

**THE BURUNDI LEADERSHIP TRAINING PROGRAM:
A PROSPECTIVE ASSESSMENT**

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1. Evaluating projects like the BLTP is not easy. As with so many of the most important things in personal and social life, measurement and attribution problems are extremely severe; basic concepts are deeply contestable (social capital, trust, peace,..); the dynamics at stake are chaotic, unpredictable, multi-dimensional, ambiguous, and complicated; the disjuncture between the long-term nature of the objectives and the short-term nature of the project cycle is even more outrageous than usual; and the pressure to focus only on the positive results is enormous. The field within which this project situates itself –peacebuilding and development– is young and no solidly established methodologies for evaluation as yet exist. Generally, project managers and donors invest too little in baseline data, monitoring and evaluation systems, and meta-evaluations – this project is no exception, with all these elements being by far the weakest.
2. We used elements of both a “theory-based evaluation” model and an assisted internal evaluation practice. We saw much of what we did as engaging in discussion with the team, stimulating learning by them and encouraging them to innovate – which they did with great rapidity and flexibility: during our stay, many changes were already made, and we consider this aspect to have been a crucial role of the evaluation.
3. A theory-based evaluation approach seeks to break down the intervention into its component activity parts, trying to hypothesize the working assumptions that connect each activity to its desired outcome. The evaluation activity then collects data to identify how well each step of the sequence is borne out. By focusing on how change is actually being generated and by linking it up to more theoretical concepts –even if they were not initially and/or explicitly part of the project document– it is possible to tease out what is really working in specific situations and under certain circumstances.
4. We sought to link such a theory-based approach with a fine understanding of the current socio-political dynamics of Burundi. By putting an intervention in the context of its long-term social and political dynamics, we hoped to be able to ground the evaluation in the specificities of that place and that time, and thus to increase its relevance.

I: CONTEXT

The conflict

5. Burundi has been ruled for over three decades by a small clique of Tutsi from Bururi Province. This clique derived its power from control over the higher echelons of the army, the key levers of the state (and, consequently, the fruits of the aid enterprise), and the business sector. While other Tutsi were given access to a few influential positions, Hutu were only allowed to hold much lower-level positions in the state and army. Dissent was held down through the liberal use of acute and structural violence. Until the early 1990s, the international community, including the World Bank, provided substantial resources to this exclusionary government, with few questions asked.
6. In 1993, an internal attempt to change the status quo failed. Following Burundi's first democratic elections, control of the state, including the presidency, was transferred to a few Hutu, while the army, business sector, and some key positions in the state remained in the hands of the Bururi clique and its allies. Many of those who had occupied the most influential positions in the state lost them. Some of those frustrated with this sudden loss of power reacted with a coup d'Etat, which was followed by widespread popular anger and violence often directed toward Tutsi in the hills. This anger and violence was in part called for by some Hutu counter-elites who had begun to use radical ethnicity as a tool for political mobilization. Political competition had become ethnic competition. The ensuing war, and the genocide in Rwanda, would deepen this dimension.
7. Rebel groups emerged, Buyoya launched a second coup, the regional embargo was imposed, and years of fighting and negotiation followed. The signing of the Arusha Peace Accord in August 2000, followed by the Pretoria ceasefire agreements, marked the beginning of the transition out of war toward the development of new institutions designed to support and maintain peace. This continues to be a slow and often painful process, which is still reversible.

The challenge of establishing new institutions

8. Burundi faces several structural challenges in the construction of institutions to support a sustainable transition from war to peace. First, a viable system of guarantees has to be created to ensure that ethnic exclusion and destruction will not occur again, neither against Hutu nor Tutsi. Ethnicity has certainly taken on a life of its own in Burundi; the social and physical separation between people has grown; a sense of victimization prevails (the charge of genocide being the trump card on both sides); and fear and distrust along ethnic lines prevail. While this is the challenge the world has focused on most, it is implicitly linked to many other challenges and not the most difficult to solve. Solutions to this can be found, many of which, including power-sharing, are included in the Arusha Accord.
9. Note that in Burundian society at large, ethnicity is becoming more openly addressed and, more importantly, surpassed. Ordinary people of all ethnicities face such hardship

that they have come to realize that ethnic division does not serve them. The general feeling among the Burundian people is that the problem lies with the politicians and the generals that have manipulated and used them rather than represented them. They see the entire politico-military class, which most of the BLTP participants belong to, as the spoilers of peace. This idea contains at least a kernel of truth, although it is not necessarily a complete scientific analysis of Burundi's problems either: the notion that others (urban people, politicians, military, foreigners) are to blame for the country's problems also fulfills the function of allowing people not to question their own roles in what is going on; it has for decades been a popular rhetorical argument in Burundi. That said, the fact that ethnicity is more openly addressed in society seems real and positive.

10. Second, the old clique of power and its allies have to retreat from the commanding heights of the state, army, and economy and new entrants have to be included in these spheres of power (a process managed until now by a temporary expansion of the number of positions available, especially in the realm of the state). Yet, the transfer of power inevitably creates objective losers, on all sides. The institutions that Burundi's leaders are asked to create or strengthen during the transition may threaten them personally. Ceasing to be a general, a parliamentarian, or a minister is not simply a move to another interesting and well-paid job, but often a complete loss of economic security and a fall from social grace. For at least some of Burundi's leaders, justice will lead them to be accused and lose their job; elections will make them lose their positions of influence; security sector reform and demobilization will make them lose jobs; good governance will reduce their income, etc...
11. Third, it is very hard to create institutions in the absence of institutions. Institutions are mutually reinforcing. If, when negotiating an agreement, one feels confident that an instance exists that can monitor and enforce such an agreement later, the ease of compromising is much greater than if there is no such faith. When designing a policy, one must feel confident that actual resources will be available and will be allocated in function of that policy and not personal relations. Burundians do not possess these kinds of institutions; one could even go a step further and say that the most powerfully present institutions in Burundi are those that make everyone expect graft and clientelism and exclusion and impunity –hardly a basis for successful negotiation. Against this background, it is very hard to engage in good-faith negotiating on the new post-conflict institutions.
12. Fourth, the challenge of institutional transformation takes place against a system of unimaginable poverty and social exclusion of most Burundians. The rural poor, whether Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa (but statistically predominantly Hutu), are the ones being killed and abused by all sides. They are the ones whose land is stolen, whose food, credit, and aid is being skimmed off, and whose children die from preventable diseases at a rate that is currently the world's highest. Few of the people in power, or those vying for power, regardless of their party affiliation, are deeply connected to the poor or seem to have their interests foremost at heart.

13. In the meantime, the size of the cake available has become smaller for all: the economy is worse off than it was a decade ago –when it was already one of the world’s ten poorest countries. This negatively affects both those in rural areas who live on the brink of starvation, and those in power, whose jobs are more precarious, salaries lower, and costs of life much higher. The people in power know how precarious their situation is, and the depths of misery that lie below. They realize, or fear, that few opportunities to maintain a decent lifestyle exist outside of positions in the state. They, like you and I, have not the slightest desire to fall further.
14. This is a stunningly difficult situation, then. Burundi’s leadership is not just a group of smart and committed people negotiating to solve extremely difficult problems, but a group of distrustful, hurt, insecure, often cynical, and unrepresentative people using any tool, under conditions of near-Hobbesian institutional anarchy, to assure themselves of a seat at the table and a piece of an ever smaller small pie. All of this takes place against a backdrop of violence, lack of predictability, profound institutional weakness, deep poverty and risk, and regional instability. It is these people the BLTP seeks to help to take the necessary steps forwards.

Incentives for collaboration and compromise

15. At the same time, there also exist contextual factors that are pushing in the direction of peace and behavioral and institutional change. Most people are sick of the war and know that they can’t win. It is clear to most people that Burundi is currently in a so-called “mutually hurting stalemate,” and thus, grudgingly but unavoidably, the politics of compromise is taking over from the politics of military victory. Linked to that, the economic cost of the war is clear to all. With the exception of a few who actually profited handsomely from the war, Burundians of all walks of life –both poor and non-poor– were a lot better off one decade ago, and they all know it. The population at large wants the war to end; it desperately seeks development, not further ethnic recrimination.
16. There is also the Arusha Accord, warts and all. The incentives at this point in time in Bujumbura are for collaboration (or at least to pretend to collaborate, even if you don’t really want to). As a so-called leader, if you are not in this game you are increasingly nowhere. See, for example, the FNL, or the extremist Tutsi parties, or the most radical people within the bigger parties, who have lost their capacity to single-handedly derail the process at this time. It is not certain that this dynamic of collaboration and compromise will last forever, nor is it the only game in town. Still, it is a central part of the landscape, and the BLTP tries to support it by giving people opportunities, self-understanding, and a few skills to enable them to work better within this new dynamic.

The empowerment alternative

17. We need to return to Arusha for a moment. The process and the agreements had major limitations: wide-ranging and general agreements and frameworks were agreed upon, but enormous challenges remained. First, many key issues remained to be

negotiated later, which is currently slowly happening. Second, there were major problems of ownership: not only had the entire civil society of Burundi been excluded from the negotiation process and consequently felt little to no ownership of it, but the same also held for crucial powerful political groups. Third, there was little further facilitation regarding the implementation of Arusha accord, although South Africa and the group of regional states have continued to pressure for and conduct high-level negotiations from the outside. The international community's attention was focused almost exclusively on the rebel/ceasefire issue; the Implementation Monitoring Committee, which was supposed to nudge the implementation process forward, has failed to live up to its responsibility. The international community's main way to assure the follow-up to Arusha has been to push the Burundians to "get on with the work" by not opening the hoped-for financial faucets and through pressure from ambassadors. These two conditional-type incentives have had limited success. No one has been systematically monitoring the peace process from inside Burundi and supporting the Burundians "leaders" in implementing these complex agreements.

