey and other data on the human rights situation reveal that the population perceives important improvements in the respect for human rights. Over 90% of respondents in all collines affirmed that, overall, respect for human rights in their communities had increased in the past six years. Other data indicate that this respect for human rights is not evenly distributed and that members of the political opposition have frequently been the target of human rights violations (see Annex 3: “Human Rights”).²⁵ Specifically, in collines benefitting from PBF interventions, about 21% of respondents mentioned the functions of the CNIDH as integral to improving overall respect for human rights while in non-PBF collines barely 1% of respondents mentioned the CNIDH at all (Annex 3: Table 13). In other words, in collines that benefitted from PBF interventions, the population was at least aware of the CNIDH and possibly of its effect as well. Many in the human rights community attribute the improvements in the human rights situation, in part, to the actions of the CNIDH.

Because the CNIDH was not evaluated in the 2010 evaluation of the peacebuilding fund (given that it had not been implemented yet), we will provide a brief assessment of it in line with all of our project-based evaluation criteria here. The **Support to CNIDH** project, which assisted the drafting of the law creating the institution as well as providing for its operation, was relevant to all key documents, notably the Arusha Accord. It was a correct entry point as it allowed for a national institution with the appropriate legal framework and operating procedures to pursue human rights cases throughout the country.

The **Support to CNIDH**, as an institution with continued proximity to its intended beneficiaries and with a mission and operating procedure that are both internationally recognized and

²⁵ Human rights organizations have also reported on the targeting of opposition groups by the state. See, for example, Human Rights Watch. *“We’ll Tie You Up and Shoot You”*: Lack of Accountability for Political Violence in Burundi. (New York, NY, 2010).

nationally accepted, is one which is building capacity through training, outreach and geographic coverage, and has catalyzed significant other resources. This effectiveness as well as the catalytic effects of the project were clearly due to a concerted effort of national and international actors: members of the JSC from the international community and the PBC carried out effective advocacy for the establishment of a CNIDH conforming to international standards.

In the **Transitional Justice** project, the PBF funded a countrywide consultation process on Burundi's transitional justice mechanisms. It sought to maintain attention on the form and function of Burundi's transitional justice mechanisms in a context where the government was unwilling to create them. Once the report of these consultations was released, the government appointed a task force to recommend provisions for a draft law on a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This draft law does not include some important recommendations emanating from the national consultations, such as the appointment of commissioners from the international community. The draft law was submitted to the National Assembly in mid-2013 and is still on the table as of this report in early 2014.

The other justice projects focused on the construction of local tribunals as well as clearing backlogged decisions in courts. Both of these projects were part of ongoing judicial reform processes, but not ideal entry points for PBF as they failed to address many of the legal and political barriers to the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary. As a result, even though communities now have greater access to justice, which our survey revealed was greatly appreciated (77% of respondents cited Resident Tribunals as a commonly used mechanism for mitigating conflicts, see Annex 3: "Conflict and Mitigation"), the justice system remains plagued with political and structural obstacles that create a general sense of impunity for crimes and breaches of the law. This impunity is one of the drivers of the conflict and, though many citizens benefitted from their judgments being executed, these interventions did not have a sustainable impact on a key aspect of the peacebuilding process.²⁶

2.3.4 Land issues

The question of resolving land disputes illustrates the dynamic character of the context in which this crucial peacebuilding issue is found. Of the cases that come to Burundian tribunals, 70%²⁷ are land conflicts. Land conflicts are not just economic in nature but have major implications for the social cohesion of communities, success of reintegration efforts, and overall perceived security.

The PBF contribution to Burundi only supported one project in the area of land disputes: it provided initial funding that helped UNHCR's collaboration with the National Land Commission (CNTB). Up until 2011, the CNTB was largely seen as a neutral body that helped to address land conflicts at the community level. But, in an increasingly polarized political environment, the CNTB has also become politicized. Under a new president, the CNTB progressively altered its mission from one of addressing all potential conflicts over land in a conciliatory manner to providing restitution of land and property to returning refugees (most often Hutu). This often means that the people who consider themselves to be the rightful occupants of the land (most often Tutsi) are dispossessed of this land and, according to a recent law, do not have recourse in the justice system. As a result, although the support that the PBF initially gave to the CNTB was well-targeted and catalytic, it is no longer a suitable mechanism to peacefully address land disputes.

²⁶ Moreover, according to the Afrobarometer survey in 2012, 48% of Burundians believe that all judges are corrupt, compared to an average response of 27% in other African countries. Afrobarometer, available at: www.afrobarometer.org, Results for Burundi, Round 5, 25 April 2013.

²⁷ Cadre Strategique de Lutte Contre la Pauvrete (2010-2014) II, Chapter 2.1 , paragraph 181.

2.3.5 Reintegration

Bubanza, Bujumbura Rural, and Cibitoke provinces were most heavily affected by the violence and received a large number of returning ex-combatants and internally displaced persons. The PBF contributed to reintegration of ex-combatants, internally displaced persons, and some refugees in these provinces. During PBF I, this was done by supporting a project that was called **P3P**, referring to the three core principles of the project (Inclusion, Appropriation, and Durability) and the three provinces in which it would take place. P3P responded to a critical need at the time, which was to help reintegrate the numerous ex-combatants and displaced persons, many of whom had not received any financial support upon demobilization, and were returning to very impoverished communities. The success of the P3P project in improving relations between these different groups and in helping some of them to create associations, led the PBF to base the entire second tranche of its support (PBF II) around this model. The second tranche of PBF support, in fact, contributed to implementing the national reintegration strategy that the P3P project initiated.

Here, we provide a brief assessment of the P3P project because it was not evaluated in the 2010 evaluation of the PBF funding to Burundi. P3P was highly relevant as it began when FNL combatants and associated persons started returning to their communities during a politically volatile time just before the 2010 elections. In other words, the timing, the selection of a diverse set of beneficiaries, and the activities chosen were well-targeted for peacebuilding. In terms of efficiency, although the costs were underestimated and filled in by complementary funds of UNDP, the outputs were extensive and satisfactory, though delays were nonetheless encountered. The project gave priority to local actors in project implementation, which initiated a process of local ownership, but was in itself a challenge to efficiency, as many local project implementers needed additional time for capacity building in the course of activities. More importantly, the projects attempted to make reintegration a sustainable pillar of the Burundian society. As part of a national ownership strategy, the project strengthened structures that would later take over: the Ministry of National Solidarity, Human Rights and Gender (MSNDPHG), other ministries, local administration, and communal counsels.

The project was effective as an innovative approach to reintegration but its effects may have been mitigated – partly due to its innovative character – by capacity gaps and misunderstandings among both authorities and community beneficiaries with regard to the limits of support for the project. The project aimed to create the conditions for self-sufficiency but it was not extensive enough to combat the expectations of those who were in great need, a problem that the PBF II program faces as well.

The P3P project had a notable success in being catalytic. The P3P funded the development of a national reintegration strategy had an innovative programming approach that attracted follow-up funding from PBSO and from the Japanese and other governments that sought to apply the approach to other countries. It also led to funding for the second phase of PBF support to Burundi, which sought to expand the P3P approach to other communities.

PBF's second tranche of funding (**PBF II**) contributed to the UN's and the Burundian Government's reintegration priorities by helping to reduce suspicion and build constructive relationships between the different ex-combatants, internally displaced persons, refugees, and community members who were selected to participate in the project. In this sense, it contributed to building positive inter-group social cohesion in communities that had been torn apart by the war. Our survey shows that 96% of all respondents perceive improvements in social cohesion, especially due to associations and the involvement of local authorities (see Annex 3: "Discrimination and Social Cohesion"). It also gave individuals who were able to form

productive local associations new economic opportunities and useful training that helped some of them to advance their particular profession (e.g. welding, tailoring, farming, cooking, etc.).

In other places, however, and in spite of the increased involvement of local administrators, the PBF II activities did not alter how social services were delivered nor did they make a clearly sustainable improvement in many of the beneficiaries' economic situation. Many of the beneficiaries that we interviewed complained that the project was too short to achieve its intended aims (See Section 3.2 and Annex 1). They argued that you could not build a sustainable social cohesion, much less real trust, among these groups in three to six months. They also argued that even though they were now members of associations and had new skills, they did not have any funding to ensure that their associations would continue to be profitable or that they could sustain the social cohesion that they had created within their associations. Our survey shows that even though discrimination overall has declined, those who are not allied with the state are being discriminated against more.

2.3.6 Gender Mainstreaming in PBF I and II

The Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding, which was the guiding strategic document for PBF I, included gender as a cross-cutting issue. Nonetheless, mainstreaming gender into all of the PBF I projects was very challenging, in part, because most of the project documents were drafted before the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding had been finalized. These project documents did not include a gender analysis nor did they integrate a gender lens. Another challenge at the time was that the UN had not yet published indicators for UN Resolution 1325, which meant that there was a lack of specific guidance for how to integrate or monitor gender in peacebuilding programming. The JSC did take one specific gender measure by giving one of its observer seats to a women's association, with the specific intention of having this association communicate women's interests. This representative worked with the BINUB Monitoring Unit to integrate gender into some of the PBF I project documents and add related gender indicators before project documents were finalized.

Two of the PBF I projects successfully mainstreamed gender: the *Cadre de Dialogue* project and the Consultations on Transitional Justice project, both of which took account of the need to include from 30 to 50% female participants and provided significant opportunities for women's voices to be heard on substantive issues. There were other PBF I projects that also took some aspects of gender into account. The Barracks project included a quota for female construction crews, which specifically recognized and promoted the capacity of women in the development of the security sector. The Displaced Families projects took the needs of families into account when undertaking the barracking of the military. The Youth project, also included a quota of 35% women in the women's quota of 35% was included for the High-Intensity Work (in French, these are referred to as HIMO activities, short for "Haute Intensité de Main d'Oeuvre") projects that they funded. The Women's project focused on giving women important economic opportunities through micro-credit loans, and strengthened the conflict resolution capacity and social position of some of its beneficiaries.

The other PBF I projects mostly failed to address or assess the differentiated experiences of men and women. In addition, even though some activities produced reports with data disaggregated by gender, they did not directly assess the *effect* of their project on gender equality or women's empowerment, including in relation to violence.

The IRF DDR project, which demobilized 11,000 adults that were associated with the FNL, explicitly aimed to implement UN Resolution 1325, Article 8, which mandates a gender perspective in the negotiation and *implementation* of peace agreements. This project gave the

women who were part of this group of ‘associated adults’ gender specific reintegration packages. Women’s associations were also involved in this project and, in one instance, notified the project staff that one of the demobilization sites was next to a school and was disturbing pupils. The site was subsequently changed.

The PBF II project included gender in its most generic sense by addressing the status and needs of vulnerable groups. Nonetheless, the activities that most of the RUNOs implemented did not seem to make a specific effort to reduce inequality between men and women, except in the case of UNWomen’s interventions. Community members asked some of the women who participated in UNWomen’s initial awareness-raising sessions to resolve help resolve disputes and give advice on domestic matters, including domestic violence. We do not yet have additional evidence of the gender effect of UNWomen’s PBF-funded activities because it is only just beginning to implement its micro-credit activities, in part to avoid many of the mistakes made with a similar project that was funded by the first tranche of PBF support. Our survey showed that in collines that benefited from significant PBF activities PBF women were 33% less likely to be poor than in collines that did not benefit from PBF activities (See Annex 3: Table 2).

3. Assessment of the Second Tranche of PBF Support to Burundi

The PBF allocated a second tranche of US\$ 9.2 million to Burundi in October 2011 for a two-year program. This program aimed to support the socio-economic reintegration of former combatants, refugees, and internally displaced persons in Bujumbura Rural, Bubanza, and Cibitoke. It was implemented by six members of the UN Country Team: UNDP, UNHCR, UN Women, FAO, and ILO in collaboration with the Ministry of National Solidarity, Human Rights and Gender. In this section, we assess the degree to which the activities implemented as part of this program employed PBF's desired *means* (Efficiency, National Ownership, Transparency, Accountability, Outreach) and achieved its desired *ends* (Relevance, Effectiveness, Catalytic Effect, Sustainability).

To conduct this assessment, we triangulate the data that we gathered from our household level survey in Bujumbura Rural, Cibitoke, and Bubanza, our 165 semi-structured interviews (90 of which were conducted in the survey collines that had a strong presence of PBF activities), and thorough document review. A table that outlines the relationship between our interviews and the survey data at the colline level is included as Annex 1 in this document. Each of the interviews used in the table and in the text below is representative of a broader trend in responses. If an interview quote is an exceptional response, we indicate this clearly.

3.1 Overview

With the second tranche, the UN in Burundi aimed to implement one of the recommendations in the 2010 evaluation: to focus on developing a cumulative program, rather than separate projects that do not add up. During a visit of the Assistant Secretary-General of Peacebuilding, Judy Cheng-Hopkins, in 2010, the PBSO, BINUB, and the Burundi Government agreed that this new program should focus on socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants, internally displaced persons, and refugees who had not benefitted from significant reintegration support.²⁸ Just over 500,000 refugees had returned to Burundi by August of 2009, while nearly 30,000 former combatants were attempting to reintegrate themselves back into the community.²⁹ Thousands of returning ex-combatants, internally displaced persons, and refugees were streaming into impoverished communities. The provinces of Bujumbura Rural, Bubanza, and Cibitoke were particularly affected by violence and displacement during the war, and had been the base of the FNL rebel group, ensuring that many would return there. To help to calm this region and give these returning groups some economic support, BNUB and the UNCT developed a program entitled *Peacebuilding through the support of the sustainable socio-economic reintegration in favor of the persons affected by the conflict*.

The PBF II program aimed to achieve this overall result: "Communities, state institutions and civil society organizations at the local level take control of the needs of the socio-economic recovery and fully participate in the peace consolidation process and the sustainable

²⁸ The original program that was for US\$ 24,084,423 and focused on Bubanza, Bujumbura Marie, Bujumbura Rural, Bururi, and Cibitoke. But, when the PBSO informed BNUB and the UNCT that they could only provide US\$ 9.2 million, the team that had developed the program decided to focus only on Bujumbura Rural, Bubanza, and Cibitoke, as these were the provinces most affected by the conflict and which were not receiving significant amounts of support from other donors.

²⁹ Ministry of National Solidarity, Refugee Repatriation, and Social Reintegration, *National Strategy for Socio-Economic Reintegration of Persons Affected by Conflict*, (Bujumbura: Burundi, 2010), 12.

reintegration.”³⁰ In addition, it aimed to achieve three specific results, listed below:³¹

- National coordination is reinforced: Decentralized structures have the necessary capacity to conduct participatory local planning, improve land management, and ensure community cohesion to deliver quality services.
- The communities with the RDExC included and the other vulnerable populations have equitable access to basic social services and lodging and, finally, they actively take part in managing the basic social services.
- The production system and the local entrepreneurial groups are improved and diversified to ensure food security in homes, sustainable socio-economic reintegration of the populations affected by the conflict and to contribute to finding a sustainable solution to land issues.

The implicit overall *theory of change* for the PBF II program was: *improved and equitable access to productive activity and social services by groups that were particularly affected by the war would increase the capacity of the population to recover from war, improve relationships between these groups, improve their trust in the state, improve their capacity to resolve conflict peacefully, and help them resist future opportunities for remobilization.* The RUNOs did not, however, clearly articulate this theory of change. Our survey and semi-structured interviews indicate that some of the PBF II activities had a positive effect on the integration of war-affected individuals into the communities, on the relationship between these individuals and their host communities, and on their economic opportunities. In some cases where local level officials were involved in the activities, it may have also increased the beneficiaries’ trust in these officials, but this was not the case in all collines. Several former combatants that benefitted from the project reported that they would never be remobilized, and that the project helped them to feel secure in this.

Before assessing the degree to which the project complied with our evaluation criteria, we will touch on two overall issues. First, even though there were important peacebuilding aspects in some of the project activities, the RUNOs did not mainstream peacebuilding throughout the activities or assess the peacebuilding effect.³² Second, even though the project was designed as a program, each RUNO largely implemented its activities in isolation from the others.

3.1.1 The example of UNDP’s 3x6 Approach

Because each RUNO implemented its own community-based approach under the overall PBF II project, we describe UNDP’s approach to illustrate the degree to which peacebuilding was integrated into the PBF II activities. UNDP’s approach is the most positive example, out of the six RUNOs, of integration of peacebuilding into its programming³³. Under the PBF II program, UNDP implemented the 3x6 project, which built on the P3P project that was funded during PBF I. The 3x6 approach has three organizational principles – inclusion, appropriation, and durability

³⁰ The language of these activities is taken directly from the English synthesis of the program found on the PBSO website: <http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/>, (last accessed on December 18, 2013).

³¹ The language of these activities is taken directly from the English synthesis of the program found on the PBSO website: <http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/> (last accessed on December 18, 2013).

³² UN PBF, *Reintegration Programme ProDoc*, BDI-A-9, 2011, 33. The provision of equal access to social services to refugees, displaced, and ex-combatants (RDExC) and host communities is certainly a potential peacebuilding goal, but would have to be assessed in terms of the equal access that it delivered or the inter-group social capital that it created, not in terms of the “existence of businesses that are created and managed by RDExC”, as the project document indicated.

³³ We were unfortunately not able to evaluate UNWomen activities because they were not sufficiently underway at the time of this evaluation.

– which are implemented over six distinct phases: 1) enrollment, 2) rapid generation of revenue, 3) savings, 4) engagement in joint ventures, 5) investment, and 6) access to markets.

The logic of UNDP's 3x6 approach was to give people work and build social cohesion by engaging community members in Community Service Reintegration activities (in French, these are referred to as HIMO activities, *approches à Haute Intensité de Main d'Oeuvre*). These activities would employ beneficiaries to construct houses, repair roads, improve water and sanitation infrastructure, among other construction activities for a period of three to six months. Then, the project would encourage the beneficiaries to create associations organized around specific professions (e.g., hair stylists, cooking, tailoring). UNDP would invest additional resources in these associations and help to support the transformation of some of them into legal entities, sometimes in collaboration with ILO. UNDP integrated a peacebuilding element into this project by selecting the most vulnerable ex-combatants, displaced persons, refugees, and some members of the host community and giving them opportunities to do construction work together for three months.

The specific peacebuilding result we believe that UNDP hoped for, although it was not specified in the project document or monitoring and evaluation plan, was to *increase inter-group social cohesion between those traumatized by the conflict and their host communities, and to give them economic opportunities that would also reinforce this inter-group social cohesion*. The theory of change was that working together would help to improve relationships between individuals who had been most affected by the war and lead to greater acceptance by their communities. Together, through approximately seven awareness raising sessions held on Saturdays, UNDP's partners would educate the project beneficiaries about issues such as conflict resolution, HIV/AIDS, and other key issues that local officials and UNDP's partners thought they should know. Then, these relationships would be continually strengthened at the same time that their economic opportunities increased, due to their participation in newly formed associations composed of people with whom they had participated in the HIMO activities.

To help UNDP obtain its peacebuilding aims of building improved relationships between people who had been affected by the conflict, its activity design should have outlined this as a specific result and monitored the implicit chain of results that would lead to the desired outcome. Instead, the program document established results that focused on a logic of job creation, which although very important does not take the conflict-affected context into account. Furthermore, the program document did not actually specify or monitor outcome-based indicators for its development or peacebuilding objectives, but instead simply focused on recording the outputs, or deliverables, of the individual activities. As a result, the PBF II program had little data on its own peacebuilding results. Staff that implemented the various activities had little guidance as to how to implement or monitor the peacebuilding element of their programming. This is unfortunate because not only did it inhibit UNDP from correcting some of its issues with its programming, it also prevented it from recording many of the positive effects. UNDP's 3x6 approach seemed to have a real effect on some of the beneficiaries that we interviewed, helping them to improve their status in and relationships with their host communities. The PBF II program document was approved by the PBSO without peacebuilding results or indicators. The PBF's new 2013 Application Guidelines should help, in part, to remedy this problem in future proposals.

3.1.2 A Program with six projects

PBF II was designed as a program that aimed to achieve three results, outlined above. In reality, the PBF II was made up of six separate projects that were implemented by six separate RUNOs. Each of the six RUNOs still worked toward the three overall results in line with the activities outlined in the project proposal document. But, they did not target the same beneficiaries or

ensure that their activities were sequenced on the ground. When we asked many of the RUNOs about the overall program approach, they indicated that they were implementing their activities separately. Our interviews and observations in thirteen collines where PBF activities were implemented confirmed this general finding. The reports that the PBF Secretariat in Burundi compiled for the JSC and PBSO presented all of the activities of the six RUNOs under the three hoped-for project results (see above). This made it very difficult for the reader to understand what each RUNO was doing and the programming logic of the PBF II program, which was essentially a compilation of six different community-based projects with different logics.

The six RUNOs included activities in the PBF II Project Document that were largely part of their overall country program. This provides part of the explanation for why peacebuilding was not mainstreamed throughout the PBF II activities. The mandate of each of the six RUNOs does not exclude peacebuilding programming, but it is not the primary organizational aim of any of the six RUNOs. Instead, the RUNOs implementing PBF II activities had other primary organizational objectives: refugee protection, food security, development, gender mainstreaming, employment, and family planning. All of these aims are potentially compatible with peacebuilding aims, but then corresponding activities have to be focused toward a clear peacebuilding objective and implemented in a conflict-sensitive way. Some (UNCT) respondents lamented the fact that the RUNOs did not work together to develop peacebuilding indicators, agree on a monitoring and evaluation system, or systematically monitor the degree to which the hoped-for changes are happening and adjust or maintain the activities accordingly.

Given a context in which each RUNO implemented its PBF-funded activities in relative isolation, it is commendable that they collaborated in several instances. UNDP and ILO collaborated to incorporate some of the associations that UNDP helped to form. But, with the PBF funds, the ILO also worked with many associations that were not linked to UNDP's activities. ILO also collaborated with UNWomen, UNDP, and FAO cooperation, but this was largely a case of UNDP sub-contracting FAO to spend some of the money that the PBF had allocated to UNDP. FAO used this money to implement the same type of activities that it was implementing with the other PBF funds that it had received: providing training about agriculture, fishing, food security, and peaceful co-habitation in their 'Field Schools' that were connected to agricultural fields.

To coordinate the PBF II program, the PBF Project Document established a Coordination and Program Direction Cell. The PBF II Project Document gives the Coordination Cell the following responsibilities: developing a work plan, coordinating the daily activities of the program, administrating the budget, preparing revisions of the budget, coordinating the support of national and international partners, supervising the implementing UN organizations, and preparing regular financial and narrative reports. The Coordination and Program Direction Cell was supposed to be located in the Ministry of Solidarity, Human Rights, and Gender, but the Ministry never gave the UN the office space. There was also a coordinator for each of the three target provinces. Each of these three individuals was supposed to live in his respective province, but the UN Security Officer forbid them from relocating there for security reasons.

Even though the Coordination and Program Direction Cell was given the responsibility to supervise the RUNOs and coordinate their actions, the staff of this cell did not have the authority to do so. The Coordination and Program Direction Cell had no direct authority over any of the RUNOs or all of the necessary expertise to ensure that their programming was effective, require them to submit reports on time or alter their programming, or effectively monitor the effects or intermediary outcomes (not simply the outputs) of each project. The Coordination and Program Direction Cell reported directly to the UN Resident Coordinator (UNRC) who technically has the authority to oversee the work of the RUNOs. But, even this authority does not correspond to clear

supervisory authority over how activities are implemented, particularly by partners at the community level. This type of authority remains with the RUNO leadership. Each of the staff of the Coordination and Program Direction Cell was housed in UNDP’s offices and most of them had been UNDP staff prior to employment with the PBF II program. As a result, many of the RUNOs seemed to consider them to be part of UNDP and did not see them as having the independence necessary to coordinate, much less supervise, the activities of the other RUNOs.

Members of the Coordination and Program Direction Cell made approximately 155 visits to field sites over the duration of the project, taking stock of what was happening with the different activities. Nonetheless, many of the problems and challenges that we observed in our evaluation, which the members of the Coordination and Program Direction Cell most likely also observed, did not make it into the reports that were compiled and submitted to the JSC and PBSO. The problem was not that there was a lack of information about the activities of PBF II – the Coordination and Program Direction Cell gathered a lot of information. The programming problems that we observed – shoddy and unfinished construction of houses and roads, the failure to complete promised activities, and the manipulation of projects by partners or authorities for their own purposes – were due in part to the fact that the information collected was not closely examined or always acted upon by decision-makers.

3.2 Assessing the ‘Ends’ of PBF II – Relevance, Effectiveness, Catalytic Effect, and Sustainability

Earlier, we discussed our evaluation criteria in terms of those that focus on the ends that the intervention seeks to achieve and the means that are assumed to make this possible. Below, we synthesize our findings in relation to the ‘ends’ and ‘means’ of the PBF II reintegration program. The quotes presented below are representative of the responses from our 90 field-based interviews as a whole, unless otherwise noted, and are triangulated with other data. The Table in Annex 1 presents a comparison of the interview and survey findings. To assess the *ends*, we use four criteria, listed below:

| <i>Ends</i> | <i>Definition</i> |
|-------------------------|--|
| <i>Relevance</i> | Relevance is a measure of a) the degree to which the project and its activities are relevant to the Peacebuilding Priority Plan, b) the degree to which the project and its activities are relevant to the most important drivers of conflict and peace during the project implementation phase. |
| <i>Effectiveness</i> | Effectiveness assesses the degree to which the project attains its stated objectives. In peacebuilding interventions, it is important to consider the effectiveness and relevance together. A project may not be effective, but may be highly relevant, if the original objectives are no longer relevant to a changed context. In the instances where the project objective is no longer relevant to the context, we assess the degree to which the project alters its objective and activities to respond to the changed context and implements activities that follow this revised logic. |
| <i>Catalytic Effect</i> | Catalytic effect is a measure of the degree to which the project triggers, accelerates, enables, or leverages resources so that follow-on peacebuilding actions are likely to occur. ³⁴ |

³⁴ “Catalytic programming does not transform a conflict root cause or defuse a trigger; instead it sets up the conditions for the root-cause to be transformed or the trigger resolved. These intermediate conditions (or enabling factors) still represent changes in the context, but they are not the ultimate peacebuilding changes desired. Therefore, like yeast and salt, enabling factors (conditions) should not be viewed in isolation of the larger or longer-term effect desired.” Scharbatke-Church, Cheyenne, Susanna Campbell, Julia Doehrn, Philip Thomas, and Peter Woodrow. *Catalytic Programming and the Peacebuilding Fund*. (PeaceNexus Foundation, 2010) 9.

| | |
|-----------------------|--|
| <i>Sustainability</i> | Sustainability “is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn.” ³⁵ When evaluating the sustainability of peacebuilding interventions, and particularly the short-term support provided by the PBF, it is important to examine the degree to which there are continued gains from the project, not whether or not the specific activity or project is sustained over time. |
|-----------------------|--|

3.2.1 Relevance

The PBF II program was highly relevant to important potential drivers of conflict and peace in Burundi and to the UN’s and the Burundian Government’s guiding documents. It aligned with a Strategic Result of the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and with the National Strategy for the Socio-Economic Reintegration of People Affected by Conflict, which was an output of the P3P project funded with the first tranche of PBF support. It was also highly relevant to the context in Burundi at the time of its design.

“At the local level, the project as it was implemented was an emergency response because the 2010 elections heated up people’s heads. The tension was calmed. Even if you don’t like someone, you respect them.”³⁶

Overall, the data on violence (See Figure 1) support this respondent’s analysis of the situation. There was a spike in conflicts and fatalities in 2010 in Bubanza and steady increases in both Bujumbura Rural and Cibitoke. In spite of this, most survey respondents mentioned that they felt that the security situation in the country had improved in the past six years.

In general, most of our interviewees agreed that the PBF II approach was relevant to some of the potential drivers of conflict at the community level. Many interviewees also said that the PBF II activities should have also focused on youth affiliated with political parties. Others argued that the PBF II activities did not have a significant effect on the scope and scale of the potential drivers of future violent conflict.

“I do not see how giving goats to this avenue can consolidate peace in Burundi.”³⁷

Interviewees argued that, to consolidate peace in Burundi, it was necessary to address the practices of the political leadership, unemployment, potential violence by frustrated youth, and corruption. The PBF II activities helped to address some of the manifestations of the war and political violence, but did not tackle most of the other potential causes of future violence on this list. Nonetheless, by contributing to intergroup social cohesion, the PBF II activities may help some individuals and groups resist using violence against other groups in the future.

3.2.2 Effectiveness, Catalytic Effect, and Sustainability

Effectiveness assesses the degree to which a program or project obtains its stated objectives. The PBF II Program Document outlines three key results that it aimed to achieve (also listed above):

- National coordination is reinforced: Decentralized structures have the necessary capacity to conduct participatory local planning, improve land management, and ensure

³⁵OECD DAC, *DAC Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance*, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm> (Last accessed on December 18, 2013).

³⁶ Interview 15a.

³⁷ Interview 3g.

community cohesion to deliver quality services.

- The communities with the RDExC included, and the other vulnerable populations, have equitable access to basic social services and lodging and, finally, they actively take part in managing the basic social services.
- The production system and the local entrepreneurial groups are improved and diversified to ensure food security in homes, sustainable socio-economic reintegration of the populations affected by the conflict, and to contribute to finding a sustainable solution to land issues.

Our survey results and interviews show that the activities were highly successful, at times, at jump-starting the reintegration process of ex-combatants and internally displaced persons who were still shunned by the community and lacked economic opportunities.

“Before the project, I hid. I never went out. I had the impression that people were suspicious of me. I fled from them. They fled from me. We were very afraid of one another. Now we are not afraid and we have trades that allow us to make money. This helped us to eat and to feed our families. Is there anything better than that?”³⁸

“First, I changed. When we stopped fighting we made people afraid. We had red eyes. I smoked marijuana and tobacco. I made myself afraid. I hated everyone. Clearly, they all hated me. Now, as you see me, I have changed. To change, I went back to school because I wanted to be educated and live in submission, ‘like a child’. Unfortunately, I don’t have sufficient means, I don’t have a place to live, but I just did three years of school and now I do not have any problems. I love people and they love me.”³⁹

Discrimination is still a prominent issue in many Burundian localities, however, there are some encouraging trends. Overall, 75% of survey respondents mentioned that in the last six years they have seen decreases in overall discrimination with particular decreases in ethnic, political, gender-based, and social discrimination (Annex 3: Figure 9). They also perceive social cohesion to be increasing in their communities, and view local associations and UN as instrumental to this process (Annex 3: Figure 11).

At the same time, the calming effect observed by the individuals’ surveyed cannot be attributed solely to the projects that were supported by the PBF.

It is difficult for me to attribute the calming that we observe in the community to the specific results of this project. There are many different efforts by the administration and other intervening actors. I imagine that peace consolidation is the result of a combination of these efforts.⁴⁰

Still, many people also said that the PBF II program was too short to change behavior of people and consolidate trust between different groups. Although the PBF II activities applied the same approach as the P3P, they did not target the same individuals or directly consolidate the gains from the P3P project. If the PBF supports short-term capacity building projects, it should try to

³⁸ Interview 21e.

³⁹ Interview 19c.

⁴⁰ Interview 21a.

ensure that the beneficiaries have some way of sustaining the gains of the project. If not, the PBSO may lose both the potential value added of the PBF funds and the hope of the beneficiaries. The humanitarian community has learned this lesson repeatedly over the years and the PBSO and RUNO's should mine the humanitarian community's approaches for addressing this problem.

The quotes below refer to the first part of UNDP's activities, where they involved ex-combatants, former internally displaced persons, returning refugees, and vulnerable members of the host community in joint construction work (HIMO), which lasted only three months.

"I would give at least a year and a half for the project. Even those who get married, living under the same roof, need more than three months to really know and understand one another."

"In three months, six months, you can't consolidate anything. You have to have at least one year, two years."⁴¹

Others argued that even though they greatly appreciated the support that they had been given to create their own local association or strengthen their existing association, the activities ended too quickly and they were still in need of a great deal of support. Even though the PBF II project officially ends in March 2014, the beneficiaries that we interviewed were not aware that they would receive any additional support. Our interviews in Bujumbura indicated that no additional financial support would be given to local associations after the initial tranche that they received and/or after they had been incorporated. We therefore do not know what the general catalytic or sustainable effect is on individual beneficiaries or associations.

"The project ended quickly just when it was time to reinforce us. We are not yet at the stage of being weaned."⁴²

"The project closed quickly. Our associations are still young. We are not yet in the period where we can fly alone."⁴³

"The cooperative was created thanks to the trainings that the members of the association had. These people understood the trainings and created a cooperative and it would be like leaving people mid way, like orphans. If the cooperative fails, this would also be a failure for the project because it is the project that encouraged people in associations to work in cooperatives."⁴⁴

The survey responses and our interviews show that the focus of PBF II on local associations was greatly appreciated by recipient communities. This favorable opinion of local associations holds in our survey responses. Among all collines surveyed, just over 60% of respondents said that local associations helped to increase social cohesion (Annex 3: Figure 11). Among the respondents in collines that benefited from significant PBF activities, 75% of respondents said that improvements in social cohesion were due to local associations, while only about 46% said this was the case in collines where PBF II activities were not implemented (Annex 3: Table 8).

⁴¹ Interview 18a.

⁴² Interview 21b.

⁴³ Interview 21d.

⁴⁴ Interview 19c.

But, in spite of the multiple positive contributions of the PBF II activities, they were not able to fulfill the highly ambitious objectives that the program set for itself. In relation to its *first expected result* – “National coordination is reinforced: Decentralized structures have the necessary capacity to conduct participatory local planning, improve land management, and ensure community cohesion to deliver quality services” – the capacity of the project to reinforce national coordination was severely limited by the lack of engagement by the Ministry of National Solidarity, Human Rights and Gender. The project provided computers and printers to support a database that would help the ministry to monitor the implementation of its National Reintegration Strategy. At the time of our interviews (November 2013), the database was not working because of delays in the Ministry. But, the PBF II 2013 report indicates that it is now operational.

The 2013 PBF II report indicates that the project also translated the national reintegration strategy into Kirundi so that local level officials could use it. Under this first result, the PBF II 2013 report also indicates that, as part of the project, UNFPA established 22 peace clubs at the community level and did conflict resolution awareness-raising sessions. In the 13 collines where we did interviews with over 90 people in total, we were not able to find anyone who had been associated with these sessions or the peace clubs and are therefore not able to provide an independent assessment of them. The report also indicates that UNWomen and the Ministry of Communal Development organized a training program on gender sensitive planning processes for CDC and PCDC’s. In this activity, members of the local administration were trained as resource persons and expected to remain as such even after their political mandate.

Our survey findings and interviews show that local level officials played a constructive role in several PBF-supported collines. Overall, the survey findings reveal that people perceived local administrators helping to improve local development. Respondents viewed local authorities as helping to decrease poverty (Annex 3: Figure 5) and local-level discrimination (Annex 3: Figure 10). Respondents also viewed local authorities as helping to increase social cohesion (Annex 3: Figure 11) and mediate local conflicts (Annex 3: Figure 13). However, respondents perceived local level officials as consistently corrupt—as cited by about 76% of respondents (Annex 3: Figure 14). Our interview findings in several collines (discussed below) also show the potentially negative role that corrupt local officials played in the PBF II activities.

In relation to the *second expected result* – “The communities with the RDExC included and the other vulnerable populations have equitable access to basic social services and lodging and, finally, they actively take part in managing the basic social services” – the project helped to provide improved infrastructure to these impoverished provinces and gave employment to some of their most vulnerable members. But the project fell far short of ensuring that these communities have equitable access to basic social services and lodging or that former combatants, former displaced persons, and returning refugees would take part in managing basic social services. In fact, it does not seem that such large effects were appropriate for the activities outlined in the PBF II Project Document. The people we interviewed overwhelmingly declared that even though they, for the most part, appreciated the efforts of the PBF-funded program, the needs were still enormous. They said that people in the three focus provinces were still incredibly poor and vulnerable, and that the state did not have anywhere near the resources necessary to ensure equitable access to basic social services.

In relation to the *third expected result* – “The production system and the local entrepreneurial groups are improved and diversified to ensure food security in homes, sustainable socio-economic reintegration of the populations affected by the conflict, and to contribute to finding a sustainable solution to land issues.” – the effects of the PBF II program seemed to be the strongest. The local entrepreneurial associations with which the project worked greatly

appreciated the support. It was generally a good strategy for the project to work with these local associations and to help people support one another. Nonetheless, as our survey found, those excluded from local associations are likely to be very poor. As a result, helping to include vulnerable people in associations, as UNDP's approach did, is an important strategy for increasing equality within society. But, relying on existing associations that are not made up of diverse or vulnerable groups, as FAO and ILO did in part, may actually contribute to excluding the most vulnerable in society from economic opportunities and to increasing socio-economic division. Nonetheless, all beneficiaries that we interviewed greatly appreciated the training that both FAO and ILO provided to these associations. The FAO 'Field Schools' seemed to improve the food security of the people in participating associations and, to some degree, their larger community.

“You know, normally fish is a food that deteriorates rapidly. Now, we do not have this fear any longer. There are fishermen who come to us to learn how to conserve the fish.”⁴⁵

But, in relation to the remaining aspects of this expected result – ‘sustainable socio-economic reintegration of the populations affected by the conflict’ and contributing ‘to finding a sustainable solution to land issues’, the contribution of the project is unclear. The 2013 PBF II report indicates that the National Land Commission (CNTB) addressed over 700 land conflicts. But, because the CNTB is no longer politically neutral, we do not know the degree to which these resolutions are sustainable or, ultimately, peaceful. The issue of land in Burundi is still highly politicized and must be addressed at a political level.

The survey results show that 96% of all respondents cited land disputes as the principal cause of local conflicts (Annex 3: Figure 12). Respondents also mentioned several institutions as particularly helpful in resolving disputes. Local authorities, for example, were cited by about 72% of respondents as helping to manage and mitigate local conflict. Approximately 77% of respondents perceived the Local Level Tribunals to be helpful in dispute resolution. Only 30% of respondents in collines that benefited from PBF programming mentioned that CNTB was important for conflict mitigation.

In spite of the multiple positive effects of the activities implemented within the PBF II program, there were several instances of low quality programming and negligence by the implementing UN agency. One such example was in the colline of Buramata (Commune Gihanga, Province Bubanza) where the houses the UNDP and its partner helped to construct remained unfinished, lacking windows and doors, poorly constructed, and unattributed to the target groups. Furthermore, when allocating the land for the project, the local officials provided a parcel of land that already had houses on it, which had to be razed for the new low-quality houses to be built.

“It was poorly done... We have a problem of oversight. We speak to the communal administration often. He says that we have to submit our question to the governor. The response that they give us is that the governor will submit the request to UNDP.”⁴⁶

UNDP has turned over its construction of houses to UNOPS, which is currently conducting an assessment of the situation of these houses. But, the question is how the situation was allowed to

⁴⁵ Interview 19e.

⁴⁶ Interview 28a.

get this bad. Why was it not corrected mid-way, when all of the different people monitoring this program saw that the activities were not proceeding as planned?