18. *The BLTP adds an entirely different dynamic for transitional change, using a more empowering process rather than a conditionality/pressure one.* It seeks to provide key players in Burundi's transition with the attitudes, skills, and relations that should make them more willing to and capable of conducting the complex negotiations that they are faced with on a daily basis within the transitional government and thus, hopefully, help to bring the transition to a peaceful end. In second lieu, the BLTP also tries to broaden the social basis of the post-Arusha process by bringing in some new people from civil society, in order to broaden the dialogue and the social basis of the new institutions.
19. The BLTP thus seeks to contribute to Burundi's transition (and, eventually, its "post-transition") by investing in the people who influence the creation of the necessary institutions. In societies such as Burundi where many of these institutions have either been destroyed or seriously weakened or may never have existed –or where the institutions that do exist create incentives for mismanagement, distrust, and conflict– individuals need to create new institutions against an extremely difficult background. Hence, the BLTP believes, work on individuals is important as well, and, at this point in Burundi's history it may well be an urgent –and unique, for nobody else does it– contribution to the required change.
20. In short, the BLTP creates an additional path to solve the Burundian crisis, in combination with the UN mission, South African facilitation, and pressure from donors. It cannot be seen in isolation from these other initiatives and policies, but must be understood as a complement and an additional input to unblock the situation. To evaluate the BLTP, then, we need to ask the following question: is US\$1 million –the equivalent of about 1 kilometer of road building-- spent on creating a cadre of leaders with a different understanding of the situation and a broader range of negotiation skills *a worthwhile addition to the other ongoing processes?* Does it interact with the latter in positive ways, adding something that is absent and yet seems empirically and theoretically promising? Our answer to this question will be "yes." Improvements are

possible, and matters of long-term impact need to be seriously considered, but our evaluation suggests that the BLTP does add a unique and relevant complement to the ongoing policies to sustain Burundi's transition.

The challenge of building trust in individuals and institutions

21. At the root of the change that BLTP seeks to foster is trust – trust in other people, trust that change is possible, and, to be successful, trust in the BLTP. The creation of trust in Burundi, where mistrust reigns supremely, is no small task. Below, we elaborate the causes of mistrust that we identified in collaboration with the project team.

Stereotypes & misperceptions

22. Mistrust may prevail because of stereotypes, ideologies and perceptual biases that assign untrustworthiness and ill intentions to other groups; people may be socialized in these and become incapable of trusting the other. In Burundi, the last decades, particularly since 1972, have seen the gradual emergence of deeply prejudicial ideologies, which go far beyond their cultural roots. Over ten years of war have only added to this.

Lack of interaction

23. Linked to that, mistrust may flow from lack of contact, from socializing and living only with people of one's own side. This is often highly prevalent among refugees, who, even less than people living inside the country, meet those from the other side. In this sense, mistrust is a self-fulfilling prophecy –since people do not meet (maybe because of ideologies of distrust to begin with) they never come to trust each other. That said, examples the world over show that people who live side by side and interact socially and economically are not immune to growing mistrust, hatred, and exclusionary ideologies. Burundi is no exception: after all, before the war, both in rural and urban areas, people did live side by side, interacted on daily bases, sold stuff to each other, met in bars and homes, and all of this did not stop the total destruction of the country from occurring. Partly this is, many argue, because the communication was unclear and distrustful.

Culture

24. Mistrust may also have cultural roots, an explanation offered by both Burundians and some foreigners (but emphatically not Mr. Wolpe). Traditional modes of indirect communication and hiding true opinions and sentiments, and possibly a positive value traditionally assigned to deceit and cunning, all may make it possible to speak of a culture of distrust. Anyone who reads a collection of Burundian proverbs and myths can find ample evidence of all the above. An argument like this is hard to prove or disprove and often masks a certain intellectual laziness, but it cannot be a priori denied that cultural patterns may be possible factors in understanding the prevalence of mistrust.

Lack of knowledge

25. Making things more complicated, and adding to the mistrust, is uncertainty or lack of knowledge. In a society where many things happen in non-transparent ways, where the facts are not well known, where historical events are shrouded in mystery, and where rumors dominate public life, it becomes difficult to know who is responsible for what, and hence, once again, distrusting all (or assigning blame to the wrong people) may become the standard practice.

Past behavior

26. Mistrust may also grow from correct assessments of the behavior of others. There are people who deserve to be mistrusted because they *have* acted in dishonest, unreliable, and nasty, if not evil, ways. Trust must be earned, the expression goes, and mistrust can be deserved. In Burundi, where hundreds of thousands of innocents have been slaughtered and where corruption, cronyism, and the abuse of power have prevailed in manners large and small for decades, there must exist an enormous amount of distrust that is based on actual facts, and not on misperception or stereotypes. This cause of mistrust far predates the war, but has also grown tremendously during it –people have committed enormous abuses, stolen more than ever, double-crossed each other, and so on.

Impunity

27. Mistrust is also reinforced by institutions. It strongly flows from impunity, or the absence of rule of law. Burundi is a country where people who kill, steal, or abuse power very often go unpunished, and often positively flourish from it. Every Burundian can tell stories of such instances that he or she has witnessed or suffered from. This is not the result of the war only, although the war has clearly made this situation even more prevalent. Under these conditions, it makes sense to distrust others –not only those who have already shown through their behavior that they deserve such mistrust (the previous category), but also those who have not (yet) so behaved, for one can never be sure. When institutions do not exist to protect people against abuse, people need to adopt individual strategies to protect themselves, and generalized mistrust is one rational solution to impunity.

Table summarizing discussion of trust

Cause of mistrust	Relation to the war	Types of solutions
1. Stereotypes & misperceptions	Predates, but significantly worsened by, war	Attitude change. Education system and reconciliation mechanisms.
2. Lack of interaction	Mainly created by the war	Communication and shared resources
3. Culture	Long predates war	Long-term and hardly programmable, although education, spirituality, sensitization are important.
4. Past behavior	Predates, but significantly worsened by, war	The past cannot be undone, but transitional justice may contribute to acceptance.
5. Lack of knowledge	Predates, but significantly worsened by, war	Media, improved governance, truth commission.
6. Impunity	Predates, but may be worsened by, war	Justice, rule of law, improved governance.

28. The BLTP mainly seeks to affect two of the variables that cause mistrust to be prevalent in a society: stereotypes and lack of interaction. This is simultaneously its strength and its weakness. The strength is evident: few other programs are addressing these causes of mistrust and in the absence of progress on them, the necessary institutional changes may never materialize. The limit is equally evident: as the BLTP does not (and cannot) address the other factors that cause mistrust, key variables that condition the changes it seeks to promote are outside of its control. The participants may have made progress on overcoming some of the causes of mistrust, but as the other causes may still be in place, major counter-pressures may remain at work. In addition, they may have made these breakthroughs, such as they are (they evidently vary from person to person, and it is impossible to measure them), between themselves, but not towards others who were not present at the workshop –and *vice versa*. All of that, of course, is exactly Burundi’s reality, and change will always be slow. On the other hand, the new incentives for collaboration and compromise created by the new power-sharing dynamic we discussed above, as well as the other policies and projects by the international community, try to impact some of the other variables (especially 5 and 6) but neglect the ones the BLTP directly addresses. In short, we believe that the BLTP covers a neglected, yet important, area in the current transitional process of Burundi. It cannot control all relevant variables, but neither can other projects or actions. Its contribution is potentially important and necessary although insufficient by itself –a fact that is also true for most other activities and projects.

II. MAKING THE PROJECT LEGIBLE: A THEORETICAL REFRAMING

The logical structure of the project

29. The following represents the project team’s understanding of the project, systematized by us. It is based on our reading of project documents, a four-hour assisted self-evaluation workshop with the entire project team (except Alain Lempereur) in which we sought to render as explicit and scholarly as possible the assumptions and aims of the BLTP project, and Howard Wolpe’s response to a first draft of this evaluation.

The workshop

30. The entry point of the project –its main output– consists of 6-day intensive workshops for approximately 30 persons each. The BLTP describes this output as “*interactive workshops in communications, negotiating skills, visioning, group problem-solving, and strategic planning [that] are designed to assist in the restoration of trust and confidence among Burundian leaders and to encourage participatory and collaborative decision-making.*” We have broken this down into four specific aims:

- individual change in attitude and in understanding of self in relation to society (aha! moment);
- the creation of relationships between the workshop participants, built on the initial individual change (referred to as the creation of social capital or a network); and

- the transmission of skills to take the above mentioned change forwards (communications, negotiating skills, visioning, group problem-solving, and strategic planning);
- the development of the initial ideas for projects or activities to reinforce the network and the relationships created across ethnic and political divisions, and to support these leaders in leading the institutional transformation required for the country's economic reconstruction, and helping to establish the conditions for a durable peace. (This final objective was articulated following this evaluation—moving away from the initial more narrow focus on economic development projects.)