Some of the infrastructure that was constructed through the joint construction work activities was already falling apart. In addition, there are examples of activities being manipulated by local officials, attributed to political parties, subject to claims of small-scale corruption, and focused on only one group of ex-combatants. In Muzinda colline (Commune Rugazi, Province Bubanza), for example, the project selected only former FNL combatants to participate in the joint construction work, excluding former CNDD-FDD combatants, which had the unintended (though perhaps not unforeseeable) consequence of undermining the aim of social cohesion and contributing to tensions in the community. In that situation, one of our interviewees responded:

“The project did not contribute to peace consolidation. To the contrary.”⁴⁷

In sum, the separate activities implemented under the framework of the reintegration program funded by the second tranche of PBF support were effective in reaching some of their specific aims, and as the discussion of our survey findings below shows, had an important positive effect on the communities where they worked. Nonetheless, the peacebuilding aspect of most of these activities was relatively weak and could have been much more thoroughly integrated throughout the different types and stages of programming. The clearest peacebuilding effect came from the initial stages of UNDP’s 3x6 program and UNDP’s efforts made to select the most vulnerable people in the community, a process that our interviewees contested only in several of the worst cases, mentioned above. In one community, UNDP used a lottery system that aimed to reduce the opportunities for bias in the allocation of the project resources.

The positive effect of the initial stages of UNDP’s 3x6 could have been strengthened if peacebuilding had been more of a thread throughout all phases of the project. For example, in our interviews with a wide range of community members, a consistent theme was the need for continued awareness-raising about peaceful co-habitation, conflict resolution, and other behaviors that are constructive for the health of the community. These opportunities could have been increased in number and extended to the larger community. In addition, the sustainability of the results achieved by these interventions is uncertain. Although other donors, such as the World Bank, the EU, GIZ, and the Japanese and the Netherlands are working on community-based reconstruction, it is unclear what will happen to the exact beneficiaries and associations that benefitted from the PBF II program. Will they be cast aside in favor of a new target group in line with other donors’ strategic goals? Will they continue to receive the crucial inputs that they asked for to help them prosper?

It is important that international actors continue to focus on community-level development in Burundi that is sensitive to the divisions and inequalities in society and seek to directly address them. At its best, the PBF II program did this. The need for this type of enlightened community-based development is obvious from the statements of many people that we interviewed at the community level. In addition, people whom we interviewed continuously called for work to improve relations within political leadership. Now that the third tranche of PBF support will support activities focused more on central political concerns, it is important that the UN and other actors continue to build on the achievements of the PBF activities at the community level and address any remaining deficiencies in the activities that have been implemented.

⁴⁷ Interview 25c.

3.3 Assessing the ‘Means’ of PBF II – Efficiency, National Ownership, Transparency, Accountability, and Outreach

We assess the overall means by which the PBF funded “Peace consolidation through support for the sustainable socio-economic reintegration of people affected by conflict” was implemented by looking at *five* criteria: the efficiency, national ownership, transparency, accountability, and outreach of the activities implemented as part of this program.

| <i>Means</i> | <i>Definition</i> |
|--------------------|--|
| Efficiency | Efficiency assesses two things: a) the cost efficiency, or whether results were achieved with the least amount of money possible compared to other alternatives; and b) the timely delivery of the planned activities. ⁴⁸ |
| National Ownership | National ownership measures: a) national buy-in - the degree to which the main people affected by a project buy into the project idea and design; and b) national involvement in implementation – the degree to which the key stakeholders are involved in the implementation of the project and feel ownership over the project outcomes. |
| Transparency | Transparency refers to the degree to which the project made information about its aims, objectives, activities, and expenditures available to the relevant stakeholders |
| Accountability | Accountability refers to the individuals that had “sanctionable authority” over the project. This criterion assesses to whom the project was actually accountable, and who exercised any leverage of the design and implementation of the project. ⁴⁹ |
| Outreach | We added the outreach criterion based on the clear finding from the 2010 evaluation of the PBF in Burundi, and other assessments of the PBF, that outreach to donors and national actors is essential for the achievement of a catalytic effect. ⁵⁰ |

The criteria that assess the means, or the way in which the project was implemented, relate to one another and to the desired ends in several important ways. Transparency and accountability help to determine who has ownership of and investment in the project and who does not, and are therefore closely related to national ownership. The capacity of the project to achieve formal and informal accountability to multiple stakeholders is likely to be crucial for its sustained relevance and effectiveness.⁵¹ National ownership and outreach are both linked to the capacity of the project to sustain its gains or catalyze new actions as they determine whether or not there is the necessary interest, investment, and capacity. Efficiency examines whether the funds were used well and whether they could have been more effective if used in other ways, and offers important insight not only into the cost effectiveness of the way that specific projects were implemented, but also the choices that were made in the design of the projects in light of other alternatives.

Efficiency is assessed both in terms of the timely delivery of planned activities and the cost efficiency, or value-for-money, of the activities. In terms of the timely delivery of activities, the PBF II does not do very well. First, the program was delayed for seven months because of slow

⁴⁸ OECD DAC, *DAC Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance*, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm> (Last accessed on February 2, 2014).

⁴⁹ Anne Peters, Lucy Köchlin, Till Förster, Gretta Fenner Zinkernagel (eds) *Non-state Actors as Standard Setters*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009, Chapter 1.

⁵⁰ Scharbatke-Church, Cheyanne, Susanna Campbell, Julia Doehrn, Philip Thomas, and Peter Woodrow. *Catalytic Programming and the Peacebuilding Fund*. (PeaceNexus Foundation, 2010); Campbell, Susanna P. *Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi*. (New York: United Nations, 2010).

⁵¹ Susanna P. Campbell, *Organizational Barriers to Peace: Agency and Structure in International Peacebuilding*, Dissertation, Tufts University, 2012.

human resource procedures that delayed the hiring of the staff for the Coordination Cell and individual activities were delayed because of other procedural issues. The first tranche of PBF support to Burundi suffered from similar problems with human resource and procurement procedures that are not suited for the timeframe and the staff profile of PBF projects. This is a systemic problem that the PBSO and the UN organizations that receive PBF funds (Recipient UN Organizations, or RUNOs) should attempt to address.

It was very difficult to judge the cost effectiveness of the PBF II tranche because we were not able to get a list of the cost of each separate activity. In the absence of this line-item list, we are not able to judge the value for money. We were able to pull together a list of expenditures in line with general categories through a relatively cumbersome online system (See the Supporting Annex, Section 6), but this again does not provide enough specificity to judge the cost effectiveness of the activities that were implemented as part of the PBF II program. One obvious aspect of the general expenditure report is that the personnel expenses are relatively low. One key problem with the PBF II activities is that the staff charged with implementing them also worked on other projects and were rarely assigned only to the PBF-funded activities. This meant that they may not have followed the activities as closely as they could have and that their organization prioritized other projects above the PBF-funded ones. But, the complexity and difficulty of peacebuilding programming requires a higher level of staff support and accompaniment, precisely because of the difficulties that peacebuilding programming is likely to face: insecure environments, possible corruption, under-resourced partners, resistance to behavior or institutional change, instrumentalization by political actors, etc.

The difficulty that we faced in accessing information about the expenditures by activity raises important *transparency* issues. First, the expense reports, by general category, are sent directly to the Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) Office, the administrator of the PBF, in line with the MoU that the MPTF has signed with each participating UN entity. In other words, neither the Coordination Cell in Bujumbura or the PBSO in NY receive a report about how much each PBF activity costs. How can these oversight mechanisms monitor what is happening with PBF funds if they are not able to assess what is spent where, much less have information about the quality of programming or outcomes of specific interventions?

As discussed above, even though there was a high level of reporting, the reporting was often focused on outputs – the number of things constructed, the number of people trained, the number of rice fields rehabilitated. Reports did not often present data on the intermediary outcome or effect of these activities, or the effect of the specific peacebuilding aspect of the project. To gather this type of data, UN staff would have to spend significant time with with the target community and use indicators that measure intermediary outcomes and effects, whether peacebuilding or otherwise. In the absence of this transparent information, the PBF oversight mechanisms could not hold the implementers of PBF activities accountable for achieving the desired results, or to provide them with guidance or support in adjusting their activities mid-stream.

A lack of transparency contributes to a lack of *accountability*. For high quality peacebuilding, development, or humanitarian programming in complex environments, implementing organizations need to be downwardly accountable to the beneficiaries and upwardly accountable to their organizations and their donors. In the case of the PBF II projects, the Technical Follow-up Committee (TFC) provided some downward accountability by ensuring that the various RUNOs explain their activities to one another and to key provincial officials. But, there were no direct accountability mechanisms that provided the beneficiaries of the activities with the opportunity to monitor the activities and communicate their findings directly to decision-makers in each RUNO

who would adjust their approach accordingly or communicate in a clear and timely manner to the beneficiaries the steps being taken. The problems that UNDP faced in Buramata and Muzinda, discussed above, illustrate this. In addition, PBSO and the Coordination Cell for the PBF II program seemed to have little leverage over the RUNOs. The PBF II projects would have benefitted from the most recent efforts of PBSO to improve the substance of reporting, which would hopefully contribute to providing PBSO relevant information on both the challenges and opportunities faced by the projects that they fund.

In the absence of information and the authority to sanction the implementing agency, true accountability does not exist. The only entity to whom the RUNOs in Burundi were directly accountable was the leadership of their country office and their organizational governance structure. Reporting lines matter. The Coordination Cell could have used the funds that were allocated in the budget for mid-term evaluations to increase both transparency and accountability, but it chose not to do so. It conducted an internal evaluation that was finalized in October 2013, but this evaluation was not specific enough and came too late in the implementation of most activities to help alter their course.

Another key aspect of accountability relates to the government and the degree of national ownership both in terms of the buy-in to the design of the program and participation in its implementation. Even though the PBF II program implemented aspects of the Burundian Government's National Reintegration Strategy, the Ministry of National Solidarity, Human Rights and Gender was neither fully invested in the design or the implementation of the activities, except for the efforts of a few lone individuals. This was a major roadblock for the project's aim of improving the government's capacity to reinforce the Ministry's coordination and monitoring capacity.

Unlike the activities implemented under the first tranche, the PBF II program did not conduct much advocacy or *outreach* with international donors or other actors to ensure that their activities were both complementary and to help them catalyze support by other donors. In comparison to the PBF I activities, there were far fewer international actors with significant familiarity with the PBF II program. This was, in part, because it was implemented at the community level, but also because these donors were not as involved in the consultations or oversight of the projects as they had been during the PBF I tranche.

Other donors did decide to support UNDP's 3x6 programming in some of the same provinces that the PBF funded as well as other provinces that the PBF did not fund (Makamba, Bururi and Rutana). These donors include: Australia, Japan, the Netherlands, and UNDP's internal fund managed by the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR). UNFPA also allocated some of its internal funds to complement the amount that the PBF gave them.

3.4 Synthesis of the findings from survey in Bubanza, Bujumubura Rural, and Cibitoke on the effect of PBF I and II interventions in these provinces

Improving the interaction of colline residents and local authorities and associations was a key component of both PBF I and PBF II interventions. Indeed, several interview respondents noted that corruption and political leadership are obstacles to peace consolidation in Burundi. In the survey, PBF collines showed several positive results when compared to non-PBF collines. For example, in terms of local planning about 19% of respondents in PBF collines indicated that the involvement of local authorities helped to decrease poverty in their communities. The same was true of only 3% of non-PBF respondents, a substantial difference (See Table 4 of Annex 3).

The involvement of local authorities was also seen as instrumental in improving social cohesion—15% of PBF-colline respondents noted that projects financed by local authorities helped to improve social cohesion compared to only about 5% in non-PBF collines (Table 8 of Annex 3). Also, involvement in local associations was seen as incredibly relevant for PBF-colline residents—75% of those surveyed in PBF collines agreed that social cohesion had increased due to involvement in local associations. Only 46% made the same claim in non-PBF collines (Table 8 of Annex 3).

Local authorities were also seen as more relevant in increasing social cohesion among PBF-colline respondents—about 15% of PBF-colline respondents cited projects financed by local authorities as instrumental in this regard compared to only about 5% among residents in non-PBF collines (Annex 3: Table 8).

Increases in social cohesion have coincided with decreased levels of discrimination across surveyed collines—just under 75% of respondents across all surveyed collines attested to significant decreases in discrimination in the past six years. These results are even more pronounced in PBF collines where the involvement of donors and PBF interventions—including the PBF I and PBF II — was cited as especially supportive. About 18% of PBF-colline respondents noted that these interventions had helped to decrease discrimination in the local community while only 8% of respondents in non-PBF collines agreed (Table 7 of Annex 3).

PBF initiatives were also seen as helpful means to mitigate land conflicts. For example, the CNTB, a component of PBF interventions dealing with land disputes, was cited by about 30% of PBF-colline respondents as a prominent local mediator. This sentiment was shared by only 13% of non-PBF survey respondents (Table 10 of Annex 3).

Based on these results, there is reasonable evidence that respondents in PBF collines are not only familiar with the substance of PBF interventions in Burundi, but see them as relevant in decreasing poverty, increasing social cohesion, decreasing discrimination, and helping to mitigate conflicts at the local level.

4. Analysis of PBF Oversight, Guidance, Support, and Implementation Mechanisms and Instruments

This evaluation presents a unique opportunity to assess the contribution of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and the evolving PBF support mechanisms to the PBF portfolio in Burundi, one of the first recipients of PBF funding and the country that has received the most funding to date from the PBF. In this section, we assess the role that PBSO's support, oversight, implementation and guidance mechanisms, and instruments played in both PBF I and II that we describe in the previous three sections, and the lessons that can be learned from Burundi for the PBSO. In the final section of this evaluation, we provide a brief conclusion and outline the recommendations that result from this study.

As detailed in the paragraphs below, there have been important innovations and professionalization of the mechanisms that oversee, guide, and support the implementation of the PBF Portfolio in Burundi. The innovations in Burundi that made a particular contribution to peace consolidation were: 1) the creation of joint project units in BINUB that integrated political, peacebuilding programmatic, and local knowledge; 2) the implication of the high level officials in BINUB and BNUB in several innovative dialogue- and security-focused projects, effectively linking the political and the operational; 3) the creation of Technical Follow-up Committees for PBF I projects that included a broad range of stakeholders (e.g. government, civil society, donors); and 4) the establishment of innovative accountability mechanisms in several projects that gave participants and observers the authority to assess regularly whether the project was progressing as planned and to suggest alterations to both the project aims and implementation.

Once PBF II got underway, these innovations were largely forgotten or dismantled. A new Technical Follow-up Committee and Coordination Cell were established, which helped to monitor the activities and created linkages between the six different UN organizations that were implementing the various PBF II activities. Nonetheless, these mechanisms lacked peacebuilding or monitoring techniques and did not seem to encourage RUNOs to regularly reflect on their activities and whether they were achieving the desired outcomes at the community level.

Field-level implementation, accountability, and monitoring mechanisms are a crucial component of peacebuilding programming and help to determine whether or not the peacebuilding activity remains relevant to the evolving context that it aims to influence. These mechanisms interact with and are influenced by headquarters mechanisms in RUNOs and the PBSO. Both RUNOs and the PBSO need to gather information and learn lessons about what types of mechanisms and systems enable, and those that undermine, the PBF's efforts to implement high quality peacebuilding programming. As the system currently stands, there are significant accountability and capacity gaps that were also identified in the 2010 evaluation of the PBF in Burundi, but have not yet been fully addressed.

High quality peacebuilding programming requires that project design and implementation teams possess a relatively rich skillset that combines local knowledge of the particular context that they aim to influence; understanding of the political and power dynamics that exist in the country and how they manifest in this context; and understanding of how to design, implement, and monitor peacebuilding programming to influence these dynamics. It also requires corresponding monitoring mechanisms that ensure that the team receives regular feedback from a broad array of stakeholders and, ideally, the delegation of some monitoring authority to key beneficiaries and related stakeholders. Finally, high quality peacebuilding programming requires procedures and policies that help hire staff with this skillset and support programmatic flexibility, speed, and

thorough planning (so that the team understands where they want to go, even if they decide to adapt it as they go along). As the PBF indicates on its website: “planning assumptions must be continuously reviewed during the implementation cycle, and intervention strategies evaluated to determine if they remain valid, or require reassessment.”⁵²

One problem is that the PBF is based on the assumption that the RUNOs have the capacity for high quality peacebuilding programming and monitoring, and that the JSC has the time and resources to oversee their programming, ensure that it aligns with the peacebuilding priority plan, and provide an additional assurance that implementation is on track. Our assessment indicates that there are significant breaks in this accountability and capacity chain that have a negative impact on PBF-funded activities. The innovative mechanisms that we identified above helped to fill some of these gaps, but a more systemic and sustainable solution is needed. In the next section, we examine each of the oversight and guidance mechanisms, and assess their strengths and weaknesses in the Burundian context.

4.1 The Peacebuilding Commission

As indicated in the introduction, the UN Peacebuilding Architecture was established to “help countries build sustainable peace and prevent relapse into violent conflict”.⁵³ Our research in Burundi revealed that the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) played an important role in sustaining the attention of the international donor community. Moreover, the PBC also contributed to high quality peacebuilding through helping to prevent the country from sliding back into conflict. The influence of the PBC in Burundi seemed to rely primarily on the energy and strategy of the chair of the Burundi country configuration, and the support that he received from the PBSO, his government, and key partnerships with other members of the country configuration (the body in the PBC that is charged with closely following the situation in Burundi).⁵⁴ The country configuration chair played a largely diplomatic and fundraising role. In several cases, the country configuration chair worked very closely with the UN Mission in the country and implemented a complementary strategy that influenced how and what peacebuilding priorities were selected, helped to unblock key roadblocks to Burundi’s peacebuilding process, raised key political concerns of the international community directly with the government, raised key concerns of the government directly with the international community, held regular exchanges with civil society, and helped to encourage donors to continue to contribute funds to Burundi.

The PBC mandates that the countries on its agenda come up with a Peacebuilding Priority Plan, which is then used to select the priority areas that the PBF will support. Over the entire period studied (2007 to 2013), the three Peacebuilding Priority Plans (or equivalent documents) were largely developed by key UN staff and Burundian Government officials, based on consultations with a broader group of Burundian and international stakeholders in the country. The PBSO indicates that a key feature of the PBC is that it “helps identify clear peacebuilding priorities for

⁵² United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, *Monitoring and Evaluation: Reflective Peacebuilding*. Available at : <http://www.unpbf.org/application-guidelines/7-monitoring-and-evaluation-me-reflective-peacebuilding/>. (Last accessed on 2 February, 2014).

⁵³ United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, *United Nations Peacebuilding Fund: Who We Are*, available at: <http://www.unpbf.org/who-we-are/> (Last accessed on Dec. 18, 2013).

⁵⁴ The PBSO synthesizes the key features of the PBC as follows: “To support the Peacebuilding Commission by providing strategic advice and policy guidance; to administer the Peacebuilding Fund and help raise funds for it; to foster a coherent, coordinated approach to peacebuilding throughout the UN family, and; to spread lessons learned and good practice on peacebuilding in the UN and beyond.” United Nations Commission, *The United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture* (New York: United Nations, 2010), 4, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/pbso_architecture_flyer.pdf.

the countries on its agenda”.⁵⁵ In the case of Burundi, the members of the Burundi country configuration and key representatives of the Burundian Government, the UN, and Burundian civil society were able to present their perspective to the members of the PBC. Nonetheless, the UN staff in Burundi, together with key partners in the international community, civil society, and government selected the priorities that would fit into the Peacebuilding Priority Plan.

Within the design of the Peacebuilding Architecture, one of the major advantages of a country configuration chair is that s/he is a representative of a member state and is therefore able to speak with other governments, donors, and other actors with a different authority than an international bureaucrat. In addition, if the country configuration chair is declared *Persona Non Grata (PNG)* by the host government and forbidden from serving as the chair, s/he does not lose his or her ‘day job’. As a result, the country configuration chair may potentially take more political risks in his/her relationship with the host government, which often means that s/he is willing to apply more direct political pressure than the SRSG or other UN staff person whose career would most likely be harmed if s/he were declared *Persona Non Grata* by the host government.

In Burundi, in part because of the frequency with which top UN staff have been *PNG’d*, the role of the country configuration chair seems to have been particularly important. The country configuration chair seems to operate largely as an individual, backed by his/her support team in the UN and his/her government. The frequency of PBC country configuration meetings for Burundi declined over time and sources report that as the meetings progressed they rarely took place at the ambassadorial level.⁵⁶ Countries like Burundi are not politically important for many of the PBC members and, as a result, it seems that the original idea of the PBC as being an intergovernmental body that can prevent post-conflict countries from falling back into war has been whittled down to one important and potentially powerful position. This position is held by one international diplomat and relies on this individual’s skills, and the guidance and support that s/he receives from the PBSO and from his/her government. The broader PBC served as a venue for different actors concerned with Burundi to voice their concerns, but the major leverage of the PBC in Burundi came in the form of the country configuration chair and his willingness and ability to play a key diplomatic and fundraising role. The country configuration chairs also often mobilized funding from their own governments (e.g., Sweden, Japan, Norway) who had not been traditional aid partners of Burundi.

4.2 PBF Funding Instruments – IRF and PRF

The UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) has two funding instruments: the Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility (PRF) and the Immediate Response Facility (IRF). The PRF is the main instrument through which the PBF has allocated funds to Burundi:

“The Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility (PRF) is the program-based financing mechanism of the PBF, typically aimed at countries within five years following the end of a conflict. Project-level approval is then delegated to a Joint Steering Committee (JSC) that is established at country level and led by the partner government. In this way, PRF provides longer-term support for initiatives that

⁵⁵ United Nations, *United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture* (New York: United Nations, 2010), 2.

⁵⁶ According to an analysis of meetings of the PBC configuration for Burundi, the group met formally 19 times and informally 34 times between 2006 and 2011. For the informal meetings, the Ambassador was listed as chairing only 17 meetings, while records do not indicate the chair at all 6 times. The frequency of meetings declined from 10 in 2007 to 1 for 2011 for formal meetings, and from 9 meetings to 2 informal meetings over that same period of time. UN Peacebuilding Commission, *Country-Specific Configurations: Burundi*. Available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/doc_burundi.shtml. (Last accessed on 2 February, 2014).

consolidate peace and to conflict-affected countries that have made clear commitments to addressing post-conflict fragility. It also creates mechanisms for effective partnerships between national authorities, the UN, and CSOs at the country level to support governments with strong commitments to peacebuilding.⁵⁷

The PBF has also given three IRF grants to Burundi that helped to address critical issues that had the potential to block the advancement of Burundi's peacebuilding process.

The Immediate Response Facility (IRF) is:

“the project-based financing mechanism of the PBF that was created to address critical peacebuilding needs in the immediate aftermath of conflict or as a result of a dramatic change in the country situation. It provides rapid funding for immediate peacebuilding and addressing urgent peacebuilding needs to support critical transition moments”.⁵⁸

The IRF was the most consistently high-performing instrument employed by the PBF in Burundi. It gave the political leadership of the UN in the country the opportunity to respond to key peacebuilding opportunities or blockages in the peacebuilding process through: demobilizing combatants associated with the FNL so that the rebel group could be transformed into a political party; providing crucial timely support for the organization of the 2010 elections, and enabling accurate ballots to be printed and distributed in time, and; supporting the organization of dialogue sessions among key political parties in preparation for the 2015 elections.⁵⁹ The IRF was a crucial funding instrument for the political leadership of the UN in Burundi and there is no equivalent fund within the UN. It consistently had an important effect on the advancement of Burundi's peacebuilding process.

The PRF less consistently produced high quality or relevant programming in Burundi, as discussed earlier in this report. First, the quality of the programming depended on the programming capacity and peacebuilding knowledge of the RUNO, which varied significantly both within each RUNO and between them. Second, the PRF programming relied on the openness of the Burundian government and local partners to the project, which also varied significantly from project to project, or activity to activity (see discussion of local ownership in Campbell, S. [2010] *Independent External Evaluation of the PBF in Burundi, 2010*), in spite of the Burundian Government's agreement to partner with the UN in the implementation of each project. Third, the PRF creates a high level of competition among the UN entities operating in the country, serving as what several interlocutors described as a 'big pie' that the various UN organizations were eager to carve up into pieces in line with their mandate and country strategy. At best, the PRF is a mechanism that can help the UN to do innovative peacebuilding programming that is not easily funded by any other source. At worst, the PRF is just another source of funding for standard programming that may not be implemented in a way that is

⁵⁷ United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, *The Peacebuilding Fund: What is the PBF?* Available at: <http://www.unpbf.org/application-guidelines/the-peacebuilding-fund-pbf/> (Last accessed on 2 February, 2014).

⁵⁸ United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, *The Peacebuilding Fund: What is the PBF?*, available at: <http://www.unpbf.org/application-guidelines/the-peacebuilding-fund-pbf/> (Last accessed on 2 February, 2014).

⁵⁹ The dialogue sessions that the UN organized for political parties in 2013 were funded by the left over money in the Cadre de Dialogue project, which was a PRF-funded project. But, because of the speed of the delivery of the funds and the way in which the funding was disbursed, we classify it with the other related IRF-funded projects here.

sensitive to the conflict dynamics or be designed to “have a direct and positive impact on the sustainability of the peacebuilding process”.⁶⁰

4.3 The UN Peacebuilding Support Office

One of the primary functions of the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) is to “administer the Peacebuilding Fund and help to raise funds for it”.⁶¹ This involves several different component activities:

“Projects funded under the IRF window are approved by the Head of PBSO. An internal Proposal Appraisal Committee (PAC) convenes to review each project proposal submission... For PRF programs, PBSO approves the Priority Plan following an internal technical assessment. For the purpose of quality assurance, project proposals can be technically reviewed by the PBSO prior to their approval. In cases of limited capacities at the country level, PBSO is committed to provide technical assistance (surge support) for purposes of quality assurance either before submission of budget requests or at the launch of the program.”⁶²

The PBSO works in close collaboration with UNDP’s Multi Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) Office, which “serves as the Administrative Agent of the PBF and is responsible for the receipt of donor contributions, transfer of funds to Recipient UN Organizations, consolidation of narrative and financial reports and their submission to PBSO and PBF donors.”⁶³

The PBSO and the MPTF Office are the primary accountability agents for the PBF at UN Headquarters. The PBSO has a small team that is responsible for administering the PBF and supporting RUNOs and JSCs for all of the 23 countries that receive PBF funding. Since Burundi received its first tranche of support from the PBF in 2007, the PBSO has made big strides in increasing the technical guidance and support that it provides to the JSCs, Senior Resident UN Official in the country, and the RUNOs in the areas of conflict analysis, preparation of Priority Plans, and some aspects of project design. It has also attempted to streamline and focus reporting procedures and it produced detailed PBF Application Guidelines and knowledge-sharing workshops in Cape Town, South Africa in 2013. In addition, the PBSO ensures that significant resources are invested in external evaluations, such as this one and the one preceding it on Burundi. However, while these evaluations provide lessons to be applied to future PBF projects, they do not alter ongoing programming or encourage reflective peacebuilding practice. Future activities would also benefit from incorporating key project design components at the outset, such as random assignment (which was only employed retrospectively with observational data), to facilitate the evaluation of relevant activities and associated theories of change.

As indicated above, the PBSO relies on the staff skills, accountability procedures, and procurement mechanisms of the RUNO’s to design, implement, and monitor high quality peacebuilding programming, and on the capacity of the JSC to monitor the contribution of this

⁶⁰ United Nations General Assembly, *Arrangements for the revision of the terms of reference for the Peacebuilding Fund*, A/63/818, (New York: United Nations, 2009), 5.

⁶¹ United Nations, *United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture* (New York: United Nations, 2010), 4.

⁶² United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, *The Peacebuilding Fund: What is the PBF?* Available at: <http://www.unpbf.org/application-guidelines/the-peacebuilding-fund-pbf/>, (Last accessed on 2 February, 2014).

⁶³ “As the Administrative Agent of the PBF, the MPTF Office transfers funds to RUNOs on the basis of previously signed MoUs between each RUNO and the MPTF Office.” United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, *The Peacebuilding Fund: What is the PBF?* Available at: <http://www.unpbf.org/application-guidelines/the-peacebuilding-fund-pbf/> (Last accessed on 2 February, 2014).

programming to the Peacebuilding Priority Plan. *Based on our findings in Burundi, we believe that this is a major flaw in the design of the PBF.* The following statement in the PBSO guidelines indicates that the PBSO is well aware of the implications of their structure and accountability mechanisms, and its link to the overall performance of the fund:

“The global Fund performance only improves significantly if the success rate of projects can be improved at the local level. For this to occur, there needs to be a solid capacity at the level of the Joint Steering Committee, Fund users and implementers to manage PBF allocations for results and report on success and challenges that need to be addressed.”⁶⁴

Unlike many other donors, after the initial approval process of the Priority Plan and the individual projects, the PBSO appears to have relatively little influence on the quality of the programming that they support. Instead, the JSC and the RUNOs are responsible for monitoring the quality and contribution of the PBF programming. In other words, the recipients of the funds, and some external parties in country, are largely responsible for determining whether or not they have the capacity to implement their proposed projects and monitoring their compliance with their stated objectives. Prior to the allocation of PBF funds, there is no assessment of the capacity of the JSC or RUNO to oversee or implement peacebuilding programming. During the entire period under study in Burundi, there were very few people either on the JSC or within a RUNO that had training or had built their expertise in peacebuilding programming design, implementation, or monitoring. Those projects that did have staff with this skillset were of significantly higher quality than those that did not.

There is also a potential issue with the information that the PBSO actually receives about the implementation of the PBF projects and how this information is addressed. Many of the problems experienced by RUNOs during the implementation of the PBF II activities in Burundi (discussed above) never made it into the reports that were submitted to the PBSO. The issues were either too politically sensitive in relation to the government, or staff were for various reasons wary of reporting them. In addition, the successes or contributions presented in the reports to the JSC and PBSO, from both PBF I and PBF II in Burundi, were often not supported by clear evidence. Staff monitored the inputs and outputs of projects and the overall amount of money spent, not the intermediary or final outcomes or potential contribution to peace consolidation.

Once PBSO received the reports, they did not systematically provide operational guidance to the PBF Secretariat in Burundi, the JSC, or the RUNOs about the content of the report. We were not able to identify any examples of circumstances when the PBSO had requested alterations in ongoing PBF-funded projects in Burundi in response to information in the reports that they received. The situation for the MPTF is not significantly different. The MPTF receives reports that show how money was spent in relation to six general categories. This information was sent directly to the MPTF Office and was not included in the reports sent to the JSC, although it is available on the MPTF website. In addition, RUNOs do not submit financial reports that link actual expenditures to planned activities. As a result, it is very difficult for the MPTF Office, the JSC, or the PBSO to assess whether the PBF money was spent as intended or whether the project achieved the intended value for the money provided.

⁶⁴ United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, *Monitoring and Evaluation: Reflective Peacebuilding*. Available at: <http://www.unpbf.org/application-guidelines/7-monitoring-and-evaluation-me-reflective-peacebuilding/>. (Last accessed on 2 February, 2014).

The PBSO's support to the RUNOs and JSC in Burundi has focused on conflict analysis, the development of the priority plan, helping to ensure the initial buy-in of the Burundian Government and some reflection on project design. However, it largely stays out of the implementation process. While this is an understandable stance from the perspective of a New York-based office with very few staff, it means that the PBSO has no real assurance that the projects that it funds will be relevant, efficient, or effective. The PBSO argues that it is up to the RUNOs to ensure that they have the capacity to implement the PBF-funded projects, and does not condition the existence of the requisite capacity or reflective monitoring mechanisms a condition for receipt of PBF funds.

Part of the problem also lies in the PBSO's definition and conceptualization of peacebuilding and the comparative advantage of the PBF. The UN, and many other organizations, have long struggled to come up with a conceptualization of peacebuilding that a) specifies what counts as peacebuilding and what does not, and b) includes all of the different activities that various UN entities want to include under the peacebuilding umbrella. In an attempt to accomplish both of these objectives, the PBF has chosen four priority objectives: 1) to support the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue; 2) to promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict; 3) to revitalize the economy and generate immediate peace dividends; and 4) to re-establish essential administrative services. However, the PBSO has not provided clear guidance on how to design and implement projects that are also conflict sensitive, build national ownership, take a political lens, are innovative, catalytic, and support a coherent peacebuilding response of the UN to the country's peacebuilding needs – all of which the PBF lists as its comparative advantage.⁶⁵

The PBF's new Application Guidelines provide guidance for reporting, the contribution of the PBF activities to its global results framework, an M&E plan, as well as links to other helpful resources on peacebuilding programming and monitoring guidelines created by other organizations. But, it does not provide clear guidance on how to design and implement peacebuilding activities that will employ the necessary *means* (efficient, based on national ownership of the original idea and implementation process, transparent, accountable, and consultative) to achieve the PBF's desired *ends* (relevant to the Priority Plan and the key drivers of conflict and peace; effective in achieving its aims; catalytic in terms of new peacebuilding capacities; and additional funding to support follow-on activities, if necessary) and achieve results that are sustainable and have a “a direct and positive impact on the sustainability of the peacebuilding process”.⁶⁶

It is very challenging to design and implement programming that complies with all of these criteria and makes an important peacebuilding contribution. The PBF did support several projects in Burundi that fulfilled most of these criteria, but this was not the case for the majority of the projects. The PBSO should take inventory of the innovative mechanisms, practices, and skillsets that enable its projects to succeed and provide concrete guidance to RUNOs and JSCs on how to design and implement high quality peacebuilding programming that fulfills what the PBF considers to be its comparative advantage. However, written guidelines are not enough. RUNOs and other interviewees repeatedly called for the PBSO to provide much better support in translating these complex ideas into practice.

⁶⁵ United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, *The Peacebuilding Fund: What is the PBF?* Available at: <http://www.unpbf.org/application-guidelines/the-peacebuilding-fund-pbf/> (Last accessed on 2 February, 2014).

⁶⁶ United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, *The Peacebuilding Fund: What is the PBF?* Available at: <http://www.unpbf.org/application-guidelines/the-peacebuilding-fund-pbf/> (Last accessed on 2 February, 2014).

Unlike some development programming in peaceful contexts, peacebuilding programming in post-war contexts often faces an uphill battle, and we recognize that challenge to RUNOs and other actors. Corruption may be widespread in the country, for instance. This means that to ensure that aid is used in the way that it is intended, implementing actors have to closely monitor its implementation. In post-war contexts where politicians are still trying to win the favor of the population, political actors may be more interested in dominating the political landscape than in building peace. By definition, peacebuilding programming works in difficult contexts where there is insufficient trust and where behaviors and institutions do not represent the interests of the entire community or population. Peacebuilding activities aim to create more equality in society and will therefore often challenge the interests of some political actors. Combined, these two contextual factors mean that peacebuilding programming will always face challenging and difficult situations, and the implementation of peacebuilding programming therefore needs to be closely monitored and adjusted. In addition, as indicated above, peacebuilding programming is based on a theory of change about its influence on conflict and peace dynamics that needs to be assessed and reassessed during the project implementation process.

When deciding to provide peacebuilding funding to the UN in a post-conflict country, the PBSO should accept that this programming may face direct or indirect resistance within the post-conflict context and within the implementing UN organizations. To address this likely resistance, and to generally facilitate high quality peacebuilding programming, the PBSO should make sure that several things are in place. *First*, it needs to ensure that the UN entities that receive its funding have the necessary combination of political, programmatic, and local knowledge. Because this type of knowledge is not often present in one UN entity, it may be necessary to develop integrated programming units and/or to pull in outside consultants with the necessary skillsets. Much of this knowledge and expertise exists within post-conflict countries, particularly in a context such as Burundi where many Burundians have been implementing different types of peacebuilding interventions for over a decade.

Second, to help to ensure that PBSO's guidelines make a real difference on the ground, the PBSO should disseminate and accompany the implementation of its 2013 Application and M&E Guidelines and related tools to help RUNOs figure out how to measure and monitor peacebuilding effects and adjust programming to better achieve these intermediary outcomes and effects.

Third, PBSO should also work with RUNOs to ensure that administrative procedures, procurement processes, and human resource practices are adapted to fit the specific timeframe and skillsets required by the PBF and for high quality peacebuilding programming. The administrative barriers and procurement processes were a major source of frustration and delays during the first and second tranches of PBF support to Burundi, as well during the procurement of this evaluation team. As the donor, the PBF should have the prerogative to demand that systems are developed to ensure the efficient and effective use of its funds.

In sum, the complexities of the post-conflict context demand more political awareness, more feedback and accountability mechanisms, more accompaniment (requiring more staff and often more skilled staff), more of a focus on capacity building and the transfer of capacity to national actors, and generally more focus on the program and project implementation process. The PBF should help to ensure that its reporting and support structures, the RUNOs, and the other country-based mechanisms are designed and implemented to deal directly with this context. Because this type of programming is more complex and requires more staff attention, there will most likely be a higher staff cost for higher-quality peacebuilding programming, and both the PBF and its donors should be prepared to support this.

4.4 The Country-based Mechanisms

The PBSO works with several key organizations in fund-recipient countries: the Joint Steering Committee (JSC) and support structures, the Recipient UN Organizations (RUNOs), and the host Government. The JSC is “co-chaired by the Senior UN Representative and a senior government representative... The JSC monitors the implementation of the Priority Plan, while also approving projects (including project amendments) and assessing program-wide achievements before the end of each calendar year.”⁶⁷ The RUNOs are the UN Organizations that implement PBF-funded projects, sometimes in collaboration with international or national NGOs:

“Each RUNO operates under its own financial rules and regulations and assumes full financial and programmatic responsibility for funds disbursed by the Administrative Agent (e.g. MPTF Office). In addition, each RUNO is responsible for: project implementation and achievement of expected results within the agreed duration of the project, including those components implemented by their partners (e.g. CSOs); project monitoring and evaluation with full cost coverage; and financial and narrative reporting.”⁶⁸

For both of the PBF tranches provided to Burundi, the UN also established Technical Follow-up Committees (TFCs) and a PBF Secretariat to support the JSC. In addition, for the PBF II tranche, as mentioned above, the UN established a Coordination and Program Direction Cell that reported directly to the UN Resident Coordinator or Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General and worked with the six RUNOs implementing the PBF II activities to help create linkages among, and monitor their activities, and, together with the PBF Secretariat, consolidate their activity reports for submission to the JSC and PBSO.

The mechanisms accompanying the PBF in Burundi seemed heavy to many participants, but they also served an important consultation and feedback function. During both the first and second tranche of PBF support, the JSC served as an important venue for discussion and the resolution of issues between the UN and the government. But, in both cases it was not able to monitor the details of the projects and ensure that there was high quality programming. Instead, it largely addressed higher-level issues of strategy, priorities, and sharing of resources between the government and the UN.

During PBF I, the JSC included the active participation of many members of civil society and donors. It met more frequently and was charged with monitoring the implementation of the PBF projects. Based in part on the recommendations from the 2010 Independent Evaluation, the JSC met every six months during PBF II and focused on monitoring the project’s overall contribution to the Priority Plan and reviewing the reports that were synthesized by the Coordination and Program Direction Cell. The membership of the JSC stayed the same for the PBF II, but attendance and the active inclusion of non-UN and non-government perspectives greatly dissipated. The community focus of the PBF II projects did not seem to carry the same degree of interest for people as the PBF I projects, which were focused on multiple sectors and on higher-level political issues and processes. This had the effect that, during PBF II, fewer people in Burundi were aware of its activities and the members of the JSC, in general, seemed much less engaged in the PBF process.