31. Attitude change is the first crucial step, without which none of the others are possible or indeed necessary. The attitude change that the BLTP is going for is “*one in which the participants are able to see each other as “whole” persons, not simply as stereotypic reflections of their ethnic and political categories.*” Seeing each other as “whole” persons should help the participants to see their common interest and switch from zero-sum to positive-sum, win-win thinking. The BLTP hopes that this new way of thinking will help the participants build consensus on the rules of the “new” game (power arrangements, decision-making procedures, and other patterns of behavior). Finally, in Wolpe’s words, this will lead to a *re-definition of self-interest to converge with the national interest and the interests of others.*

32. To achieve and reinforce this attitude change, the BLTP workshops combine a series of training and dialogue tools designed to build communication and negotiation skills among a group of people who need to apply these skills in their professional lives --that is, both with one another, inside and outside of the workshop, and with others, who did not participate in the workshop. The BLTP workshops take the participants through a series of exercises and discussions that aim to build trust and strengthen relationships between the participants; strengthen the communication skills of each participant; give them both humility and confidence; help them to put themselves in the shoes of others (including their antagonists); better understand how one’s own behavior contributes to the problems one faces; think creatively about ways out of gridlock and find paths to possible change; and help to engender a general sense of hope and possibility. Finally, the workshops lead the participants through a brainstorming exercise around next steps and possible actions to reinforce the relationships created during the workshop and address the larger issues of economic development and peace. (See Annex IV for a detailed narrative description and analysis of the Ngozi III workshop.)

Beyond the workshop

33. The real aims of the project reach beyond these individual-level changes sought in the workshop and are intended to produce impacts beyond the 33 or so participants through:

- changes in the immediate environment of each participant (family, workplace, community), and

- changes in national institutions (primarily at the central level).

34. This is a prelude to the ultimate dynamic the BLTP wishes to influence – the construction of the institutions of sustainable (including just) peace in Burundi. In BLTP’s words, its purpose is “*to make possible the resolution of the underlying issues [of the conflict] by helping to create the relationships, dialogue, space and context for Burundian leaders to begin to address those problems.*” This is based on the belief that “*institutional change is not at all possible without individual transformation*” and thus the development of effective national institutions must begin with the transformation of the individuals that are responsible for building them.

35. Schematically, the aims, actions, expected outcomes, and indicators of the project identified during our discussion with the BLTP team are as follows:

	Expected outcomes	BLTP actions (outputs)	Indicators (identified by BLTP team)
<i>From direct impact on individuals to</i>	Changes in relations between participants	Initial workshops Follow-up workshops	Participants lose their fear and speak honestly. Participants understand that other participants see the world differently than they do. They should be able to articulate the other’s perspective and accept that they have different perspectives, which they can justify. They should also respect the other’s perspective. Participants should understand not only how the other feels, but also that if they had been born in different circumstances they could also be in that situation. Participants come out of their boxes and think/act as individuals and see others as individuals. Participants build new relationships among themselves.
	Changes in relations between participants and others	Support to participant activities	Participants should manage their perception of other people/groups more effectively. Participants use their new knowledge, perspective, and tools to build relationships with others outside the group.
<i>Indirect impact on social processes</i>	Changes in participants’ immediate environment	Support to elaboration of development projects Impact on other donors’ projects (e.g., OTI)	Participants should have an improved capacity to work collaboratively. Participants should create new patterns of relationship and behavior outside of their formal group structure. Participants should be able to accept that different views of history are possible, which should allow them to live with their community.
	Indirect impact on national institutions	Selection of participants New, targeted BLTP projects or network activities	No specific criteria mentioned.

III. THE WORKSHOP – WHO IS TRANSFORMED INTO WHAT?

36. In this section, we will discuss the initial workshops: who attended, why they came, what happened at the workshops, and how that affected the participants.

37. The BLTP has held three Ngozi workshops, composed of “*approximately one hundred Burundian leaders, drawn from diverse ethnic, social and institutional backgrounds*” (July 2004 proposal). We read the written evaluations by the participants of 5 workshops (Ngozi I, II, I, as well as Nairobi and Bujumbura). These show that the workshops are very much appreciated: scores are very high across the board. A few other trends include:

- Ngozi I had the lowest score on a number of variables, showing an improvement in the quality of workshop management. This is logical; the team has learned from the first one. Even then, scores for Ngozi I were actually very nice.
- The two questions that get the lowest scores in all workshops are those dealing with the rhythm of the workshop and the time allocated to the different exercises.
- Among the military workshop evaluations, there are some very large degrees of abstention at times –sometimes more than 50%. We do not know why.
- It is standard knowledge that written participant evaluations of workshops and courses are not very reliable sources of information, and this case is no different. In the Ngozi III workshop, for example, the last exercise was never done, for lack of time. Yet, in the evaluation form, it was consistently rated very positively: only 3 participants indicated that it did not take place. In short, then, the evaluations measure an overall sense of happiness and appreciation as well as politeness, but are not highly scientific when it comes to the details.

Impact of the workshop on participants

Attitude change

38. Both our own observations and interviews with dozens of participants and observers indicate that the BLTP workshops do effect a personal transformation in the way people perceive themselves in relation to the other participants. People relax in each other’s presence. They humanize and individualize each other in ways they did not do before. They begin questioning their own attitudes and modes of behavior, and the way these contribute to their interactions. They begin to break through some of the stereotypes and a priori’s that they may have carried for years. As it sets out to do, the BLTP helps the participants to see the other participants more as “whole” people.

39. The degree of attitude change during the workshop depends on the previous experiences and mindset of each individual. We observed some of the most dramatic impact with two categories of people: extremists and refugees or newcomers to the political game. Many of the extremists --people who have been entirely defined by one single issue from which they could not budge– underwent a real transformation in their capacity to see others as people rather than categories of opponents and evil.

40. For those who had spent years fighting in the bush, living in camps, or simply living abroad, the attitude change was often major as well. They came to the BLTP with prejudices and stereotypes that had been hardened by a longstanding lack of interaction with “different” groups. Having normal conversations with a broad range of people created a new sense of possibility for them, and did allow them to break through the fixed categories that dominated their life. The impact was further increased because the people that they were coming to see more as “whole” people were, in fact, sometimes powerful people with reputations and stories preceding them.
41. The impact on many civil society members and seasoned politicians may be less in terms of attitude change, but still quite strong in the relationship building area. The civil society participants were often already in the business of interacting with people different from themselves (although certainly often uneasily), but many of them said that they rarely had the opportunity to interact so closely with political and military leaders. Some expressed real satisfaction at being able to hold discussions with these leaders and to challenge them on specific issues, which was made possible by the non-threatening, game-like atmosphere created in the BLTP workshops. Others saw this as disenchanting. “It was frustrating,” said one participant. “They just stayed entrenched in their positions.”
42. More generally, for relatively moderate people who have been in the Burundian political process for some time, the BLTP did not do a great deal to change their mindset or position. The same holds for those who have participated in other dialogue processes in the past: they are already familiar with many of these tools and had already gone through any initial “aha-moment” that they might have. A number of Ngozi I-III participants, for example, had participated in an earlier process of inter-ethnic discussion created by International Alert, which led to the creation of CAP (Company of Apostles for Peace, an organization that still exists now); others had participated in the dialogue between UPRONA and FRODEBU in 1993, the Arusha and Pretoria talks; and others continue to participate in other conflict-related dialogue and training processes. With this group, then, the BLTP may have helped to maintain and reinforce attitude change that had already taken place, rather than engendering the attitude change itself.
43. The important question for the impact of the BLTP is whether or not this attitude change (or reinforcement) continues beyond the workshop, influencing the participants’ immediate and wider environments. Participants repeatedly told us that once the “aha!-moment” happened, it did not go away. “*In spite of everything,*” said one participant, “*at the individual level, the realization does not leave you. It pushes you to think before you take a decision.*” Yet, even if people change individually, their environment has often not changed. “[Y]ou have to figure out how to reinforce it,” said the same participant. And another: “*We return to our group, which has a very strong impact on each of us, and we begin to think poorly of others again.*” Each individual participant possessed a different degree of personal and environmental flexibility to apply what they learned from the BLTP. Thus, the impact on the participant’s environment also depends on the nature of that environment (see below).

Relationships and networks (social capital)

44. Most participants cited the relationships that they built at the workshops as an important impact. Any attitude change that did take place occurred most directly in relation to the other people present at the workshop –in being able to see these people in a different light. Not that all became friends of all, of course, but the change in the mode of social interaction was dramatic and visible to all.
45. Given the current context in Burundi, where there is much more collaboration and dialogue (making the job of pulling all of these people together a bit easier), but where there is also the real threat that division and violence will erupt again, the relationship-building that takes place at the BLTP takes on an increasing importance. Many people said that the fact that the BLTP is able to bring together such a diverse group of people and create dialogue between them is already an enormous contribution. There is no other venue where this group of decision-makers can come together informally and relate relatively openly with one another. Some go as far as saying that the social capital that is being created at the BLTP is essential for helping the peace process to move forward, precisely because there is still the real possibility that it will fall apart. For that reason, maintaining this social capital beyond the initial workshop is considered crucial by all.
46. As discussed above, the degree of impact of the BLTP workshops varied depending on the environment and personality of each participant. For most civil society representatives the relational impact seemed to be to increase the pool of people capable of engaging the politicians and the military. When we asked how many workshop participants they knew personally before the workshop began, the answer for civil society people was typically “less than 10.” For them, also, a strong impact of the workshop, and motivation to participate, was precisely this access to people they did not usually get to meet –senior politicians, senior military officers. In a country where people often complain that one problem is the lack of interaction between politicians or military officers and the rest of society, this is an important contribution. On the other hand, the civil society represented at the BLTP are only a step or two removed from political elite and do not necessarily represent the perspective or position of the large majority of Burundians. Nonetheless, building relationships and confidence between civil society, refugees, former rebels, and politicians may represent an important expansion in the number and type of people able to participate in the political dialogue.
47. The success in relationship-building at the initial Ngozi workshops led to the initiation of targeted military workshops (Nairobi, Gitega, Bujumbura), which built confidence and understanding between people who have to work and negotiate with one another on a daily basis. As a result, the impact of the social capital created is more immediately visible and led to some concrete results. We discuss the impact of these spin-off workshops in the next section.