⁶⁷ United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, *The Peacebuilding Fund: What is the PBF?* Available at: <http://www.unpbf.org/application-guidelines/the-peacebuilding-fund-pbf/>, (Last accessed on 2 February, 2014).

⁶⁸ United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, *The Peacebuilding Fund: What is the PBF?* Available at: <http://www.unpbf.org/application-guidelines/the-peacebuilding-fund-pbf/> (Last accessed on 2 February, 2014).

But, the most powerful mechanisms that the PBF created during PBF I, and possibly during PBF II, were the TFCs and several innovative monitoring structures within several PBF I projects. The TFCs (when they worked well) and several innovative monitoring mechanisms served the crucial role of creating some regular external accountability for the intermediary outcomes of the PBF interventions and provided important data about the progress of the project and opportunities for reflection on the purpose and effectiveness of the PBF project or activity. This type of data, based on an assessment from multiple different stakeholders about contribution to its aims, and the space for reflection and critical analysis are crucial for organizational learning and mid-course correction.⁶⁹

There was an important difference between the TFCs that supported the PBF I projects and the TFC that supported the PBF II projects. The TFCs for the PBF I projects were organized around different sectors (security, human rights, rule of law etc.) and some included the active participation of civil society members, national NGOs, international donors, and key government officials. These individuals used their own time and energy to critically assess the quality of the PBF projects and suggest adjustments and alterations to their design and implementation. In the absence of these key individuals who gave their time to the PBF process for free, TFCs would not have been nearly as effective in improving the quality of the PBF I programming. In several cases, these individuals had knowledge and understanding of peacebuilding programming and monitoring and used this knowledge to help improve the design of the PBF projects, set up innovative monitoring mechanisms within several security and dialogue projects, and helped the projects to make important mid-course corrections.

As indicated in the 2010 external evaluation of the PBF support to Burundi, two innovative project monitoring mechanisms stand out, which both worked in close collaboration with the TFC for their particular project. The Cadre de Dialogue developed an evaluation group that was composed of a representative group of participants in its dialogue sessions. This group assessed and evaluated the content and organization of each dialogue session and conveyed their recommendations to the TFCs and the project team housed in the Ministry of Good Governance. The project that worked with the National Intelligence Service was evaluated at two intervals by a widely respected Burundian Human Rights NGO, and the continued disbursement of the funds was made conditional upon a positive report by this NGO. There are numerous potentially innovative mechanisms that could be integrated into the design of PBF-funded projects.

There are three components that all of these project-focused monitoring and accountability mechanisms should have. *First*, they should include a group of individuals who are not directly affiliated with the organizations implementing the project and represent diverse perspectives in terms of politics, gender, position of power within society, ethnicity, and other factors that may be related to the goals of the project. This group of individuals will need to include those with good technical skills in peacebuilding programming and monitoring, or receive support from staff that have this skill set. *Second*, they should gather accurate information about the implementation at regular intervals (every one to three months) and analyze this information in relation to the

⁶⁹ Susanna P. Campbell, "When Process Matters: The Potential Implications of Organizational Learning for Peacebuilding Success," *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*, 4:2 (2008) pp. 20–32; Susanna P. Campbell, *Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi*, Evaluation (Bujumbura, Burundi: BINUB, 2010), accessed September 18, 2011, here: <http://www.unpbf.org/burundi/burundi-progress.shtml>; Susanna P. Campbell, "Routine Learning? How Peacebuilding Organizations Prevent Liberal Peace," in *A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding*, Susanna P. Campbell, David Chandler, and Meera Sabaratnam (Eds) (London: Zed Books, 2011), pp.89–105.

project's theory of change, desired intermediary outcomes, and possible unintended effects.⁷⁰ *Third*, the analysis and recommendations that come from these monitoring mechanisms have to be seriously considered by the leadership of the project, the RUNO, and the senior leadership of the UN in the country.

While the TFC for the PBF II projects had some very active members, it was much smaller and seemed to apply less direct pressure on the RUNOs to alter their approach or make mid-course corrections. Furthermore, most of its members did not have significant experience with peacebuilding programming or monitoring and evaluation, and those that had some peacebuilding programming knowledge did not seem to be able to encourage RUNOs to integrate this more effectively into their programming. Furthermore, the annex from the original project document, which the TFC and the Coordination and Program Design Cell used to monitor the implementation of the PBF II activities, did not include clear peacebuilding aims or indicators that would allow them to monitor the contribution of the activities to the drivers of conflict and peace. As a result, the TFC and the Coordination and Program Design Cell monitored what they thought they were supposed to monitor, focusing primarily on activity-level outputs rather than peacebuilding outcomes or contribution.

In addition, the PBF Secretariat in Burundi and the Coordination and Program Design Cell conducted an internal evaluation in August 2013, which brought a broader group of civil society representatives and other non-UN actors together with UN staff and M&E experts from different members of the UNCT. The evaluation provided some helpful overall conclusions, but lacked the details necessary to evaluate and understand the overall contribution of PBF II or the variation in the RUNOs' different contributions. It also did not attempt to assess the peacebuilding effect or outcome of the PBF II activities, instead mostly summarizing project activity information such as the number of houses built, roads reconstructed, goats distributed, people trained, and other project output indicators.

In sum, during the second tranche of PBF support to Burundi (PBF II), the TFC and the monitoring undertaken by the RUNOs and the Coordination and Program Design Cell helped to gather important data about the implementation of the activities. However, they did not lead to the necessary mid-course corrections in the collines where some of the PBF II activities were not achieving their intended results (see Section II above on the effectiveness of the PBF II activities). These monitoring efforts did not infuse a political or peacebuilding lens into the PBF II activities or directly address some of the lingering concerns that some recipients had about the sustainability and catalytic effect of the support provided to local associations.

There was US\$ 120,000 for three mid-term evaluations of effects, US\$ 15,000 for a baseline survey, and US\$ 10,000 for monitoring and evaluation training that was never used. The PBF II project team reported that this was because each RUNO took care of its own monitoring and evaluation. The staff in the Coordination and Program Design Cell and the PBF Secretariat worked very hard and often seemed to be overburdened and overworked. Among other things, the money available for monitoring and evaluation could have been used to provide important technical support for these overworked staff in the area of peacebuilding monitoring and evaluation (particularly because key staff were lost during the project implementation process)

⁷⁰ There are multiple tools that can be used to support this type of monitoring, data gathering, and analysis, including: Most Significant Change; Outcome Mapping; Theory of Change Mapping; Appreciative Inquiry; and other mechanisms that support consultative processes with the communities affected by the project, observers, and other key stakeholders. These tools can also support a pre-project assessment and planning process that will ensure that the projects are grounded in the needs, perspectives, and capacities of their intended beneficiaries.

and enable an overall reflective process among the six RUNOs implementing the PBF activities, both before and during the implementation of their activities.

Another important difference between the PBF I and the PBF II tranches was that there was a high degree of variation, both between PBF I and PBF II and within PBF I projects, in the degree to which government partners engaged in project design and implementation. As indicated in the 2010 Evaluation, the projects that had a high degree of national ownership during both the conceptualization and implementation stages had a higher likelihood of achieving their peacebuilding aims. During PBF II, the Ministry of National Solidarity, Refugee Repatriation, and Social Reintegration originally agreed to partner on the project but then failed to provide the agreed-upon office space to the project and blocked several other activities that were contingent upon their cooperation. For example, a baseline was planned for the project, but was never conducted because the ministry did not make a timely commitment to carry it out.

As indicated above, the RUNOs are responsible for ensuring that they have the capacity to design, implement, monitor, and report on high quality peacebuilding programming. This presents a particular problem in the UN System because there are still not enough staff who know how to design and implement peacebuilding programming or to monitor its contribution. Even though multiple UN entities count peacebuilding among their core competencies, none of them systematically train their staff to implement or monitor peacebuilding programming. For example, in UNDP, the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) has developed important expertise in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. BCPR serves a support role to country offices and can send staff to help support the implementation of specific peacebuilding projects, but this peacebuilding skillset is not systematically provided to staff who will be implementing or overseeing PBF-funded projects or assigned to countries that are recovering from war.⁷¹ Similarly, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) hire staff that are skilled in political analysis and political processes, but do not ensure that staff are trained in how to implement programming with a political lens.

In Burundi, particularly during the PBF I tranche, staff indicated that they did not have the requisite training to design, implement, and monitor peacebuilding programming. PBF II staff were less open about this point, but it became clear in our interviews that most of the individuals who were implementing PBF projects did not have a good grasp on the particularities of peacebuilding programming or how to assess and monitor its effects. Many of them muddled through and figured it out, but many others did not.

The UN, both within and between organizations, is still divided between a political and technical focus and corresponding skills, making it difficult to create teams that have the rich skillset that high quality peacebuilding requires. As indicated earlier, the specific design of BINUB, which implemented the PBF I tranche, made it possible to combine these various skills for several of their joint project teams. BINUB created integrated teams that combined staff from the UNCT, often UNDP, with staff from DPKO or DPA. In many, but not all, cases, this created a potent mix of politically informed programming that was focused on key peacebuilding priorities. The PBF II did not benefit from such integrated teams, but each RUNO that received PBF funding largely viewed their programming as separate from the other RUNOs, even though they were all pursuing the same three overall effects outlined in the project document in the same three provinces and, at times, with the same population. Particularly in the case of some of UNDP's

⁷¹ Susanna Campbell and Lisa Schirch. *UNDP's Role in Peacebuilding: Issues and Strategies*. (New York: UN Development Program, 2012); Susanna Campbell and Lisa Schirch, *UNDP's Role in the Peacebuilding Landscape*. (New York: UN Development Program, 2012).

3x6 programming, there was an important peacebuilding component that had an important effect on individuals and communities. Yet, the quality of the programming depended on the quality of the local partner and the local administrator, as well as a relatively thorough beneficiary selection process that UNDP put in place.

When the partners were strong, understood the peacebuilding aspect of the programming, communicated the expectations clearly to beneficiaries, and closely monitored the implementation of activities, then they seemed to have an important peacebuilding effect on the part of the population that was most affected by the war. But, as indicated in Section III, there were big problems with some of the partners that had a negative affect on the communities that they aimed to help. The RUNO's monitoring mechanisms or staff were not able to correct these problems when they first appeared and only addressed some of them once the activities were largely finished. Furthermore, as mentioned above, it is unclear how much information on these setbacks made it up to the broader accountability mechanisms that the PBF has established. This information was not included in the reports presented to the JSC, and the PBSO was not aware that there were some problems with how some PBF II activities were implemented.

Even though the PBF and PBC's support to Burundi led to a much greater awareness in the UN, the Government, and the broader international community on how to identify and address the drivers of conflict and peace in Burundi, it did not lead to systemic changes in the capacity of RUNOs to design and implement peacebuilding programming. With staff turnover and changes in leadership, many of the innovations that the UN made, and skills that were built during the first tranche of PBF support to Burundi, were lost during the second tranche. During the second tranche of PBF support to Burundi, overall conflict analysis and targeted peacebuilding strategies were developed, but were not systematically supported by the integration of political awareness at the operational level, particularly because PBF II focused on community-based programming. Peacebuilding programming takes place at the micro operational level and therefore needs to be designed and implemented by staff who have both programmatic knowledge on how to do good peacebuilding programming and political knowledge on the manifestation of the potential drivers of conflict and peace that affect the specific project.

PBF projects also need a high level of support from the Senior UN Officials to help to ensure that they continue to focus on the right political priorities. Even though this is the role of the JSC, this encouragement has more power when given by someone who has clear authority over staff. Senior UN Officials can also play an important role in helping staff implementing PBF projects to overcome difficult political and bureaucratic obstacles, both within the UN System and the host country. In addition to the political oversight from the leadership of the UN mission, if there is one, the leadership of the RUNO should also be implicated in the PBF intervention and provide a high level of oversight. These are highly political and complex interventions that often need the support of UN country-level leadership. This is a consistent lesson in both the PBF I and PBF II activities in Burundi. In PBF I, the Senior UN leadership was highly engaged in some of the PBF activities and in the overall PBF process, which made a big difference to the process. But, the same was not true in relation to PBF II, partly due to the focus of activities at the community level, partly because BNUB was a much smaller mission with fewer staff, and partly due to preference.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

Between 2007 and 2013, the PBF made several important contributions at critical points in Burundi's war-to-peace transition. It supported programming that helped to unblock a deadlock in the Burundian Parliament in 2007, removing the final remaining barrier to the transformation of the FNL rebel group into a political party in 2009; it provided quick funding necessary to ensure the relatively smooth organization of the 2010 elections; it helped to calm communities in provinces that received a high number of returning refugees, IDPs and ex-combatants and had suffered from the high levels of political violence and instability surrounding the 2010 elections; it supported members' of the above-mentioned communities entrepreneurial capacity; and it supported dialogue workshops in 2013 to try to break another deadlock between political parties surrounding the preparation for the 2015 elections. The PBF also supported key institutional reforms in institutions that are considered to be central to the development of a liberal democratic state that can sustain peace. Programming supported by the PBF established the Independent National Commission for Human Rights (CNIDH) and advanced crucial reforms in the Burundian military, both of which catalyzed additional funding for these reforms from other donors and helped to build core national capacity in these institutions.

Combined with the efforts of the chair of the Burundi country configuration of the PBC and the Representatives of the Secretary-General, the PBF was a powerful tool that helped the UN implement innovative peacebuilding programming that made a crucial positive contribution to Burundi's peacebuilding process and achieve aspects of its Security Council mandate that would have been difficult to do without it. There was no equivalent funding source for the UN to pursue peacebuilding programming in Burundi and the PBF, in general, made a big difference for the UN, its staff, and for many of the Burundian institutions that were implicated in its projects.

In spite of the PBF's successes in Burundi, our research reveals that the PBF still faces important systemic problems that contributed to some low quality programming that did not make good use of the PBF funds and had negative effects on potential drivers of peace in Burundi. The quality and contribution of PBF-funded projects depended on whether they were implemented by staff with political, peacebuilding programming, and monitoring knowledge; whether they were supported by innovative feedback mechanisms from a representative group of stakeholders; and whether they had national partners that were invested in both the idea and the implementation of the activity.

The mechanisms and procedures that the PBSO has established to support the projects that the PBF funds focus primarily on the identification of peacebuilding priorities and the selection of projects to achieve these priorities. But, as indicated above, the success of peacebuilding programming is determined by how it interacts and engages with the specific context that it aims to influence. As a result, how PBF projects are implemented, and how the original project designs are adjusted and adapted to fit the context, are at least as important as the selection of the project. Unfortunately, the current mechanisms and capacities that the UN has for peacebuilding programming are not sufficient to support consistently high quality peacebuilding programming.

To improve the overall quality of the projects and programs that the PBF supports, we recommend that the core actors involved in the PBF address three systemic problems: the insufficient capacity within RUNOs to design, implement, and monitor this distinctive type of programming which we call "high quality peacebuilding programming"; the insufficient accompaniment and support capacity of the PBSO and RUNOs; and the fact that lessons about processes, practices, and mechanisms that support high quality peacebuilding programming are

not transferred from one recipient country to the other, or between country teams in one country. We maintain that these factors should determine when the PBF decides to stop funding programming in a country (e.g. its exit strategy). Below, we provide specific recommendations in relation to each of these issues.

Overall Recommendation 1: Ensure that RUNOs have the capacity to design, implement, and monitor high quality peacebuilding programming.

1.1 PBSO

1.1.1 – PBSO should provide clear guidelines as to how projects should be designed, staffed, implemented, and monitored so that they can achieve the effect called for by the PBF mandate.⁷²

1.1.2 – PBSO should assess the capacity of RUNOs to design, implement, and monitor this distinctive or “high quality peacebuilding programming” before agreeing to provide funding for a specific project. This capacity includes the following components:

- Project teams that have a combined skillset: technical knowledge related to the specific type of peacebuilding activity; political knowledge related to the broader political context; local knowledge related to the focus of the project; and peacebuilding programming knowledge related to the process of designing, implementing, and monitoring reflective peacebuilding;
- Procedures and procurement practices that: enable the organization to hire the necessary staff or consultants within an appropriate timeframe that does not delay the project; procure any necessary goods within an appropriate timeframe that does not delay the project;
- Reporting practices that identify the intermediary outcomes of activities, not simply the outputs and the amount of money spent;
- The implication of the country-level leadership of the RUNO in the direct oversight of the PBF activities, including by visiting the projects and supporting constructive problem-solving when barriers are encountered.

1.1.3 – If RUNOs do not have the capacity to implement high quality peacebuilding programming, then the PBSO should ensure that they provide the necessary capacity, using some of the PBF funds if required. This may mean that the PBSO funds fewer projects, but that the ones that it funds are of a consistently higher quality.

1.2 RUNOs

1.2.1 – Before agreeing to receive funds from the PBF, the RUNOs should ensure that they have the capacity necessary to design, implement, and monitor high quality peacebuilding programming. If RUNOs do not have the requisite capacity in the particular country office, then they should find it and/or request that they use a portion of the funding for it.

⁷² According to the PBF’s mandate, assessment of its comparative advantage and evaluation criteria project that it should employ the following *means* (be efficient, based on national ownership of the original idea and implementation process, transparent, accountable, and consultative) to achieve the PBF’s desired *ends* (relevant to the Priority Plan and the key drivers of conflict and peace, effective in achieving its aims, catalytic in terms of new peacebuilding capacities and additional funding to support follow-on activities, if necessary, and achieves results that are sustainable) and have a “a direct and positive impact on the sustainability of the peacebuilding process”. United Nations General Assembly, *Arrangements for the revision of the terms of reference for the Peacebuilding Fund*, A/63/818, (New York: United Nations, 2009), 5. Available at: <http://www.unpbf.org/document-archives/terms-of-reference/> (Last accessed February 2, 2014).

1.2.2 – RUNOs should establish procedures, mechanisms, and staff capacity that are designated to implement and support high quality peacebuilding programming. This does not mean simply sending a staff person into the country for a couple of weeks to backstop. Instead, this means that the RUNO allocates staff and alters procedures so that they correspond to the requirements of high quality peacebuilding programming for the duration of the peacebuilding program for which they receive funding. This peacebuilding capacity and altered procedures may also generally help any UN country office that is intervening in a war-torn or post-war context.

1.3 JSC

1.3.1 – The JSC, and the PBSO, should require that the RUNOs report on the intermediary contribution that they are making toward their aims, the challenges that they are facing, the adjustments that they have made in their programming, and their alignment with and/or adjustment of their theory of change about how they think they will influence potential drivers of conflict or peace.⁷³ In Burundi, the JSC primarily received information from the projects on the number outputs of the projects and the amount of money spent and not the quality or intermediary contribution of the work, making it difficult for them to assess the quality of the programming, help the RUNOs to address roadblocks, or improve their programming.

1.4 MPTF Office

1.4.1 The MPTF Office should renegotiate its MOUs with RUNOs and require them to submit financial reports that indicate how much is spent on each of the PBF activities that are implemented as part of PBF-funded projects and how this relates to key project milestones. These reports should be sent directly to the JSC and to the PBSO, as well as the MPTF Office.

Overall Recommendation 2: Ensure that both headquarters and country-based mechanisms accompany the implementation of PBF activities and support critical reflection.

2.1 PBSO

2.1.1 – To enable reflective peacebuilding, PBSO should help to create spaces for reflection during the design and implementation process about each PBF project, its contributions, and its challenges and opportunities. The PBSO can do this by accompanying the project's implementation process through regular field missions – attending key meetings of the JSC, meeting with the project staff, visiting the project sites, and talking to partners and observers. The value of checking-in periodically, rather than being based in the country, is that you have more perspective on the situation and can ask questions that the people based in the country may no longer ask. An active partnership between donors and recipients is an important way to improve accountability and effectiveness. In many organizations, not just in the UN, details and observations that donors need to know and understand are often not included in the reports that they receive.

2.1.2 – PBSO should inform Senior UN leadership in the country, senior leadership of the RUNOs in the country, the JSC, and the Government of their key role in supporting high quality peacebuilding programming. This cannot be done through the provision of documents alone, but

⁷³ The 2013 current PBSO reporting guidelines request that RUNOs report on outcomes, but most of the reporting still focuses on outputs. The PBSO and RUNOs should explore alternative reporting frameworks that permit more flexibility in relation to the initial indicators (which are not always good measures), the discussion of the theory of change, open discussion of challenges and setbacks, and identification of perceptions of beneficiaries and observers and intermediary outcomes.

requires that the PBSO spends time with each key actor to explain the specific requirements of peacebuilding programming and their role in ensuring that it is high quality.

2.2 RUNOs

2.2.1 – To enable higher quality peacebuilding programming by RUNO country offices, RUNO headquarter staff should collaborate with the PBSO in their efforts to accompany and support RUNOs that are implementing PBF-funded projects, including through regular field visits and by ensuring that the appropriate capacity and guidance are provided to the country office.

2.2.2 – RUNOs should establish innovative participatory monitoring and feedback mechanisms that help each project to receive regular feedback from a wide range of stakeholders in the project. These are project-specific mechanisms. Their task cannot be accomplished by the Technical Follow-up Groups (TFGs), which are often comprised of higher-level officials or representatives of civil society. Participatory monitoring mechanisms should involve the beneficiaries and observers of the project and provide these actors with opportunities to communicate their perceptions of the project to the project, and possibly RUNO, management.

2.3 Senior UN Leadership and RUNO leadership in country

2.3.1 – Because peacebuilding programming is complex and is likely to face resistance in the country environment and within standard UN practices, it is important that Senior UN Leadership are implicated not only in the initial selection of the peacebuilding priorities, but also in periodically following the implementation of the activities. This will help to increase the accountability that staff feel for implementing high quality programming, enable the individual(s) to address important roadblocks and support mid-course corrections, and ensure that the PBF projects maintain a political lens. This may require additional staff to be allocated to support the Senior UN Leadership in the effort. This is an investment in quality; as indicated above, it is better for the PBF to spend its funds in ways that support fewer higher quality peacebuilding projects, rather than more projects that are variable in quality.

2.3.2 – RUNO leadership in-country should follow the PBF projects closely, including by conducting regular field visits and ensuring that the requisite capacities and mechanisms are in place to support high quality programming.

2.4 JSC

2.4.1 – The JSC should ensure that TFGs are established for each sector of projects and that these groups are composed of individuals that have some peacebuilding programming knowledge; have sectoral knowledge; represent diverse perspectives; represent donors, INGOs, and other actors that do similar programming; and are concerned about the outcome of the PBF-supported projects in this sector. It may also be important to compensate these individuals in some way for the time and energy that they give to the PBF activities.

2.4.2 – The JSC should consider itself an important space for reflection. Whenever possible, the members of the JSC should also speak directly with the staff implementing PBF projects to hear from them how their projects are advancing and what challenges they are facing. The JSC should also ensure that it benefits from the participation of a wide range of stakeholders: civil society, donors, regional states, and INGOs who can offer important perspectives on the peacebuilding priorities and the implementation of PBF-funded activities.

Overall Recommendation 3: Collect and transfer lessons learned about the practices, mechanisms, and processes that support high quality programming.

3.1 – The PBSO should collect the lessons learned from RUNO staff, partners, the JSC, and Governments about the practices, mechanisms, and processes that have seemed to contribute to high quality peacebuilding programming. The PBSO should provide descriptions and explanations of these different options back to the RUNOs, JSC, and Governments who are involved in the design and implementation of PBF activities and help them to design processes and mechanisms that will help them to support high quality peacebuilding programming.

3.2 – The PBSO should investigate the lessons that have been learned by the broader humanitarian community about short-term socio-economic support at the community level. The experience of the community-based PBF projects in Burundi shows that they can easily turn from ‘peace dividends’ to ‘peace disappointments’ if they do not implement a solid strategy for helping individuals and communities to sustain the socio-economic gains from the project.

Overall Recommendation 4: Link exit strategy both to the country context and to the capacity of the UN and the host Government to deliver high quality peacebuilding programming.

4.1 – The PBSO should determine its exit strategy based on the answer to four questions, listed below:

- 1) Is there still a clear need in the country for high quality short-term peacebuilding programming implemented by the UN?
- 2) Does the senior UN leadership have a clear vision for peacebuilding in the country and is s/he committed to supporting the implementation of high quality peacebuilding programming?
- 3) Does the senior leadership of the host government have a clear vision for peacebuilding in the country and is s/he committed to supporting the implementation of high quality peacebuilding programming?
- 4) Do the RUNOs in the country have a clear vision for peacebuilding and have, or are willing to attain, the capacity to implement high quality peacebuilding programming?

Assessing the PBF’s exit strategy on the country context alone is not likely to deliver an effective exit strategy. The UN should ask itself whether, as the Secretary-General’s Fund, the UN can deliver high quality peacebuilding programming with a political lens in that country that addresses critical peacebuilding priorities. When it can no longer do this with the UN in a particular country, then this is a potential indication that the PBF should no longer provide funding to this country.

ANNEX 1: Combination of Survey and Interview Data for PBF II

This table shows the relationship between the 138 household-level surveys and the 90 interviews conducted at the field level in PBF collines. The interview quotes are broadly representative of the responses provided in that colline. This table differs from Annex II in that this table only includes the collines that had PBF projects, while the survey described in Annex II looks at both PBF and non-PBF collines. The Key Questions of Interest represent the survey questions related to peace and security. The numbers in parentheses refer to the difference between the average value for that response and the actual response for that colline.

| Colline and agencies active in colline. | Key Questions of Interest | | | | Representative Quotes: Pulled from 90 interviews across 11 collines | |
|--|---|---|---|--|---|--|
| | Improvement in <i>social cohesion</i> in the past six years? | Possible causes of <i>local violence</i> ? | Perceptions of <i>security</i> and whether security has worsened or improved | Perceptions of <i>human rights</i> environment and whether it has improved or worsened | Did the colline-level projects contribute to peace? | What the respondent would differently if he or she were in charge of the project |
| All PBF collines | 94% of all respondents reported that social cohesion had improved. | 96% and 74% said land disputes and frequent robberies respectively are the main causes of local violence. | 89% of all respondents claimed that security is good and 93% claimed that it has improved. | 73% of all respondents claimed that human rights were 'good' and 85% said that they had improved. | --- | --- |
| Buramata UNDP ⁷⁴ UNWOMEN ⁷⁵ UNHCR ⁷⁶ ILO ⁷⁷ | 90% said social cohesion improved. 90% each attributed this to: local associations (+15%) ⁷⁸ , different groups in decision-making (+55%), local authorities (+29%), and UN organizations (35%). | 100% of respondents attributed local violence to land disputes (+3%), infidelity (43%), impunity (35%), and frequent robberies (26%). | 90% said security was good, while 100% said it had improved. 75% attributed the increase to the absence of combatants (+17%), while 71% attributed it to having a Resident Tribunal (+59%). | 30% said human rights were good and 90% said it had improved. 88% attributed the improvement to the involvement of local authorities (+28%) and 86% to the professionalization of the police (+59%). | "It was poorly done.... We speak to the communal administration often. He says that we have to submit our question to the governor. The response that they give us is that the governor will submit the request to UNDP." (28a) | "[I would] build the homes well, and distribute them in proper fashion. Next, it would be necessary to build local associations so that they are strong. It is also necessary to financially support these associations, and to support the poor." (28a) |

⁷⁴ UNDP adopted the 3x6 approach, which had organizational principles – inclusion, appropriation, and durability – which are implemented over six distinct phases: 1) enrollment, 2) rapid generation of revenue, 3) savings, 4) engagement in joint ventures, 5) investment, and 6) access to markets.

⁷⁵ UNWOMEN promoted the involvement of women in microcredit projects.

⁷⁶ UNHCR assisted with the construction of housing.

⁷⁷ ILO organized local work associations into cooperatives.

⁷⁸ The numbers in parentheses refer to the difference between the average value for that response and the actual response for that colline. For example, 90% of respondents in

| Colline and agencies active in colline. | Improvement in <i>social cohesion</i> in the past six years? | Possible causes of <i>local violence</i> ? | Perceptions of <i>security</i> and whether security has worsened or improved | Perceptions of <i>human rights</i> environment and whether it has improved or worsened | Did the colline-level projects contribute to peace? | What the respondent would do differently if he or she were in charge of the project |
|--|--|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gihanga <i>UNHCR</i> <i>UNWOMEN</i> <i>ILO</i> | 91% said social cohesion improved, and 55% each attributed this to local authorities (-7%) and religious groups (+44%). | 91% said land disputes and 64% said frequent robberies were causes of local violence. | 82% each said the security was good and that it had improved. 90% each attributed this to a lack of local conflicts (-2%) and the absence of combatants (+32%). 25% attributed decreases in security to the persistence of youth violence (+20%). | 73% said human rights were good and 91% said they had improved. 70% each attributed this to local authorities (+9%), no local conflicts (-11%), and no local combatants (+22%). | “The country has a lot of problems. To consolidate the peace at the national level, many things are necessary. It is not the simple support for a commercial association that can maintain the consolidation of peace at the national level.” (27g) | “In six months we cannot consolidate these associations. What is necessary therefore is at least a year, two years, even three years.” (27g) |
| Gihanga <i>UNHCR</i> <i>UNWOMEN</i> <i>ILO</i> | 91% said social cohesion improved, and 55% each attributed this to local authorities (-7%) and religious groups (+44%). | 91% said land disputes and 64% said frequent robberies were causes of local violence. | 82% each said the security was good and that it had improved. 90% each attributed this to a lack of local conflicts (-2%) and the absence of combatants (+32%). 25% attributed decreases in security to the persistence of youth violence (+20%). | 73% said human rights were good and 91% said they had improved. 70% each attributed this to local authorities (+9%), no local conflicts (-11%), and no local combatants (+22%). | “The country has a lot of problems. To consolidate the peace at the national level, many things are necessary. It is not the simple support for a commercial association that can maintain the consolidation of peace at the national level.” (27g) | “In six months we cannot consolidate these associations. What is necessary therefore is at least a year, two years, even three years.” (27g) |
| Kabezi <i>ILO</i> <i>UNHCR</i> | 100% said that social cohesion had improved. 100% attributed this to local associations (+25%), and 36% attributed it to UN organizations (18%). | 91% said that land disputes were causes of local violence. 82% said that frequent robberies were sources of local violence. | 100% said that security was good, and 91% said it had improved. 91% attributed this to a lack of local conflicts (-1%), and 50% attributed it to other factors (+6%). | 91% said that human rights were good, and 100% said that they had improved. No responses were given to explain the increase. | “When the people are together, they are not distracted by bad ideas. They speak only of work.” (20c) | “It is necessary principally and foremost to teach the youth about peaceful cohabitation of all social categories in the commune and even of the province Bujumbura Rural because we must live together. It is also necessary to reach the leaders of political parties.” (20b) |

| Colline and agencies active in colline. | Improvement in <i>social cohesion</i> in the past six years? | Possible causes of <i>local violence</i> ? | Perceptions of <i>security</i> and whether security has worsened or improved | Perceptions of <i>human rights</i> environment and whether it has improved or worsened | Did the colline-level projects contribute to peace? | What the respondent would do differently if he or she were in charge of the project |
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| Gihanga <i>UNHCR</i> <i>UNWOMEN</i> <i>ILO</i> | 91% said social cohesion improved, and 55% each attributed this to local authorities (-7%) and religious groups (+44%). | 91% said land disputes and 64% said frequent robberies were causes of local violence. | 82% each said the security was good and that it had improved. 90% each attributed this to a lack of local conflicts (-2%) and the absence of combatants (+32%). 25% attributed decreases in security to the persistence of youth violence (+20%). | 73% said human rights were good and 91% said they had improved. 70% each attributed this to local authorities (+9%), no local conflicts (-11%), and no local combatants (+22%). | "The country has a lot of problems. To consolidate the peace at the national level, many things are necessary. It is not the simple support for a commercial association that can maintain the consolidation of peace at the national level." (27g) | "In six months we cannot consolidate these associations. What is necessary therefore is at least a year, two years, even three years." (27g) |
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| Colline and agencies active in colline. | Improvement in <i>social cohesion</i> in the past six years? | Possible causes of <i>local violence</i> ? | Perceptions of <i>security</i> and whether security has worsened or improved | Perceptions of <i>human rights</i> environment and whether it has improved or worsened | Did the colline-level projects contribute to peace? | What the respondent would do differently if he or she were in charge of the project |
|---|---|--|--|--|--|--|
| Kagazi FAO ⁷⁹ ILO UNWOMEN UNHCR | 85% said the social cohesion had improved. 77% attributed this to local associations (+2%), and 54% to the involvement of UN organizations (-1%). | 93% said land disputes and 36% said that frequent robberies were causes of local violence. | 93% said that security is good, and 93% said it had improved. 100% attributed the improvement to a lack of local conflicts (+8%), and 31% to the absence of combatants (-27%). | 71% said that human rights were good and 79% said they had improved. 75% attributed this to the lack of local conflicts (-6%) and 50% attributed it to other factors (+17%). | "I do not see how giving goats on the same road can help to consolidate peace in Burundi." (3g) | "It is necessary to support the fight against poverty in households. It is necessary for development to generate revenue." (3a) |
| Kansega UNHCR FAO ILO | 100% said that social cohesion had improved. 67% attributed the change to local associations (-9%), while 55% attributed it to the local authorities (-7%). | 100% said that land disputes were causes of local violence, while 73% each responded that frequent robberies (-1%) and other factors (+15%) were causes of local violence. | 92% said that security was good, and 85% noted that it had improved. 100% attributed the change to a lack of local conflicts (+8%), while 40% attributed it to the absence of combatants (-18%). | 85% said that human rights were good, and 92% said that they had improved. 100% attributed the change to a lack of local conflicts (+19%) and 80% attributed it to local authorities (+19%). | "Our area is calm thanks to the project that brought together the youth of different tendencies. This project helped a lot in the reintegration of ex-combatants who had been recovered by the politicians and their bad ideologies. Only this can help Burundi." (5d) | "It is necessary to provide an occupation for the people, to give them some work, some instruction. It is necessary to combat poverty. It is also necessary to support the people to work in the associations." (5d) |
| Kinyami ILO UNDP | 91% said that social cohesion had improved. 100% attributed this to local associations (+25%), and 82% attributed the change to UN organizations (+27%). | 100% said that land disputes and 82% said that impunity (+17%) were causes of local violence. | 82% said that security was good, while 100% said that it had improved. 91% each attributed the change to a lack of local conflicts (-1%) and the absence of combatants (+33%). | 55% said that human rights were good (-16%) and 82% said that they had improved (-3%). 73% attributed the improvement to the lack of local conflicts (-8%), while 64% attributed it to the involvement of local authorities (+3%). | "The project was working first and foremost to support the target groups. We selected the dynamic associations and gave them good instruction on entrepreneurship with GERME: to create your business better. It permits the maintenance of the people together and in peace." (22c) | "It is necessary to finance many associations of repatriates in the collines of our commune. Financial support is also necessary for us." (22b) |

⁷⁹ FAO provided food security programming and training about agriculture and peaceful co-habitation.

| Colline and agencies active in colline. | Improvement in <i>social cohesion</i> in the past six years? | Possible causes of <i>local violence</i> ? | Perceptions of <i>security</i> and whether security has worsened or improved | Perceptions of <i>human rights</i> environment and whether it has improved or worsened | Did the colline-level projects contribute to peace? | What the respondent would do differently if he or she were in charge of the project |
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
| Colline and agencies active in colline. | Improvement in <i>social cohesion</i> in the past six years? | Possible causes of <i>local violence</i> ? | Perceptions of <i>security</i> and whether security has worsened or improved | Perceptions of <i>human rights</i> environment and whether it has improved or worsened | Did the colline-level projects contribute to peace? | What the respondent would differently if he or she were in charge of the project |
|---|--|---|--|--|---|---|
| <p>Muzinda</p> <p>FAO UNWOMEN UNHCR</p> | <p>100% said that social cohesion had improved. 100% attributed the change to local authorities (+39%), while 77% attributed it to local associations (+2%).</p> | <p>100% of respondents each said that land disputes, money (+60%), impunity (+35%), cultural differences (+60%), alcohol (+62%), frequent robberies (+26%), and other factors (+42%) were causes of local violence.</p> | <p>85% said that security was good and 100% said that it had improved. 92% attributed the improvement to a lack of local conflicts (+0%) and 67% attributed it to other factors (+22%).</p> | <p>77% said that human rights were good and 92% said that they had improved. 85% attributed the change to the local authorities (+24%) and 67% attributed it to the absence of local conflicts (-15%).</p> | <p>“The project did not contribute to peace consolidation. To the contrary.” (25a)</p> | <p>“I would create a lot of jobs for the youth and bring them together often so that they would be habituated to living together peacefully and prioritize the common problems of the youth and not those of the political parties which often change.” (25a)</p> |
| <p>Nyamabere</p> <p>FAO UNDP UNWOMEN UNHCR</p> | <p>93% said that social cohesion had improved. 100% attributed the change to local associations (+25%), while 83% attributed it to different groups in decision-making (+48%).</p> | <p>100% said that land disputes, infidelity (+43%), and impunity (+35%) were causes of local violence.</p> | <p>71% said that security was good, and 100% said that it had improved. 100% attributed this to a lack of local conflicts (+8%) and 79% attributed it to the absence of combatants (+21%).</p> | <p>57% said that human rights were good and 71% said that it had improved. 90% said that the improvement was due to the lack of local conflicts (+9%) and 70% attributed it to the absence of local combatants (+23%).</p> | <p>“Yes. A lot. When we met in the associations we changed and our relations are more consolidated. If there is a member of the association who fled the consequences of fighting that the country knew, as soon as he returns he reintegrates in the association and retakes his place without problems.” (2a)</p> | <p>“It is necessary to finance the activities of the association in order that we could produce a lot.” (2a)</p> |

| Colline and agencies active in colline. | Improvement in <i>social cohesion</i> in the past six years? | Possible causes of <i>local violence</i> ? | Perceptions of <i>security</i> and whether security has worsened or improved | Perceptions of <i>human rights</i> environment and whether it has improved or worsened | Did the colline-level projects contribute to peace? | What the respondent would differently if he or she were in charge of the project |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|--|
| <p>Nyambuye</p> <p><i>ILO</i> <i>FAO</i> <i>UNWOMEN</i></p> | <p>100% said that social cohesion had increased. 100% attributed this to local associations (+25%), different groups in decision-making (+65%), projects financed by local authorities (+85%), international agencies (+78%), the involvement of local authorities (39%), women (+86%), men (+95%), religious groups (+90%), UN organizations (+45%), and other factors (+71%).</p> | <p>100% said that land disputes, cultural differences (+60%), and alcohol (+62%) were causes of local violence.</p> | <p>92% said that security was good said that it had improved. 100% said that the improvement was due to professionalization of the police (+60%), a lack of local conflicts (+8%), the Resident Tribunal (+88%), the lack of youth violence (+85%), and other factors (+56%).</p> | <p>58% said that human rights were good and 92% said that they had improved. 100% said the improvement was due to CNIDH functions (+80%), the professionalization of the police (+73%), the military (+91%), Resident Tribunals (+90%), involvement of local authorities (+39%), the lack of local conflicts (+19%), the lack of local combatants (+53%), and other factors (+67%).</p> | <p>Respondent did not know of any PBF projects in the colline.</p> | <p>Respondent did not know of any PBF projects in the colline.</p> |
| <p>Ruyaga</p> <p><i>ILO</i> <i>UNDP</i> <i>UNWOMEN</i></p> | <p>85% said that social cohesion had improved. 85% attributed this to local associations, while 54% each attributed it to different groups in decision-making (+19%) and the involvement of local authorities (-7%).</p> | <p>92% said that land disputes and 54% said that frequent robberies were causes of local violence.</p> | <p>100% each said that security was good and that it had improved. 77% attributed this to a lack of local conflicts (-15%) and the professionalization of the police (+14%). No responses were given for decreases in security.</p> | <p>85% each said that human rights were good and that they had improved. 85% attributed this to the lack of local conflicts, and 23% each attributed it to the professionalization of the police (-4%), the reintegration of ex-combatants (+15%), and the involvement of local authorities (-38%).</p> | <p>“It is difficult for me to attribute the calming that we observe in the community to the specific results of this project. There are many different efforts by the administration and other intervening actors. I imagine that peace consolidation is the result of a combination of these efforts.” (21c)</p> | <p>“The project ended quickly just when it was time to reinforce us. We are not yet at the stage of being weaned.” (21f)</p> |

ANNEX 2: Research Design and Methods

Using data from PBF I and PBF II project reports, we examined various PBF interventions down to the colline level across Burundi. About 70% of overall PBF interventions were located in Bubanza, Bujumbura Rural, and Cibitoke — three provinces along Burundi’s west coast that have experienced the majority of conflict, as displayed in the map below. As such, they were prime targets for interventions and we thus focused most of our research and methodological efforts here.