48. The workshops also seemed to have the impact of humbling some of the most powerful participants, and providing more confidence to those who did not see themselves to have much power. The team used games/exercises that put everyone on the same level, and made remarks/speeches that encouraged those that might need encouragement and humbled those who might need a bit of humility. The workshops, thus, helped to equalize the status of everyone around the table, at least as long as the workshop lasted. In a couple of cases, this behavior change in participants' views of their own power in relation to others remained after the initial workshop.

Skills training

49. One of the important aspects of the BLTP design is that it combines both dialogue and training approaches in a way which is designed to be mutually reinforcing. One participant said that part of the success of the dialogue/relationship building process came from the fact that it was couched in the form of a skill-building and planning workshop. The skill training element of the BLTP should also be considered in the light of contributing to the fulfillment of the other attitude change and relationship-building objectives.

50. In general, the participants were very pleased with the skills, tools, and methods used in the BLTP training. Almost all said that their communication and negotiation skills were refined and they were better able to address the daily conflicts that they came across in their individual and, particularly, personal lives. Particularly if they had not been exposed to these tools before, they found them very useful in their daily lives and in helping to aid better communication among the participants during the workshop. They rarely saw this as contributing to institutional change or transformation of their environment, but it did empower them as individuals to more effectively get across the messages that they wished to get across and to better understand the people they interact with on a daily basis.

51. At the same time, the general skills transmission part was superficial. In the workshop evaluations, the questions related to the amount of time available for the skills training and the depth in which that was done are really the only ones that rather systematically get less than top scores: no particular tool ever gets taught, or learned, to the end. Participants told us that it was clear to them that they were not being trained as technicians, but rather received an introduction of sorts to communication and negotiation skills. None of the participants were capable, unless they had participated in serious training prior to the workshop, of acting as negotiators or mediators following the workshop. Participants requested further skill training, which the BLTP provided in follow-up workshops; after Ngozi I, written documentation that would make the application of the BLTP methodology in their work easier was also timely assured by the project; the BLTP is now in the process of exploring new options for deepening the skills of participants in its next phase.

52. We were unable to figure out how the BLTP seeks to transmit the skill of "visioning" to the participants, as it says it does. This seems to be one of the areas where the workshop and the follow-up workshops have fallen short. Most participants

have requested some type of visioning exercise, or at least to come up with some type of common vision among themselves, but the BLTP has not yet been able to get there. It is not clear to us what methodology they have used or seek to use for this. The only visioning example that the participants referred to was the “vision group” that was created, as one of the four follow-up groups, at Ngozi I. Most of the Ngozi I participants whom we spoke to expressed some frustration that these groups had not been reinforced or sufficiently followed up on.

53. In summary, the workshops did provide an interesting and largely appreciated introduction to new negotiation, communication, and programming skills to participants, especially those without prior knowledge of these fields. They rarely saw this as contributing to institutional change or transformation of their environment, but it did empower them as individuals to more effectively get across the messages that they wished to get across and to better understand the people that they interact with on a daily basis. The BLTP did not create technicians nor has it provided an easily transferable curriculum –none of the participants claimed that it did, and this was not the aim either. Future workshops might be more effective if they cut down on the number of tools and concentrated on doing a few of them well. In addition, there may be skills more adapted to leadership and protracted social conflict out there that might be considered. For the rest, much of the skills training takes place in the follow-up workshops, which are a crucial part of the BLTP project and which we discuss later.

Initiation of activities and projects

54. The initiation of activities or projects during, or even following, the six-day workshop has been one of the BLTP’s major challenges. The economic brainstorming that we observed using the 4-Quadrant tool and the 7-Element Framework ended up being much too general and fell far short of coming up with any innovative ideas. During the last few hours of the last day of Ngozi III, the trainers changed their tactic from the one they had used in previous workshops and asked the participants to focus on three questions: developing the competencies and capacities of the participants; reinforcing the network; and increasing the impact on institutions. In the first Ngozi workshop, in comparison, the trainers had focused almost exclusively on joint development projects, which we will discuss below. This new approach has more potential to generate activities or projects by the BLTP participants in the follow-up stage. The main difficulty is that because the workshop never really talked about the real problems that the participants were dealing with as “leaders” of Burundi, it never got to the point where they could identify issues that they would like to work on as a group or even as a few individuals. It may be that the initial workshop time is too short to go that far, as is the fact that participants come from a broad variety of backgrounds and with great initial mistrust towards each other. As a result, more concrete joint visioning as well as identification of concrete follow-up activities may indeed need to be left to the follow-up workshops – but this does have to happen somewhere, lest the BLTP be only a feel-good talk shop.

Objectives	Degree of achievement during workshop	Remaining Challenges
Attitude/mindset change	As high as possible given the circumstances.	How to maintain and deepen the change How to scale it up How to have a larger impact beyond the individuals
Relationships and networks	As high as possible given the circumstances.	How to maintain and deepen the change How to scale it up How to have a larger impact beyond the individuals How to build a sustainable network
Skills development	Low to medium	How to deepen it either during the first workshop or the follow-up workshop
Initiation of activities and programs to reinforce above changes and contribute to institutional transformation for economic development and peace	Low	How to employ tools that engender new thinking and planning about economic development and peace How to support a process that would influence the implementation of new tools

Composition of the workshops

55. As is to be expected, the method for participant selection was eclectic: lists of influential people were requested from a number of key informants, and a number of such lists were actually received (we were given figures between 8 and 15), these names and other names were then discussed and representative names selected in function of ethnicity, region, political affiliation, gender, professional background, etc... The choice of participants at times also involved negotiations with some of the selected participants: a few people who could not come suggested (often at the very last minute) others in their organizations. This eclectic process of participant selection was necessary to ensure that all parties to the conflict are represented at all the workshops – crucial for the project’s credibility and impact. On the other hand, it *is* by necessity rather ad-hoc, leaving one to wonder why one “leader” is chosen over another, a question that many participants posed to us. This is a major issue when one considers applying the BLTP approach to other countries: if in a small country like Burundi tough issues arise of why one “leader” is chosen over another, how much more would this be the case in a much bigger and more diverse country like the DRC, with a population 7 times larger, possibly 50 times more ethnic groups, and many more NGOs, CSOs, entrepreneurs, and organizations of all kinds?

56. That said, there was quite widespread agreement among all people we interviewed that the BLTP has chosen participants excellently. Never before in Burundi has a project worked with such a large group of people so diverse in political background and ideology and so high in level of power and influence. The main critiques we heard

regarding participants selection were a) that the project had not managed –and yet should manage– to reach the “real” top of power in Burundi, and b) that the project had not chosen enough moderate, “new,” civil society leaders. The first critique we heard constantly, and it is a concern shared by the BLTP team itself, which seeks to address it. The latter critique came primarily from some civil society people and is contested by the BLTP team.

57. The main question regarding participant selection really is the fundamental strategic one: is the broad/inclusive approach of Ngozi I-III the best one, or should the BLTP have adopted a narrow/targeted strategy instead, as happened with the military workshops funded by other donors? The current understanding of the project team is that a focus on particular groups with specific joint interests is more effective than the broad approach. The Ngozi I-III workshops, then, can be seen as a learning ground, a tool to gain credibility in Burundian society and to pave the way for more targeted workshops, but not necessarily the way forwards for the future. We agree with that. (Note, however, that this does not mean one should stop working with the Ngozi I-III participants in the future: it would be a waste of past investment and a harm to the credibility of future BLTP initiatives if the BLTP were to drop the Ngozi I-III participants. Now that the network exists and has been invested in, one should reinforce it and take it further, which can be a relatively low-cost activity in any case. We will come back to this later).

58. The BLTP has taken a deliberately realistic approach to participant selection: it sought the most influential people, including the extremist ones (potential spoilers), for they have the biggest impact on the transitional dynamics, for bad or for good. Wolpe is proud that out of the ten “extremists” the team identified early on, half of them have participated in a workshop, and most of the other half’s non-participation is due to unexpected circumstances rather than unwillingness. Some people in civil society criticized this approach: where are those without blood on their hands? Does all this recognition of these people as leaders, all this gentle and respectful work with them, not reward the wrong people? Why not use the BLTP to empower the middle, civil society, youth –non-politicians and non-military, in short?¹

59. There is no fixed answer to this question; it all depends on the strategic aim of the BLTP. The main advantage of widening the social basis of the workshops is clear: the discussions, the social capital, and the network will be broader. As a result, the concerns and the needs of the large majority of Burundian people *may* become more central to the workshop and subsequent network dynamics. The disadvantage is one of opportunity cost: more such people means less people with real power now. The

¹ It seems that the proportion of civil society was about 30% for Ngozi I (plus about 15% more for the private for-profit sector), 25% in Ngozi II (civil society and for-profit combined), and 15% in Ngozi III. The prime source of civil society representatives are churches, although youth organizations and media have been systematically tapped into as well. These are high estimates: we put refugees and students in the civil society category, although there is no reason that, merely by being a refugee or a student, one actually belongs there. After all, civil society is not some category that automatically includes every single person who does not work for a political party or the state.

project had to make a choice here in function of its vision of its contribution to Burundi's evolution. If the prime aim of the BLTP is to support, strengthen, and improve the current transitional dynamics (as seems to be the case), then selecting mainly people with current power (including spoiling power) is a better use of scarce resources. This choice is most visible when one trains specific institutions. In the EMGI workshop, for example, there were no civil society people at all –nobody to speak for those displaced since years by the warring factions, those whose human rights were massively being trampled on the ground by the FAB and the CNDD (and the FDR, not present at that workshop), nobody to discuss what it would take to promote human security for Burundi's ordinary citizens. The nature of the discussions and the network, then, were very narrow. Yet, it is this narrowness that, at least in part, accounts for the fact that this workshop produced rapid results feeding into the current transition. If, on the other hand, the aim is to lay the groundwork for the long-term emergence of *new* leaders in Burundi and to contribute to better post-transition development policies, then the inclusion of more civil society representatives, youth, refugees, farmer's and women's organizations, and the like, is warranted.