Figure 1: Burundian conflict areas



To assess the effects of PBF interventions at the local level, we used a mixed methods approach by gathering quantitative data as well as conducting surveys and semi-structured interviews. Together, these different approaches tell a more complete story about the impact of PBF interventions. Interviews supplemented the surveys and were designed to provide information about the projects that were implemented in the collines where the surveys took place, as well as some collines where surveys did not take place. This approach ensures sufficient coverage of the

PBF II and A-8 (from PBF I) activities. Below we describe our protocols and methods for each of these research types and provide a table (Table 1) that show the distribution of semi-structured interviews.

Matching and site selection

Within our three provinces of interest, we needed to create a subset of representative collines – some that received PBF intervention and some that did not – in which to conduct the surveys. *Ex ante* randomization of the PBF interventions could have balanced potentially confounding factors equally across all collines, such that the unique effect of PBF interventions could be isolated. However, the selection of where to implement PBF projects was *not* a random process and so we chose a version of a “most-similar” design in order to assess differences between collines. In a most-similar experimental design, treatment entities (collines in which PBF was active) are matched up with identical (or close to identical) control entities (where PBF was not active). We matched collines so that, on average, as many characteristics as possible were highly similar. As such, any observed differences between entities can be ascribed to the treatment condition. We used this approach in our own research design, with collines as the primary entity of interest.

Specifically, collines were paired using a “propensity score matching” design. In this design, we produced a model that estimates the likelihood that a given entity – a colline, in this case – will receive the treatment. For our purposes, a high level of PBF interventions is viewed as a “treatment”. We therefore calculated how likely it would be for each colline to have experienced PBF interventions given its specific characteristics. These likelihoods were based on meaningful characteristics of the collines, such as population size, socio-economic distributions, geographic features, urban vs. rural divisions, etc. Having such a likelihood for each entity allowed us to identify a specific subset of most-similar collines — e.g. the Buramata colline in the Bubanza province received a propensity score coefficient of 0.684 and so was matched up with the Migera colline of the Bujumbura Rural province which received a 0.688. It is important to note that matching is never perfect; that is, there will always be unobserved entity characteristics and/or limitations in data availability. However, our model provided the best possible estimates based on the available colline-level data.

Using this matching method, we created a sample of matched pairs — ten “treatment” collines (i.e. collines that experienced a high level of PBF interventions) and ten “control” collines (i.e. collines without any PBF interventions). Thus, in the highly similar pairs, one of the collines received PBF involvement and the other did not. As mentioned before, creating such a list of matched pairs allows us to simulate an experimental environment by ensuring that potentially confounding factors are balanced between the “control” and the “treatment.”

Surveys

It was within the above-detailed subset of matched colline pairs that we employed the survey. Between 10 and 14 surveys were distributed in each colline at the sous-colline level (i.e. sub-colline neighborhoods). This provided us with about 250 surveys in total. This sample size is sufficient to evaluate statistical differences which, due to the research design, can be attributed primarily to differences in colline exposure to PBF interventions.

We compiled survey questions based on stated objectives of PBF I and PBF II initiatives. For example, a key component of PBF projects was to work through local associations in order to build trust in local institutions. Thus, in our survey we included sections dealing with the effects of local associations on poverty and general social trust. Also, PBF initiatives sought to help resolve local disputes through both direct conflict mitigation and by increasing general social unity. Thus, there are survey sections dealing with characteristics of local conflicts, increases and

decreases in social cohesion, and what respondents considered to be the most relevant local institutions for conflict mediation. For full survey design and individual questions, please see our separate Supporting Annex report. This separate document includes all survey questions, interview protocols, and financing information for our work in the matched colline groups above.

Survey households were also selected through random sampling. Once in the colline, our team approached the *chef de colline* to acquire a list of the sous-collines. The names of each sous-colline were written on separate sheets of paper, which were then selected at random. If there were less than 5 sous-collines in a given colline, 2 were selected for survey distribution. If there were 5 or more sous-collines, 3 were selected. As the team collected an average of 13 surveys per colline, 3-5 surveys were conducted per sous-colline. The team then divided the number of households in the sous-colline by the number of surveys needed. For example, if there were 100 households in the sous-colline and the team needed 3 surveys, then every 33rd household was included in the survey.

After completion, surveys were assigned numerical identifications in order to preserve anonymity. These results were then combined with PBF project information and our colline-level observational data in preparation for statistical analysis.

We used a variety of statistical models to examine differences between PBF and non-PBF collines. However, due to the accuracy of our matching models, the simplest method we used — difference-of-means tests — were also our most telling. They showed both statistical and substantive differences between PBF collines and non-PBF collines, which can be viewed in Annex 3.

Semi-structured interviews

To substantiate our survey and empirical results, we also conducted 70 semi-structured interviews in Bujumbura and 95 at the community level in Bujumumbura Rural, Bubanza and Cibitoke. These interviews were used to: gather more in-depth perceptions from PBF project beneficiaries; to trace the project design and implementation process; to assess general efficiency and effectiveness; and to uncover the interaction between projects and the behaviors and institutions that were influenced, including the effects or non-effects observed in the initial quantitative analysis. Each interview was conducted by a team member and covered topics such as: how projects contributed to peace consolidation; whether the projects benefited the respondent and, if so, how; and how the different projects related to one another. General interview results can be viewed in the text and, as mentioned above, example interview questions can be viewed in the Supporting Annex.

Interviewed individuals were selected by stratified purposeful sampling. A team member went to areas in which projects were implemented and interviewed both beneficiaries of the projects and those individuals who were able to observe the projects, even if they were not direct beneficiaries. These individuals were also requested to direct the team member to additional individuals, either beneficiaries or observers, to interview.

Combining the strengths of these three methods — matching analysis, survey research, and qualitative interviews — allowed us to assess PBF intervention effects at several levels of analysis. At an aggregate level, we used our observational data to assess trends among all provinces, communes, and collines and relevant differences between them. We then focused our analyses on certain collines themselves to assess differences between most-similar locations, both in the PBF “treatment” group and the PBF “control” group. We then took these results further by looking at individual survey results and analyzing the responses to interview questions. This

mixed methods approach allows for both robust statistical viability and vigorous qualitative substantiation.

Table 1: Distribution of Interviewees

| | Bujumbura | | | |
|---------|----------------------|--|----------|--------------------------------------|
| | Burundian Government | PBF Advisory Group (Monitoring Group, JSC or Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Group)* | UN Staff | NGO Partners and Foreign Governments |
| PBF I** | 4 | 9 | 28 | 4 |
| PBF II | 22 | 34 | 31 | 11 |

Notes: (*) for overlaps or dual roles, Advisory Group membership is prioritized; (**) those that were classified with both PBF were classified under PBF I.

ANNEX 3: Statistical Explanations and Substantive Analysis

The Burundi survey (see Supporting Annex) featured questions split into five main sections: the return of displaced persons, overall quality of life, discrimination and social cohesion, corruption, and perceptions of security and human rights. Site selection for the surveys utilized a propensity score matching model (see Annex 2) to create a balanced sample of collines. That is, we identified a set of collines that held many similarities, but differed primarily in whether there was substantial PBF involvement. Half of the collines in the sample (10) were subject to high levels of PBF intervention (“PBF collines”) while the other half (10) received no PBF interventions at all (“non-PBF collines”). By creating such a sample, we could observe whether answers to survey questions were significantly different between PBF collines and non-PBF collines. Below, we discuss these differences within each section of the survey.

The analysis includes 23 collines, 13 of which are PBF collines and 10 of which are non-PBF collines. In summary, we find substantial differences both among collines that received PBF involvement, and between those that received and those that did not receive PBF involvement.


In the sections that follow, we use a common structure. For each survey topic, our analysis shows two main sets of results. First, we review the overall responses among respondents in all collines in our sample, *regardless of whether there was PBF involvement*. Second, we examine more closely the differences between PBF and non-PBF collines. This allowed us to understand public perceptions due to exposure to and familiarity with PBF I and PBF II initiatives.

It is important to note that these results represent the *perception* of individuals and not actual measurements of project effectiveness. Thus, it could be the case that respondents from PBF collines were not commenting based on the effectiveness of PBF interventions in their community. Rather, their responses could be influenced by their relative exposure to the projects; their relative familiarity with international objectives and intentions; or, their relative understanding of the basic problems in areas identified for PBF involvement. However, these are important to capture and, as we will see below, show that even a basic proximity to PBF initiatives can be associated with different perceptions of community characteristics and trends. More generally, while the two are not identical, citizen perceptions are notably missing from much of the study of foreign aid effectiveness.

The return of refugees, internally displaced people, and ex-combatants

A key objective of several PBF-funded interventions in Burundi was to help refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and ex-combatants return to and reintegrate with their communities of origin. During PBF I, this was done by supporting a project called **P3P**, referring to the three principles of the project (Inclusion, Appropriation, and Durability) and the three provinces in which it would take place. Our first finding is also one of the most significant — 75% of survey respondents agreed that they had noticed the return of individuals to their communal unit. Among those returning, respondents noticed refugees and people from other communities the most, as is featured in Figure 1.

Figure 1: The return of displaced persons (all collines)



While Figure 1 simply demonstrates the overall %ages, there were also apparent differences between PBF collines and non-PBF collines, as displayed in Table 1. For example, respondents in PBF collines were much more likely to notice the return of ex-combatants: just under 15% mentioned they had observed ex-combatants return, compared to only about 5% in non-PBF collines. Note that highlighted rows represent statistically significant differences between PBF and non-PBF collines.⁸⁰

Table 1: The Return of displaced persons/ identified groups (PBF vs. non-PBF)

| Survey question | % that said “yes” | |
|--|-------------------|------------------|
| | PBF collines | Non-PBF collines |
| Have you noticed the return of different groups of people to your community? | 80.3% | 69% |
| Have these people been ex-combatants? | 14.9% | 5.3% |
| Refugees? | 26.1% | 23% |
| IDPs? | 5.2% | 7.1% |
| People from other communities? | 35.1% | 15% |
| Foreigners? | 11.9% | 8.8% |

Notes: Highlighted rows represent statistically significant differences at the 0.05 level with the null hypothesis: $H_0: PBF_1 = PBF_0$.


The quality of life

A central component of PBF interventions was to help the above groups of people, especially those returning from civil conflict-related issues, to reintegrate with their communities and

⁸⁰ By statistically significant, we use conventional thresholds that effectively evaluate the likelihood that differences between PBF and non-PBF collines could have occurred by random chance. Put differently, if we observe a difference, is that difference really meaningful? A statistically significant result gives greater confidence that the result is indeed meaningful.

improve their overall quality of life through projects such as the construction of housing, rehabilitation of roads, and the development of water infrastructure. Figure 2 shows which groups survey respondents identified as “poorer than other groups in society.”

Figure 2: Perceptions of poverty (all collines)



Recall that Figure 2 does not differentiate respondents by PBF and non-PBF collines, although Table 2 below does. Between PBF and non-PBF collines, differences in perceived poverty were most apparent among women, children, the landless, and the unemployed. These findings are important because they indicate that certain vulnerable populations are perceived to be better off in PBF intervention areas than in non-PBF areas, offering suggestive evidence of the effectiveness of PBF interventions.⁸¹

Table 2: Perceptions of poverty (PBF vs. non-PBF)

| Survey question | % that said “yes” | |
|--|-------------------|------------------|
| | PBF collines | Non-PBF collines |
| Do you view ex-combatants as poorer than others? | 57.5 | 60.9 |
| What about women? | 41.6 | 74.7 |
| Children? | 29.6 | 71.4 |
| Youth? | 22.5 | 66.7 |
| The elderly? | 95.1 | 92.2 |
| What about refugees? | 46.3 | 58.5 |
| Residents? | 23.6 | 32.1 |
| IDPs? | 84.3 | 79.6 |
| The landless? | 53.2 | 35.7 |
| What about people not in local associations? | 16.7 | 15.7 |

⁸¹ Notably, the effect is opposite for the landless and orphans.


| | | |
|-----------------|-------------|-------------|
| The unemployed? | 9 | 34 |
| Widows? | 97.6 | 93.6 |
| Orphans? | 92.1 | 78.5 |

Notes: Highlighted rows represent statistically significant differences at the 0.05 level with the null hypothesis: $H_0: PBF_1 = PBF_0$.

As a follow-up to perceptions on current poverty levels, we asked respondents about perceived changes in poverty rates over the past six years. We made these inquiries in two stages. First, we asked respondents *if* any of the above groups had experienced a change in poverty in the last six years. Second, among those who responded in the affirmative, we asked whether the group's poverty had increased, decreased, or remained constant.

According to respondent perceptions, the past six years have brought large increases in poverty to almost *all* groups mentioned in the survey. This includes people not participating in local associations, an interesting trend considering that many PBF II interventions explicitly chose to work through such associations. These results can be viewed in Figure 3 for all collines, regardless of whether they received PBF involvement.


Figure 3: Changes in poverty over the past six years (all collines)



These findings held between PBF and non-PBF collines such that there were almost no statistical differences between perceptions of increases to poverty. We therefore do not report a table of differences.

Thus, it would seem that people perceive poverty to be on the rise. In an attempt to determine why, we asked respondents to comment on a few potential causes. Across all collines, the most common explanations were the lack of agricultural inputs and unemployment. These are in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Potential causes of increases in poverty (all collines)



Within these potential causes, however, there are clear differences of opinion between PBF and non-PBF collines, as shown in Table 3. For example, PBF colline survey respondents were about 35 %age points higher in attributing increases in poverty to the influx of refugees than were non-PBF respondents. Thus, while respondents observed more persons returning to their communities (Figure 1 and Table 1), they may attribute the return with negative consequences.

Table 3: Potential causes of increases in poverty (PBF vs. non-PBF)


| Survey question | % that said “yes” | |
|---|-------------------|------------------|
| | PBF collines | Non-PBF collines |
| Do you think that any increases in poverty can be attributed to the influx of refugees? | 45.7 | 10.6 |
| What about the influx of IDPs? | 28.7 | 5.7 |
| Of Ex-combatants? | 22.6 | 4.8 |
| What about low international intervention? | 30.4 | 23.8 |
| Corruption in the community? | 17.5 | 7.5 |
| What about gender-based violence? | 2.6 | — |
| What about the costs of polygamy/infidelity? | 45 | 16 |
| Other types of violence? | 1.8 | 1 |
| The lack of agricultural inputs and land? | 83.5 | 89 |
| What about administrative ignorance? | 20.7 | 11.4 |
| Solicitation from political parties? | 10.3 | 5.7 |
| Inadequate policies? | 16.5 | 26.7 |
| What about unemployment? | 76 | 88.2 |

| | | |
|----------------------------|------------|----------|
| Less involvement of men? | 13.9 | 7.5 |
| Less involvement of women? | 6.1 | 1 |

Notes: Highlighted rows represent statistically significant differences at the 0.05 level with the null hypothesis: $H_0: PBF_1 = PBF_0$. Also note that dashes signify that there were not enough responses to conduct a difference-of-means analysis.

With so many survey respondents citing poverty as being prevalent, we thought it prudent to ascertain some potential causes of *decreases* in poverty, particularly since poverty reduction is an implicit objective in the P3P project and the PBF II program. In response to this question, those surveyed pointed most often to HIMO projects and community solidarity. This and other cross-colline trends can be seen in Figure 5. Note, however, that in Figure 5 the %age of “yes” responses never reaches higher than about 14%. This signifies that respondents, on average, were not pointedly optimistic about any of these possible methods for decreasing poverty.

Figure 5: Potential causes of decreases in poverty (all collines)



Here again there were differences in opinion between PBF and non-PBF collines as shown in Table 4. For example, PBF colline residents were about 17% more likely to identify the Revenue Generating Activity (AGR) project for women as a helpful component for reducing poverty.

Table 4: Potential causes of decreases in poverty (PBF vs. non-PBF)

| Survey question | % that said “yes” | |
|---|-------------------|------------------|
| | PBF collines | Non-PBF collines |
| Do you think that any decreases in poverty can be attributed to the return of refugees? | — | 2.7 |
| What about the return of IDPs? | — | 2.7 |
| Donors and development interventions? | 14 | 2.7 |
| The engagement of local authorities? | 18.6 | 2.7 |

| | | |
|--|-------------|------------|
| Engagement of political parties? | 2.4 | — |
| Involvement of women in decision-making? | 16.9 | — |
| The AGR project for women? | 1.2 | 2.7 |
| The AGR project for youth? | 3.7 | 1.4 |
| HIMO projects? | 18.8 | 5.5 |
| What about community solidarity? | 23.5 | 2.7 |

Notes: Highlighted rows represent statistically significant differences at the 0.05 level with the null hypothesis: $H_0: PBF_1 = PBF_0$. Also note that dashes signify that there were not enough responses to conduct a difference-of-means analysis.


Although positive responses to potential decreases in poverty were generally low, it is interesting to note that PBF collines were, on average, at least more *aware* of what international organizations are doing and appear to attribute positive effects to such involvement. This is a positive note for PBF interventions, which were undoubtedly part of these initiatives.

Discrimination and social cohesion

We now turn to a discussion of discrimination and social cohesion. There are important indicators because helping residents to reintegrate with communities and helping communities themselves to adjust to post-conflict changes were important goals for PBF interventions, including the PBF II program and the P3P project.

Across all collines surveyed, responses to the question of “Have you heard of discrimination in your community” were split at about 60-40 in favor of saying “No”. This is a positive result, although not entirely in favor of people living in PBF collines. Among respondents in areas with high PBF interventions, people were about 12% more likely to say that they had noticed discrimination in their community. The results disaggregated by PBF involvement are shown in Figure 6.


Figure 6: Discrimination in the community (all collines / PBF vs. non-PBF)



In addition to hearing about discrimination, respondents were asked to identify the most frequent types. Figure 7 shows the results for all collines irrespective of PBF involvement. In this respect,

the most prevalent forms of discrimination were said to be political, economic, or based on who benefits from the allocation of state resources.

Figure 7: Types of discrimination (all collines)



There were several apparent differences between PBF and non-PBF collines, which Table 5 shows in disaggregated form. PBF collines noted much more economic discrimination — about 44 %age points more than non-PBF collines — as well as discrimination based on gender, age, and ethnicity.


Table 5: Types of discrimination (PBF vs. non-PBF)

| Survey question | % that said “yes” | |
|---|-------------------|------------------|
| | PBF collines | Non-PBF collines |
| Have you heard of political discrimination in your community? | 66.2 | 66.7 |
| What about discrimination based on social relations? | 17.6 | 33.3 |
| What about discrimination in relation to the allocation of state resources? | 77 | 71.1 |
| What about economic discrimination? | 67.1 | 23.2 |
| Gender-based? | 35.1 | 18.2 |
| Religious? | 20.2 | 8.9 |
| Age-oriented? | 25.7 | 6.7 |
| Ethnic? | 12.3 | 2.2 |

Notes: Highlighted rows represent statistically significant differences at the 0.05 level with the null hypothesis: $H_0: PBF_1 = PBF_0$.

Relating to types of discrimination, we consider which groups typically bear the brunt of such actions. Among responses in all collines as shown in Figure 8, women and political party members were overwhelmingly identified as being the most discriminated against.

Figure 8: Groups most often discriminated against (all collines)



This effect was even more pronounced in PBF collines compared to non-PBF collines, as displayed in Table 6. For example, while only about 43% of people in non-PBF collines mentioned that discrimination occurred against political party members, this group was identified by over 58% of people in PBF collines.

Table 6: Groups most often discriminated against (PBF vs. non-PBF)


| Survey question | % that said "yes" | |
|--|-------------------|------------------|
| | PBF collines | Non-PBF collines |
| Are ex-combatants usually the target for any discrimination? | 3 | 1.7 |
| What about women? | 43.8 | 35.5 |
| Children? | 2.9 | 4.8 |
| Refugees? | 3 | — |
| Local residents? | 2.9 | — |
| Political party members? | 58.1 | 42.9 |
| Youth? | 16.2 | 29 |
| Men? | 15.2 | 32.3 |
| What about people without land? | 12.1 | 12.9 |

Notes: Highlighted rows represent statistically significant differences at the 0.05 level with the null hypothesis: $H_0: PBF_1 = PBF_0$. Also note that dashes signify that there were not enough responses to conduct a difference-of-means analysis.

These are important results because an expected result of the PBF II program is the equitable access to social services for all members of society, which is believed to be crucial for assisting post-war recovery and conflict resolution. The existence of discrimination could, therefore, undermine peacebuilding efforts.

While discrimination levels may be discouraging, it appears that the overall trend in discrimination is decreasing, as displayed in Figure 9. When asked about trends in discrimination over the past six years, just under 75% of respondents across all collines said that they had noticed significant decreases. When broken down into groups, these decreases were most pronounced for women and ethnic groups. However, some increases were still observed — for example, about 38% of respondents noted that discrimination has increased for the beneficiaries of state resources within the past six years.

Figure 9: Increases and decreases in discrimination (all collines)




Notes: The y-scale for this figure is the aggregated number of responses to the question “Has discrimination increased or decreased for the following groups?” Responses noting an “increase” in discrimination were given a positive value while answers noting a “decrease” were given a negative value. Thus, positive bars show which groups respondents consider to have received more discrimination in the past six years while negative bars note which groups received less.

Responses in both PBF and non-PBF collines were almost identical when identifying these increases and decreases among groups and thus we do not display them in a separate table.

Due to such noteworthy downward trends in discrimination, we asked respondents to identify some potential causes. Most of the people surveyed pointed to community dialogue and the involvement of local authorities, as displayed in Figure 10.

Figure 10: Potential causes for decreases in discrimination (all collines)



In response to this question, there were clear differences between responses in PBF vs. non-PBF collines, as shown in Table 7. For example, respondents in PBF collines were 15 %age points higher in noting that changes in discrimination could be attributed to differences in the poverty environment.

Table 7: Potential causes for decreases in discrimination (PBF vs. non-PBF)


| Survey question | % that said “yes” | |
|--|-------------------|------------------|
| | PBF collines | Non-PBF collines |
| Can the decreases you observe in discrimination be attributed to the return of refugees? | 18.7 | 9.5 |
| What about the return of IDPs? | 14 | 8.3 |
| The return of ex-combatants? | 15.9 | 3.2 |
| Several donors and interventions? | 18.2 | 8.4 |
| Only a few donors and interventions? | 5.6 | 3.2 |
| More engagement of local authorities? | 46.2 | 36.5 |
| No engagement of local authorities? | 3.8 | 2.1 |
| Poverty? | 26.1 | 11.5 |
| Women participating in decision-making? | 8.3 | 6.3 |
| Microcredit projects for women? | 38.9 | 33.3 |
| Microcredit projects in general? | 2.8 | 1 |
| HIMO projects? | 17 | 6.3 |
| Culture? | 13.9 | 6.3 |
| What about overall community dialogue? | 46.1 | 50.5 |

Notes: Highlighted rows represent statistically significant differences at the 0.05 level with the null hypothesis: $H_0: PBF_1 = PBF_0$.

With such noted decreases in discrimination, we should also expect social cohesion to be on the rise. This is overwhelmingly the case among all collines — 96% of survey respondents said that they had perceived improvements in social cohesion in the past six years. This is a very important result when considering the objectives and methods of PBF I and PBF II initiatives, especially if PBF collines experience higher levels. This is explored in Table 8 below.

As depicted in Figure 11, increases in social cohesion across all collines are most attributed to associations and the increased involvement of local authorities. Additionally, it is interesting to note that the intervention of UN organizations also ranks high on the list, with about 42% of respondents noting a positive effect of UN efforts on social cohesion.

Figure 11: Potential causes of increases in social cohesion (all collines)



The effects of local associations and the UN were even more pronounced in PBF collines when compared to non-PBF collines, as seen in Table 8. For example, 75% of PBF colline respondents noted that associations contributed to social cohesion compared to only 46% in non-PBF collines. This trend is similar for UN interventions — about 55% of people in PBF locations attributed increased social cohesion to UN efforts compared to 29% in non-PBF collines.

Table 8: Potential causes of increases in social cohesion (PBF vs. non-PBF)

| Survey question | % that said “yes” | |
|---|-------------------|------------------|
| | PBF collines | Non-PBF collines |
| Have local associations helped to increase social cohesion in your community? | 75.2 | 46.4 |
| What about the inclusion of different groups in decision-making? | 35.3 | 29.6 |
| Projects financed by local authorities? | 15.2 | 4.6 |
| Projects financed by international agencies? | 22.1 | 19.4 |

| | | |
|---------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| The involvement of local authorities? | 61.1 | 58.6 |
| Involvement of youth? | 7.2 | 7.3 |
| Involvement of ex-combatants? | 1.8 | 0.9 |
| Involvement of women? | 14.3 | 12.8 |
| Involvement of men? | 5.3 | 11 |
| Involvement of political parties? | 2.7 | 11 |
| Involvement of religious groups? | 10.5 | 22.9 |
| Involvement of UN organizations? | 54.7 | 29.1 |

Notes: Highlighted rows represent statistically significant differences at the 0.05 level with the null hypothesis: $H_0: PBF_1 = PBF_0$.


As local associations were an integral part of the PBF approach at the community level, these results are much more meaningful from the perspective of evaluating PBF involvement.

Conflict and mitigation

Mitigating land disputes, among other conflicts, was another important component of both PBF I and PBF II. The PBF contribution to Burundi only supported one project in the area of land disputes: it provided initial funding that helped UNHCR’s collaboration with the National Land Commission (CNTB). We thus asked respondents to comment on the potential causes of conflict in their communities and the organizations they most associate with conflict mitigation.

In terms of conflict catalysts, survey respondents overwhelmingly pointed to land disputes as the most frequent cause, as shown in Figure 12. This fits with our previous discussion of PBF interventions and their support to resolving land disputes.

Figure 12: Potential causes of conflict in the community (all collines)



Here again, there are significant differences between PBF and non-PBF collines, though land is not one of them. Money, for example, was cited about 25% more often in PBF collines than in non-PBF collines. Other significant potential causes are noted in the table below.


Table 9: Potential causes of conflict in the community (PBF vs. non-PBF)

| Survey question | % that said “yes” | |
|---|-------------------|------------------|
| | PBF collines | Non-PBF collines |
| Is land a principal cause of conflict in the community? | 97 | 93.8 |
| What about money? | 39.5 | 14.3 |
| Political affiliations? | 24.8 | 18 |
| Ethnicity? | 5.8 | 2.7 |
| Infidelity? | 56.7 | 21.6 |
| Impunity? | 64.8 | 17 |
| Livestock? | 23.1 | 16.2 |
| Cultural differences? | 40 | 38.4 |
| Alcohol? | 38.4 | 19.6 |
| What about frequent robberies? | 73.6 | 34.8 |

Notes: Highlighted rows represent statistically significant differences at the 0.05 level with the null hypothesis: $H_0: PBF_1 = PBF_0$.

Important to this discussion are the most frequent mediators of conflict. Across collines, the most noticeable mitigation of conflict is attributed to Resident Tribunals with over 77% of all respondents citing it as a prominent mitigator. Other prominent actors across collines are family councils, neighborhood agreements, the Bashingatanhe, and decisions by local authorities. Others are seen below. It is important to note that our survey question did not deal with effectiveness — these institutions may not be the most effective at resolving disputes. Thus, responses are more oriented towards the relative frequency with which residents use such institutions, which, in itself, is an interesting result.

Figure 13: Mediators of conflict (all collines)



PBF and non-PBF collines seemed to have differing opinions on these groups, however. For example, almost 91% of PBF colline residents associated Resident Tribunals with conflict resolution, compared to only 62% in non-PBF collines. Other significant actors and institutions are shown in the table below.

Table 10: Mediators of conflict (PBF vs. non-PBF)

| Survey question | % that said “yes” | |
|---|-------------------|------------------|
| | PBF collines | Non-PBF collines |
| Are local conflicts often ignored instead of resolved? | 0.9 | 0.9 |
| Do local residents use violence with heavy arms to resolve conflicts? | 1.8 | — |
| Does popular justice help to mitigate conflicts? | 16.4 | 9.1 |
| What about family council decisions? | 60 | 62.1 |
| Neighborhood agreements? | 69.8 | 60.4 |
| Decisions by community leaders? | 31.6 | 22.5 |
| Decisions by local authorities? | 73.8 | 71.2 |
| Decisions by the Bashingantahe? | 49.2 | 72.1 |
| Decisions by the Abakurumbere? | 26.5 | 7.3 |
| Decisions by the CNTB? | 30.3 | 12.7 |
| Resident Tribunals? | 90.8 | 62.5 |
| The High Tribunal? | 36.7 | 7.3 |
| The mediation of women? | 13.7 | 3.7 |

Notes: Highlighted rows represent statistically significant differences at the 0.05 level with the null hypothesis: $H_0: PBF_1 = PBF_0$. Also note that dashes signify that there were not enough responses to conduct a difference-of-means analysis.


We now turn to a discussion of community corruption, its potential causes, and its trends across the last six years.

Corruption

Corruption is still seen as a prominent issue across all collines in Burundi — about 50% of respondents agreed that corruption exists in their community. This trend is especially pronounced in PBF collines, where about 59% of respondents attested to community corruption compared to only about 38% in non-PBF collines.

Overall causes of corruption seem to be centered on local administrative officials and the police, with 76% and 70% mentioning these as potential causes, respectively. Other responses can be viewed below in Figure 14.

Figure 14: Potential instigators of corruption (all collines)



As with previous survey questions, these results are again subject to differences between PBF and non-PBF collines. For example, although administrative officials are seen as corrupt overall, respondents in PBF collines were about 30% more likely to mention this than respondents in non-PBF collines. The same is true of the police — PBF colline respondents were, on average, about 39% more likely to cite corruption in the police. Other differences can be viewed in the following table.

Table 11: Potential instigators of corruption (PBF vs. non-PBF)

| Survey question | % that said “yes” | |
|--|-------------------|------------------|
| | PBF collines | Non-PBF collines |
| Are local administrators responsible for corruption in your community? | 89.2 | 59.3 |
| What about businessmen? | 5.2 | 3.4 |
| Managers of international projects? | 6.5 | 6.8 |
| The police? | 86.7 | 47.5 |
| The military? | 11.7 | 6.8 |
| Ex-combatants? | 6.5 | 5.1 |
| Leaders of local associations? | 35 | 15.3 |
| Political party leaders? | 20.8 | 10.2 |
| Religious leaders? | 3.9 | 3.4 |
| Refugees? | 2.6 | 3.4 |
| IDPs? | 2.6 | 3.4 |
| School directors? | 61 | 32.2 |
| The Bakurambere | 7.8 | 6.8 |
| Other community leaders? | 5.3 | 6.8 |

Notes: Highlighted rows represent statistically significant differences at the 0.05 level with the null hypothesis: $H_0: PBF_1 = PBF_0$.

While we’ve noted decreases in variables such as discrimination, it seems that corruption has not followed the same trend over the past six years. More than 44% of people noted increases in corruption, while only about 35% said it had decreased. As expected, this trend is all the more significant in PBF collines, with about 62% of respondents mentioning increases in corruption, while only 45% mentioned the same in non-PBF collines.


Security and human rights

The final section of our survey dealt with perceptions of security and the respect for human rights. In Burundi’s post-conflict atmosphere, it was important for PBF interventions to help people feel safe and respected within their own communities and political environments. As mentioned in section II, several of the security projects were highly relevant in addressing these concerns and were even catalytic, while several others were not very relevant to the key peacebuilding needs, well targeted, or well implemented. Nevertheless, they seemed to have worked out well, as overall survey results in this section showed significant feelings of safety and respect.

When asked to assess their overall security environment, only *one* respondent out of 229 across all surveyed collines mentioned that it was “bad” — all other respondents responded that it was either “good” or “very good.” This result is supported by a second question — whether the past six years had produced an increase or decrease in feelings of security. In response to this question, 95% of respondents across collines said that they felt their situation had improved during this timeframe.

As to potential causes of this perceived improvement in security, decreases in local conflict (combat) were cited as most common by a large margin. Other potential causes are seen below in Figure 15.

Figure 15: Potential causes to increases in security (all collines)



In this area, PBF collines and non-PBF collines were mostly in agreement, though the intervention of Resident Tribunals was seen as more helpful in PBF collines. While only about

3% of people in non-PBF collines cited Resident Tribunals as significant in improving the security environment, this statistic increased to 12% in PBF collines. This can be seen in Table 12 below.


Table 12: Potential causes to increases in security (PBF vs. non-PBF)

| Survey question | % that said “yes” | |
|--|-------------------|------------------|
| | PBF collines | Non-PBF collines |
| Do you think the professionalization of the police has led to increases in local security? | 40 | 38.9 |
| What about having no military presence in your community? | 2.7 | 7.4 |
| What about a lack of local conflicts? | 92.2 | 88.1 |
| What about the absence of combatants? | 57.9 | 67 |
| Less possession of heavy arms in the community? | 8.7 | 48.1 |
| Having a Resident Tribunal? | 12.3 | 2.8 |
| No youth violence? | 14.6 | 26.9 |

Notes: Highlighted rows represent statistically significant differences at the 0.05 level with the null hypothesis: $H_0: PBF_1 = PBF_0$.

Also important to our survey was to identify the potential detriments to security. Across all collines, malfunctioning of the police and youth violence were seen as the worst threats to security. These and others can be seen in Figure 16.

Figure 16: Potential causes to decreases in security (all collines)




On this topic, PBF and non-PBF collines were in almost complete agreement, most often citing youth violence, malfunctioning of the police, and political violence as with the trends across all collines.

Human rights

In our last section we turn to the topic of human rights. Human rights were another key priority for the PBF, as evidenced by the support provided for the Independent National Commission on Human Rights (CNIDH). Here, results are similarly encouraging with 91% of respondents in all collines noting that overall respect for human rights in their communities had increased in the past six years. This is reinforced by the fact that only *eight* out of 202 respondents mentioned that they felt that their human rights environment was “bad” — 96% cited their environment as either “good” or “very good.”

As to which actors or events are ascribed to these impressive increases in respect for human rights, respondents pointed most often towards the absence of local violence and the absence of active combatants. This relates directly to our earlier discussion of improvements to Burundi’s security environment. Local authorities were also seen as instrumental in improving the human rights environment, as shown in Figure 17.

Figure 17: Potential causes for human rights being more respected (all collines)



Again, some subtle differences between PBF and non-PBF collines exist. For example, as was the case in conflict mitigation, respondents in PBF collines more often cited Resident Tribunals as helping to improve community attributes. About 10% of PBF colline residents noted Resident Tribunals, compared to 4% in non-PBF collines. Also seen as more associated with human rights in PBF collines were CNIDH functions, a principal component of the PBF I initiative. About 21% of PBF colline respondents mentioned these functions as integral to improving overall respect for human rights, while in non-PBF collines barely 1% of respondents mentioned them at all. The table below shows these and other differences.


Table 13: Potential causes for human rights being more respected (PBF vs. non-PBF)

| Survey question | % that said “yes” | |
|---|-------------------|------------------|
| | PBF collines | Non-PBF collines |
| Do you think that CNIDH functions have led to increased respect for human rights? | 20.8 | 0.9 |
| What about the professionalization of the police? | 27.1 | 26.9 |
| The National Intelligence Service? | 3.9 | 3.7 |
| The military? | 8.7 | 20.6 |
| The integration of ex-combatants into the workforce? | 7.9 | 4.7 |
| Having no military presence in your community? | 1 | 3.7 |
| Less heavy weapons among civilians? | 10.8 | 17.8 |
| Resident Tribunals? | 10.4 | 3.7 |
| Involvement of local authorities? | 61.1 | 53.7 |
| No youth violence? | 7.8 | 26.9 |
| No local conflicts? | 81 | 79.6 |
| What about having no local combatants? | 47.3 | 61.3 |

Notes: Highlighted rows represent statistically significant differences at the 0.05 level with the null hypothesis: $H_0: PBF_1 = PBF_0$.

Also important to consider in our survey were the potential causes for any deteriorations in the respect for human rights. In this regard, residents in all collines were overwhelmingly likely to blame the poor performance of police forces, among other things. These are shown in Figure 18 below.

Figure 18: Potential causes of the deterioration of human rights (all collines)



PBF colline respondents were about 11% more likely to point to the lack of involvement by local authorities as a prominent cause for deteriorating human rights, again showing the importance of community institutions in improving post-conflict conditions. Other differences between PBF and non-PBF collines are listed below.

Table 14: Potential causes of the deterioration of human rights (PBF vs. non-PBF)

| Survey question | % that said “yes” | |
|--|-------------------|------------------|
| | PBF collines | Non-PBF collines |
| Do you think that the poor performance of the CNIDH leads to a decrease in the respect for human rights? | 1.7 | 2 |
| What about the poor performance of the police? | 6.8 | 2 |
| Of the National Intelligence Service? | 5.2 | — |
| Abuses by ex-combatants? | 1.7 | 3.8 |
| Possession of heavy arms by civilians? | 1.7 | — |
| Resident Tribunals? | 1.7 | — |
| Low involvement of local authorities? | 13.3 | 1.9 |
| What about the presence of violent youth? | 11.5 | — |

Notes: Highlighted rows represent statistically significant differences at the 0.05 level with the null hypothesis: $H_0: PBF_1 = PBF_0$. Also note that dashes signify that there were not enough responses to conduct a difference-of-means analysis.