60. We generally think the BLTP team has done a very good job at choosing participants. Since its prime aim was to influence current transitional dynamics, it has largely privileged powerful people, although it has added in most workshops a nice number of less powerful, socially diverse people as well –a good compromise it seems to us. However, if the BLTP's aims in the next phase were to move more toward contributing to longer-term development policies, it will need to seriously reflect on its selection system. Evidently, this would mean that the numbers of potential leaders will rise, posing further problems of selection and workshop management: how does one choose leaders among much broader social groups and informal organizations? How does one bring them together in the same room with much more senior and powerful people? Can the size of the workshops be enlarged to have more participants?

Why did people participate?

61. In determining the expectations of the participants, and hence qualify their fulfillment, it is important to understand why people agreed to come to the BLTP workshops in the first place. Some people came because of the respect and recognition that came with being called a leader. Participants use the "leadership" appellation – the seal of approval –with pride in conversations, including in interviews with us. With each subsequent workshop, as the results echoed through Bujumbura, the workshops increasingly became something to be involved in, something tied to prestige, power, and leadership. Some civil society participants told us that their own level of prestige, particularly in their immediate environment, had increased following their participation in the BLTP workshop.
62. For many of the newcomers to the political game, being seen and recognized as a leader was very important, as was the chance to interact in a relatively informal atmosphere with senior politicians and military officers who they might be working with. Yet, many of them also seemed to carry a great deal of fear about being part of this group. One could distinctly notice this in the workshop we assisted at: they felt

clearly ill at ease in ways the others, even the civil society folks, did not. For them, the opportunity to meet others and establish contacts is invaluable by itself. For some others who were part of the political establishment, the opportunity to meet and talk with the newcomers to the political and military game was as also important. Thus, insiders came to meet outsiders, and vice versa.

63. There was a great deal of confusion among participants at Ngozi I and II as to what the nature of the planning and economic development would be. Most thought that the work of BLTP would lead to some tangible result, and that there would be money to fund whatever the participants planned together. The hope of quite a few participants was that development projects –and consequently foreign aid– would follow the workshops, with them in an active role. In interviews with them, the early participants did stress that this hope was a prime reason for their attendance and continued involvement in the follow-up workshops. In general, even if they were not wedded to being involved in a project, the subtitle of the BLTP, “Planning for Burundi’s Future: Building Organizational Capacity for Economic Reconstruction,” motivated many of them to come because they thought that it would lead to tangible economic programming. Participants in the third workshop, however, came with much less expectation of this sort of tangible results. Many of them must have known that after a year, no single project was funded, and the workshop itself has also downplayed this aspect. We believe this is the correct approach: what Burundi needs from these people is not a few extra development projects, but a leadership role in taking forwards the challenges of the transition.
64. As is often the case in Burundi, there was much external speculation as to whether or not participants were coming to the BLTP to receive a nice per diem. It is true that the 15,000Fbu allowance (the team strongly objects to calling it a per diem) which is given to defray cost was mentioned by some of the poorer participant as a pleasant inducement. At the same time, the entire thing is not a boondoggle, nor are its rates close to the famous Arusha ones. The 15,000Fbu does not seem to be likely to make it worth engaging in 12-hour workdays in a remote location, and the rather Spartan living conditions of Ngozi are not much in the way of a holiday either. Participants attendance, then, is only to a small extent due to the per diem/allowance.

Content of the workshops

65. Annex IV of this report contains a detailed narrative of the workshops: anyone interested in understanding how the workshops unfold should read it.

Critical Analysis

66. At the most fundamental level, it may well be that the very things that make a BLTP workshop so successful are also those that limit its further impact. The workshops manage to create an environment propitious to attitude change and relationship building by being a-political, mostly not dealing directly with Burundi (and certainly not with the difficult issues), remaining closed to the public, being non-directive, and acting as if there is shared goodwill among all participants. All of this takes place in Ngozi, outside of most of the participants’ normal context of life,

helping them to interact as individuals over a six-day period. This approach represents a sensible strategic choice on the part of the BLTP team. It helps to create a protective bubble favoring the sort of human interaction and individual change the project seeks to achieve. As the BLTP team articulated in a recent paper, “[e]verything is done to establish the workshop as a “safe” environment in which individuals feel comfortable taking certain risks, opening up to each other, exploring new ways of relating to one another.”²

67. At the same time, in “real life” none of the BLTP workshop conditions prevail. The great challenge, then, is to assure that the gains made at the workshop are not temporary (hardly lasting beyond the flight or drive back home); limited (applying only between those who personally participated in the workshop); or theoretical (creating no concrete engagements under more difficult conditions). To avoid these outcomes, constant follow-up is needed. Participants themselves are very aware of this. Indeed, while they have raved about the success of this methodology in helping them to better understand themselves, their environment, and their interaction with others, they also constantly ask for support in translating this theory into practice, either through activities, more training, or discussions of Burundi’s most pressing issues.
68. This is where one of the main originalities and strengths of the BLTP comes into the picture. Unlike so many other training or dialogue projects, the BLTP has a follow-up system in place that tries to reinforce and deepen the impact of the initial workshop. This is clearly a very important aspect of the project, without which its impact would be minimal. We discuss the follow-up process in the next session, but its relevance to the analysis below is the question of how the initial six-day workshop sets the stage for the follow-up process, which has thus far proven quite challenging for the BLTP.
69. In the next few pages, we will briefly critically analyze a few issues related to the workshop. These are suggestions for reflection, not final judgments or condemnations. The project team does a great job and is a very tightly-run, self-critical, and flexible organization. During the many discussions we had with the team before and during the workshop, they engaged in self-critical discussion, welcoming the outside look and at times immediately incorporating changes in the workshop based on our feedback. The BLTP’s “conjunctural capacity responsiveness,” as Lederach calls it –*i.e.*, the capacity to respond flexibly to opportunities and challenges as they emerge while maintaining a sense of the long-term—is clearly high.

Can the tools be more geared toward the challenges of the transition?

70. While the tools used in the BLTP training are designed to address conflict, they were developed in the west and thus are based on some assumptions about the institutional and systemic framework in which they will be applied. The problem in Burundi, of course, is that of getting from where Burundi is now to the type of stable

² *Rebuilding Peace and State Capacity in War-Torn Burundi*, March 2004, p. 13.

democratic system in which these tools were developed. The majority of tools used in the BLTP training do not sufficiently address the process of creating the institutions that are necessary to achieve this system and to manage the transition from here to there.

71. Wolpe describes the 7-Element Framework tool as “*an analytic tool designed to assist individuals who are in conflict find the way to a sustainable agreement*” and the SIMSOC as “*a tool designed – in the first instance – to help participants acquire insight into what drives conflict – e.g., exclusion, lack of inclusivity in decision-making processes, inequality in distribution of resources, poor communications, people acting on the basis of untested assumptions, etc...*”³ While we agree that these are important tools, the workshop falls short of addressing the type of challenging transitional situation in which Burundians live and work. They don’t begin to deal the complexity of conflict in the Burundian context, much less the complexity of leading a transition from war to sustainable peace. At some point, then (either at the end of the initial workshop or during the follow-up workshops), the BLTP needs to start dealing more explicitly with the concrete level, the compromises and sacrifices and intermediary steps and guarantees required. The SIMSOC, if slightly more adapted to the Burundian reality, could in fact form a platform for discussion of the challenges of developing institutions and mechanisms to support Burundi’s transition. Most participants believed that this would be a very helpful exercise. In addition, the other tools could be slightly adapted and/or exchanged with a few other tools that have been developed for work with protracted social conflict, or for conflict resolution in Burundian culture.

72. In response to the first draft of this evaluation, Wolpe responded that “*we would argue, however, that getting from here to there requires, in the first instance, addressing the issues of trust-building, relationship-building and communications; only then can one get to the resolution of the underlying issues of exclusivity, inequality, brutality, etc.*” The opposite is true as well, however: without some progress on issues of exclusion, brutality, and so on, trust will not grow further either – the two move hand in hand. We recommend that more be done, especially in the follow-up meetings, to use the progress made in trust and social relations between the participants to get to the tough issues of exclusion, inequality, and brutality that hinder further trust-building, relationship-building, and communications. The BLTP smartly began with the latter, but it cannot stick to this only: at some point, both need to be addressed.

Can the fit between the tools be made more optimal?

73. One originality of the workshop is the use of the SIMSOC: a full day simulation with extremely powerful effects. The originality of SIMSOC is that it brings socio-economic power and inequality squarely onto the table, and in an experiential manner – something most conflict resolution training tools do not. This, in turn, represents a different aspect of the attitude change being promoted by the BLTP –not only the

³ Response from Howard Wolpe and Steve McDonald to the first draft of this evaluation.

ethno-political question, but also the social question at the heart of Burundi's war is touched upon here. The problem is that the SIMSOC is only loosely linked up to the rest of the workshop. Trainers and participants regularly make reference to differences in power relationships in the workshop after the SIMSOC, and SIMSOC references often pop up in later discussions, but there is little organized follow-up to this powerful exercise.

74. The BLTP team says that *“as a result of their common experience in SIMSOC –in which people are divided not on the basis of their ethnic identities but, rather, on the basis of their regional identities and economic interests – the participants are now able to discuss Burundian problems with far greater objectivity and less defensiveness, and with much greater sensitivity to the perspectives and feelings of each other.”*⁴ We take issue with two things here. First, there is little real discussion of Burundian problems going on at the BLTP, at least not out in the open. Second, we would suggest that the SIMSOC can be taken much further than only as a tool for relationship-building, it can be used to get at the structural issues, either theoretically or practically, as to why social capital is not easily built in Burundi. We wonder if it is possible to follow up on the SIMSOC by introducing issues of power, inequality, exclusion, and injustice more regularly in the workshop, or by having the individual participants grapple with them soon after the SIMSOC exercise –while the iron of discovery is hot, so to speak. Quite a few participants suggested that the SIMSOC could become much more central to the whole training, and that, in fact, the training could be built around the SIMSOC. They clearly saw it as one of the most powerful tools.
75. In addition, to address some of the real problems with “leadership” in Burundi, we strongly suggest considering the following modification: the day after the SIMSOC exercise, split the workshop participants up in four groups of 8 or so and take them out to visit a number of initiatives with Burundi's habitually excluded – small farmers, refugees, single women, etc. Make them use their active listening skills in this context –no discourses, no use of power and prestige. Link it up to SIMSOC and, in the afternoon, begin a planning exercise based on this field experience.

Is it possible to get to more concrete engagements?

76. There is a tension in the workshop between collective social action responsibility and the individual responsibility of leaders. People can hide too easily behind the state, the war, the aid system, poverty, and the things the BLTP can do for them. It seems to us that it is important that as part of a leadership training the “leaders” present begin to talk about their own individual and collective responsibility for leading. To this end, we suggest that people be encouraged at the workshop to take things one step further, by developing an initial basic work plan and set of aims in which they, individually and collectively, can/will make a difference. The Parliamentarians in the group, for example, could sit together to discuss if they wish to work together on convincing the highest political authorities to bring this training to the Bureau des Parties Politiques –

⁴ *Rebuilding Peace and State Capacity in War-Torn Burundi*, March 2004

the place where top negotiations take place. Trainers and professors could sit together and decide if there would be joint ways they want to adapt key tools in the curriculum to their needs. Each of these could count on being supported by the BLTP bureau, without the latter taking the lead or taking things over for them. Honesty obliges us to admit that there may simply not be enough time to do this during the initial workshop, and in that case, clearly, this is the priority for the first follow-up workshop.

When is it okay to deal with the sensitive issues?

77. The BLTP workshop, seeking to avoid creating inter-personal conflict and defensiveness, which would undermine the success of the workshop, tends to stay far away from any of the difficult issues. Strategically, it adopts an attitude of presumed and shared goodwill, acting as if the participants are motivated only by goodwill but thwarted by external problems. This approach works well as a facilitation tool because it decreases the tensions that would have otherwise prevailed (although the project does allow participants to bring these issues up, which they sometimes do). It also reflects a vision that “there is good in all people,” as more than one of the project staff told us on different occasions. Correct as both of these may be, they do not make participants’ past behavior go away, especially outside of the protective bubble of the workshop. Past actions will thus continue to constitute a major stumbling block towards the creation of trust, both between participants, and between them and others in society. It is important to realize this and to address as a team the question: at what times can sensitive issues be brought up? Can and should the BLTP use its credibility and its team of skilled facilitators to push the discussions into the more difficult areas of Burundi’s socio-political life?

78. Currently, the project seems to oscillate between a rather naive approach, in which it is believed that shared goodwill and better communication skills will make the world a better place and –especially when critiqued– a very ‘realistic’ approach that plays down expectations and situates all change within the long term. In many ways, this is logical: in this sort of project, one constantly needs to square the wheel of a sense of the weight of the past and yet a hope that things can change; a sense that many people have committed many small and large acts of evil and a sense that they also possess the qualities of all good people in them; etc. What is a problem, however, is that this situation –especially when combined with the absence of detailed programming and of an M&E system-- makes it very difficult to discuss their choices, for they usually do not face up to them squarely, moving constantly between either wild optimism and naïveté or by sudden burst of realism and long-term thinking. *The BLTP project is essentially at this point in time not susceptible to critique or debate: either one believes in it or one does not. Our evaluation suggests the project does have an impact – one that is worth the investment in it. However, it is necessary for the project to be more explicit, specific, and transparent on what it seeks, what it can do and cannot do, and make it self more legible to discussion by outsiders, by non-believers.*

79. We are not saying here, however, that the one-week workshops shall be filled with discussions of difficult personal and political matters, with recriminations of

people's past behavior, etc. Evidently, that would be a recipe for failure. There is a risk that even gentle pressure for honest discussion and concrete engagement may come too soon in the development of group dynamics. Will it lead to recriminations and conflicts within the group? Will people clamp up as they feel personally questioned or attacked? Will it, then, endanger the other aims of the workshop? The team is clearly, and understandably, concerned that these negative outcomes would indeed occur, and we respect that fear, but it is an issue we nonetheless wish to put on the table for further discussion. The participants themselves have almost unanimously requested that the BLTP address more directly the larger challenges facing Burundi, which they themselves are confronted with in their daily lives. It may be important to at least lay the groundwork for more concrete discussion and engagement in the initial workshop, even if more concrete decisions and actions will only come to life in the follow-up workshops.

How to deal with economic development?

80. *“Under this program, a core group of approximately one hundred Burundian leaders, drawn from diverse ethnic, social and institutional backgrounds, is receiving intensive training in a broad range of leadership skills required in the implementation of projects of economic recovery.”*⁵ This quote from the BLTP's most recent proposal makes too big of a jump from a very mild training in project development skills that participants have received, and a bit of general discussion they engaged in, to stating that they are being prepared to design and implement projects for economic recovery. We do not believe this to be the case (nor ought it to be a priority); we will discuss so in more detail in the next section on the follow-up workshops.
81. If the BLTP wants to continue promoting dynamics in the field of economics (generation of new ideas; creating of engagements; design of fundable projects, etc...) it needs more resources to do so. Currently, participants merely rehash old, general development strategies without critically analyzing how these actually fed into the conflict. Many Burundians know the development lingo backwards and forwards, and much of it remains based on regurgitating old ideas that did not create development in the past. Future development in Burundi will only work if things are done differently than they have been done in the past. Changes in behavior that would address the things that really prevent development from happening need to be identified. More time to discuss these matters would also help: during the workshop at which we assisted, there really was little opportunity to go further than platitudes.
82. It may be also useful to have a person on the facilitating team who is more specialized in development (and particularly Burundi's past development trajectory). This would create more of a push toward quality new ideas rather than just rehashing the old stuff. Such a person could needle the participants a bit, push them – respectfully, and in due time, of course– to go beyond platitudes and generalities, provide some extra data and concrete information to nudge the discussions along, etc. This is especially crucial if the BLTP were to engage more in development-related

⁵ July 2004 proposal for the next phase of BLTP.

workshops in the future. This need not be a foreigner: there certainly are Burundians who could play this role.

IV: BEYOND THE WORKSHOP – THE FOLLOW-UP, THE NETWORK, AND THE HOPED-FOR SUSTAINABLE CHANGE

83. In this section, we will discuss what happens *after* the workshops. We will progressively move further away from the project itself, starting first with the Ngozi network and the email discussion group, moving then to the development projects, which were originally designed as a major way of producing a lasting post-workshop impact, and then analyzing the impact of the participants on broader institutional change in Burundi. We will finish with an analysis of the way BLTP has managed to go beyond its initial aims, affecting other donors in Burundi and organizing new, targeted workshops with fresh outside funding.
84. A crucial and original aspect of the BLTP is the organization of follow-up workshops that seek to deepen the personal impacts of the initial workshops (both in terms of attitude change and skills improvement) and strengthen the network. The objective of the follow-up and the network is to increase the impact – to take it beyond the initial “aha-moment” achieved, for the most part, in the first workshop toward the next stages of reinforcing the impact on the participants, the participant’s environment, and national institutions. This second stage is where the greatest challenges of the project lie –but, to the extent this follow-up is successful, it is also *the* crucial and original contribution of the project.
85. In their March 2004 paper, the BLTP team clearly stated the importance of its follow-up process and allude to the risk of not doing it well: “*The “learning” of the Ngozi process – like all learning – must be reinforced – by further interaction, by further training, and by actual collaborative effort in addressing their common problems. Absent such reinforcement, the impact of their training will almost certainly dissipate with time.*” This section analyzes these follow-up workshops, the development projects that were initially designed as crucial tools for achieving the post-initial workshop impact, and the spin-off workshops.

Follow-up workshops

86. The BLTP has held eight follow-up workshops: three for Ngozi I only, two for Ngozi II only, two for Ngozi I and II together, and one for Ngozi III. The Ngozi I and II follow- workshops focused on development project design, proposal writing, negotiation, and mediation skills. Additionally, all of these workshops had the strengthening of relationships and of the network as either an implicit or explicit goal. The May 2004 joint Ngozi I and II combined workshop began to address the issue of activities other than projects that the groups could take forward. The Ngozi III follow-up workshop in June 2004 followed this trend, partially in response to the initial findings of this evaluation, and focused the discussion on the responses of the participants to three questions asked at the end of Ngozi III: how to develop the

competencies and capacities of the participants; reinforce the network; and increase the impact on institutions. As a result, this follow-up workshop focused much more on actions and activities other than projects.

Participation

87. The proportion of initial participants who attended the first follow-up workshop were very high in both cases (85% for Ngozi I; 77% for Ngozi II), testifying to the enthusiasm and sense of community created by the workshop. Attendance at subsequent follow-up workshops shows a consistent decline –to be expected, really, and not at all a sign of failure. The most recent attendance rates were 45% for Ngozi I (5th follow-up workshop for them, including the integrated ones with Ngozi II) and 54% for Ngozi II (3rd follow-up workshop). Note that these figures are relatively generous, as they include people who only came for a short time. There were certainly not 33 persons who participated throughout the two-day follow-up workshop we assisted at on May 18-19 –that figure is probably more likely half of the total– which is logical, one could say, for people with quite some responsibility.
88. Evidently, at some point, the decline must be stemmed lest participation reaches zero, but it seems likely that the remaining group is a pretty committed one –a group of people really interested in the BLTP vision and network, or, for some, in getting their projects funded. This includes a proportion –26% for Ngozi I and 45% for Ngozi II– who have been to *all* follow-up workshops. One may assume that this continued investment reflects a rather strong sense of commitment and interest on their part.
89. We spoke to five people from Ngozi I and II who did not attend any follow-up workshop. They did not attribute their lack of attendance to their disregard or indifference to the BLTP; indeed, they spoke equally positively about the project and the initial one-week workshop as did the others. They said that they would very much have liked to go, but that they were too busy and other priorities won out. If the follow-up workshops were more targeted toward their interests and shorter, they said, they would certainly do their best to attend. We share this recommendation: diversifying the range of follow-up activities offered by the BLTP and making them more directly relevant to ongoing dynamics in Burundi seems like a generally good option to pursue.

The network

90. The relationships and social capital built at the workshop are supposed to create the basis for a BLTP network. In its most recent concept paper, the BLTP said that “[t]he long-term objectives of the initiative are to build a cohesive, sustainable network of key leaders capable of working across the lines of ethnic and political division, leading the institutional transformation required for the country’s economic reconstruction, and helping to establish the conditions for a durable peace.” Building a cohesive, sustainable network of key leaders working across lines of ethnic and political division is an enormous challenge in itself, without the additional objective of having this network support institutional transformation, economic reconstruction, and durable peace. This is, unquestionably, a tall order.

91. The network should be more than simply people coming to the BLTP meetings: ideally, it lives on outside such formal meetings, as relationships are created that lead to some direct new output or action, joint program or initiative that is not supported or sponsored by the BLTP. There are cases that we heard of where exactly this happened. Many are social: people go dancing together or invite each other to major moments in their lives (marriage, birth, death in the family), a refugee moves back to Burundi, in part because of the BLTP, etc... A few were professional. One was the development of a visioning project, which does have potential to feed back into the BLTP. The other was a street children project, which is indirectly related in terms of the effects of the conflict. Most of the other relationship-building that participants cited enabled them to get information when they needed it or to more openly interact and discuss with other workshop participants when they met them. In some cases, BLTP participants, who would not have previously met informally before, arranged meetings and discussions outside of the workshop or follow-up groups; but this was the exception rather than the norm.
92. On the other hand, there is also a lot of “non-network” behavior. Someone in the follow-up workshop we observed complained bitterly that two ex-participants lived in her street (one a close neighbor) and had never visited or even greeted her. Other people similarly told us that they maintained personal relations with only a few of the other workshop participants. This makes sense: none of us change our social relations easily or rapidly, even after a successful workshop.
93. Note that the first follow-up meeting of Ngozi III, which just took place in July 2004, outlined many more actions and approaches that could help to strengthen the network. Implementing some of these could be an important step towards new ways of strengthening the network and increasing its impact.

Email discussion group

94. The email discussion group proves the existence of a loose network and provides an example of the rapport that developed among the Ngozi I and II participants. After Ngozi II, one of the participants, a refugee living in Belgium, created a web-based discussion group for the participants of both Ngozi I and II. Between October 23, 2003 and June 3, 2004, 169 messages were exchanged. The rhythm was sustained, and new entrants were added all the time --as recently as June 2004. There have been a total of 28 people participating (about 40% of the Ngozi I and II participants) – a very nice proportion in a country where, of course, many people do not have email access at all.
95. Three of the people produced more than 20 messages (23, 22, 20; one of these was the website creator); two were above 10 (16, 12); 6 had 1 message --of the latter, maybe two have been lost (two early contributors who never did so again). The other 17 participants had between 2 and 8 messages. Six of the participants were the BLTP team members, accounting for 30 messages --a nice enough quantity (almost 20%), but still not at all enough to say that they dominated the groups or mastered it. Indeed, they were never the initiators of the threads, some of which were more than 10

messages long. In other words, all the issues that were discussed at some length came on the initiative of the Ngozi participants themselves.

96. The atmosphere is rather mutually supportive and warm, with lots of respect, kindness, mutual help, mutual congratulations, and commiseration. This seems truly a community that feels strongly about itself. Some of it is touching, like after the arrest of one of the participants, when they try to get to sit together (for all the parties involved had someone at Ngozi II) and use the 7-elements to work it out. We do not know if they actually did it, but they did talk about doing it –which is already quite something. Similarly, recently, a relatively inflammatory posting occurred, using the typical innuendo language and reference to ethnic clichés so familiar to anyone who follows the Great Lakes region. However, within a few hours, both the parties had backed off, explicitly countering the escalation that could have taken place. The issue was not brought up or commented on the discussion list anymore. The discussion group, in short, seems to testify to the strength of the network and its impact on the way the people within it behave.

The impact beyond the workshops

97. We have seen that the initial workshops had a major impact on the participants, and that the follow-up activities try to maintain and deepen this impact; we also suggested ways in which both of these can be done better. Things become harder when it comes to judging the broader impact of the workshops, the impact beyond the individuals who participated.

Type of change promoted	Indicators	Sources of information	Problems
1. Personal change between participants themselves	Openness of speech, spontaneity, inter-personal behaviors	Observation during workshops Self-declaration Participation in network	All have an interest to see positive change May have other incentives (\$, access); not very objective
2. Personal change between participants and their immediate environment	Openness of speech, spontaneity, inter-personal behaviors	Self-declaration Third party observations	May have other incentives (\$, access); not very objective selection problem; attribution
3. Impact of participants on their immediate institutions	Positions taken in parties, militaries, etc. New initiatives undertaken and bridges built Breakthroughs in previously unresolved conflicts	Self-declaration Third party observations New actions and dynamics	Idem
4. Impact on national transitional institutions	Successful changes resulting from the above	98. Political change	Many intervening variables; time horizon unclear
5. Impact on post-transition polices and institutions	Emergence of new ideas, people, organizations dealing with this	Self-declaration Third party observations New actions and dynamics, documents,	Even further down the line, in the future

Impact on the participants' environment

99. There exists anecdotal evidence that some participants of the Ngozi I and II workshops have taken some of the new insights home with them, beginning to apply them in their personal and professional environments. There are a number of instances mentioned where people have used some of the tools taught in the initial or follow-up workshops in professional spheres – foremost by teachers and professional trainers, sometimes in general workplace management, and a few times in real negotiations (with the officers from the EMGI acting as the ideal example here). Most referred to are the tools to list different parties' interests, which really help to understand the situation (but not necessarily to solve it); the active listening tools (used by teachers in schools, by managers of workplaces); the 7-Element framework and the win-win approach, the 4-quadrant tool... Note that, with the exception of the EMGI, these are all self-reported cases, of which no independent confirmation exists, nor any serious analysis of impact (did the use of these tools make a difference?) Similarly, people regularly mention using the tools and the overall approach at home or in the family. These too are cases of self-reporting by those who did the effort to come to follow-up workshops. Still, all in all, there are a large number of instances known to the project staff (see annex for a list prepared by the project team).

100. This is based on self-reporting, and thus admittedly flawed as evidence. On the positive side, people did not *have* to come to the follow-up workshops and tell Howard Wolpe and the other participants sometimes very private stories about the way they tried to follow up on the workshop: if they really did not care, they didn't need to come. On the other hand, there is the case of the per diem –making 15,000 extra francs a day for some of them is a nice salary supplement; in addition, no third party observers have been able to document a case of serious professional change they attributed to the project (or, for that matter, of any serious professional change in these people: the overwhelming consensus was that they behaved the same as before). Also generally unknown are *trends*: do participants use the tools they learned more or less as time goes by? Are later workshops more effective at producing this sort of change? Have others in the immediate environment of the participants imitated the latter's approach or adopted similar tools?

101. This absence of objective and clear indications of impact is a common occurrence with projects of this kind: it does not tell us that the project is without impact, but rather that no amazingly rapid cases of larger-than-individual impacts have been detected by us, as could be expected: the sort of change promoted here is the stuff of years, not weeks, and the methodological problems of measuring and attributing impact are enormous. That said, in a section below we will suggest some ways that the BLTP can –and should- improve its monitoring capacity. Some of this is linked to having clearer intermediary objectives, as discussed above already. Also, the actual follow-up workshops could be used to engage in much more critical discussion with participants about their use of the knowledge and skills acquired from the BLTP: now, the dynamic is biased towards brief feel-good stories, which the BLTP team soaks up,

rather than towards realistic and critical (but respectful) discussion of constraints and opportunities.

The initial focus on development projects

102. The BLTP has increasingly privileged the building of confidence, trust, a network of committed individuals, a broad range of activities in support of the transition, and targeted intervention in security sector reform rather than economic policy-making or development projects. We strongly support this choice. It is justified by two main factors: first, that the choice of development projects as a product of the BLTP workshops has shown itself not to be a good strategic choice; and second that the general context of Burundi requires attention to the current transition before all else. If successful (in combination with other policies) in advancing the current transition, the BLTP may well have a crucial impact on future economic policymaking in Burundi; in addition, there are some interesting ideas floating around on how to apply the BLTP approach targeted on economic sectors such as agriculture –these may be pursued in the future. However, looking back at its first year, we believe the choice made by the BLTP to favor influencing the transition was the right choice.

Purpose

103. Development projects were very much put in the spotlight initially, in the way that the project was pitched to/by the World Bank, the way it was presented to potential participants, and in the focus of the workshop exercises and the follow-up workshops. The idea of favoring the creation of development projects had four aims:

- the prime aim was as a tool for maintaining the changes unlocked at the workshop, by creating a way for people to work on a tangible product;
- projects could also act as a mechanism for producing a broader impact of the BLTP project: if a diversified group of people with fresh attitudes and new leadership skills work together to create development projects, that may have an important “demonstration effect,” to use the words of Fabien Nsengimana;
- the projects provide the potential for some personal monetary gain and prestige for their key promoters, who could act as consultants to, or directors of, the project. This objective is not officially one of the BLTP; it was mentioned, however, both by a senior member of the BLTP project team and by a number of the workshop participants. Let’s face it, in a country where economic insecurity reigns and the incomes of many of these people are small, this personal incentive is a realistic way to cement continued involvement, and
- to a much lesser extent, the projects could act as a small way to make a difference in Burundi’s poverty.

Results

104. It seems to us that the projects are not achieving any of these aims. We see six specific disadvantages of the project approach:

- Projects engage only a few people. The further a project goes, the more, by definition, only a few people can be involved in the process because of the enormous amount of energy and time it takes to actually produce a fundable project document can simply not be spread out over a large number. The only project that has advanced far enough to be proposed to a donor, for example, started as the product of one of the four working groups at Ngozi I, was then discussed in general terms at a follow-up meeting, but then became really the project of four people of whom two did the actual work. This reduction in numbers is basically unavoidable.
- There is little chance of the projects actually getting funded, for it is extremely hard to get money out of donors because:
 - there is little non-humanitarian money out there;
 - they are not necessarily brilliant new proposals; and
 - there is a fear among many donors that the projects may be vehicles designed for political or personal reasons rather than quality projects for which there is a deep felt need in Burundi.
- It creates frustration among participants. Why raise expectations and set an aim that is so likely to fail and so likely to involve only so few? While the BLTP team never guaranteed that all projects would be funded, given the fact that the BLTP is supported by the World Bank, many participants assumed that the projects that they developed would be funded by the Bank as well. “Why would you ask us to plan for Burundi’s future if you will not give us money to implement those plans?” demanded more than one participant. In general, our interviews indicated that the level of frustration was the highest among the Ngozi-I members, and we believe this is due to the failure of the development project promise.
- It takes too much of the BLTP staff time to sell the projects.
- It runs counter to the selection of the participants. If most of the participants were selected on the basis of their potential institutional impact on Burundi’s transitional dynamics, does producing results outside of their particular institution through projects make any sense? Shouldn’t people rather be encouraged to develop activities and changes within their institutions where they possess influence and impact?
- Many of the projects do not seem particularly inspired by the “BLTP spirit.” General ideas about how great it would be if all farmers adopted 100\$ solar ovens that take four times as long to cook one little pot, which they would get in return for planting 50 trees, have been around –and devoid of success—in Burundi for decades, and hardly required the BLTP to develop. One participant suggested that there should be criteria for projects, such as who was involved and what they were trying to communicate, etc... that would at least ensure that they transmit some of the messages of tolerance, communication, reconciliation, and cooperation that the BLTP training is trying to get across. One project does have some elements of participation in it (the use of DELTA methodology, amply used by Christian

NGOs in the country since 20 years or so), but that does not turn it into an inspiration, symbol, instance, or impact-multiple of the BLTP approach. It just may make it a more or less decent project. The only project, it seems to us, that may act as a living instance of the BLTP spirit is the fishery project involving a Twa, a famous FAB colonel, and a returned CNDD/FDD officer – but this one has not come close to being proposed to a donor yet, nor is it sure that its actual content is very original. At this point, then, only the OTI project, which was partially developed by the trainers themselves and does not involve any of the workshop participants, has really embodied the qualities of the BLTP training and is designed to pass those qualities onto others.

Spin-offs: the example of the OTI project

105. Indeed, the prime project that has indirectly grown out of the BLTP is a major decentralized leadership training project managed by OTI, with the WWC in the role of technical assistance (training) provider. It is not a project of the BLTP participants, but it is, however, extremely close in content to the ideas developed by one of the Ngozi I project follow-up teams. Oddly enough, this success – *for the OTI project is on its own terms an extremely interesting and promising project, and the BLTP approach clearly influenced it deeply*--has become a major diplomatic embarrassment for the BLTP –one of the few mistakes the BLTP has made in its existence, it seems to us. The problems are:

- BLTP participants feel they were not informed and consulted
- Even worse: some BLTP participants feel that their idea was stolen. If one reads the report of the 2nd follow-up workshop, for example, one can see there the full embryo of the OTI project, developed by the “internal capacity-building” group. – they were not even consulted or told that it was happening. One participant said that all that the BLTP team had to do to make up for this was to sit down with the “internal capacity-building” group and apologize to them and explain the full story.
- Some people wanted actual roles in this: they need the money, the influence the prestige, and resent that it escapes them
- The foreign youngsters who came to present the project to the Ngozi I-II follow-up workshop offended the BLTP participants—one more case of foreigners running away with local ideas and doing well from it. This is not these young people’s fault: they were enthusiastic, kind, and from all we heard competent people. Rather, it is the problem of those who organized the project in such a way as to hire foreigners rather than locals, and those who asked those foreigners to come and present it that day.

106. To be fair: it is possible or even likely that some of the people who were angry about the OTI project failed in some degree of self-criticism: how much had they themselves done to take their own project idea forwards? How unique was their project idea really? Doesn’t it make sense that someone else ran with it and implemented it? Still, it seems to us that it is bad form to expose a heavily funded

donor project in front of a whole group of people who are struggling, and being encouraged by the team to do so, to develop their own projects, and who are financially insecure to boot. If the spirit of the BLTP is cooperation, collaboration, and linkages, then it is counterproductive and contradictory to present a project funded by a big donor without looking at how the project might link in with the capacities of the people in the room. Even if the “internal capacity-building” group hadn’t already come up with a very similar idea, this was bad form and people would most likely still have been offended that they were not included or asked to be included in any way. In fact, there is lots of room for potential collaboration, if only in an advisory sense, with the BLTP participants, collaboration that would strengthen the quality and support for the OTI project, and thus hopefully increase its impact.

Spin-offs: the example of the EMGI Training

107. To clarify the impact that the BLTP can have on an institution, it is important to look at the different impact of the training of the EMGI and the earlier training of the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC). Indeed, an un-planned type of follow-up that has grown out of the BLTP project consist of three targeted workshops, funded by outside donors (DfID and the EC mostly) and targeted at military institutions. These workshops perfectly represent what we said earlier about the “conjunctural response capacity” of the BLTP: they are brand-new initiatives, responding to opportunities and demands that were not initially predicted, flexibly designed (workshop content specifically adapted to the new aims), rapidly designed and implemented (thus capable of responding to a demand while the need is still felt), innovative (targeted at specific institutions rather than a cross-section of Burundian society), and, it seems, of great future interest.
108. The most important case to discuss is the success of the training of the Etat-Majeur Général Intégré in Gitega in May 2004 –one of the three targeted workshops. There is unanimity among participants and observers that the recent breakthrough on one of the questions that deadlocked it for months –the question of the “statut du combattant”– is the direct result of the BLTP training they received. In terms of the table above, this is because in cases where the initial workshops manage to train a large proportion of the leadership of an institution, the inter-personal impact immediately becomes the institutional impact. It is clear that this is a highly efficient way to produce rapid results, and it is considered by the BLTP team as one of the main ways to proceed in the future.
109. Note, however, that the JCC, which received the same BLTP training, is completely deadlocked in its negotiations and is unlikely to find its way out because of too many adverse incentives (from high salaries to instructions not to negotiate). The relationship and confidence building that resulted from the BLTP training with the JCC (evaluated by the participants as equally successful as the other workshops) could not surpass these major institutional and political barriers. On the other hand, in the EMGI, the incentives are pushing more in the direction of agreement, laying the ground for a much easier breakthrough following the BLTP Gitega workshop. EMGI participants said that the softening of the rapport between the members of the EMGI,

and the fact that they saw that the other side understood their problems, meant that they were able to come back together and talk more openly and calmly about the polemic issues they were dealing with. It also helped to give them the confidence that they could, in fact, try to address the three contentious issues and not just pass them off to their superiors. In the JCC, on the other hand, the relationships might have improved, but there was no real opportunity for them to use the improved relationship or confidence to get to some kind of resolution. Thus, part of the conclusion is that the degree of impact of the targeted BLTP workshops depends on the degree to which the institutions it works with can absorb that impact.

110. It is important to explicitly mention here that the three non-Ngozi workshops have all been funded by other donors, most notably DfID and the EU. Combined with the fact that USAID has funded the local BLTP office, this demonstrates that the project has been both of sufficient interest to a number of other player in the international community (as well as in Burundian society) to engage them too; in addition, it demonstrates that the BLTP team has been proactive and efficient at seeking wider buy-in and support. The team, has generally done an excellent job at keeping all parties informed by sending regular project reports as well as directly briefing agency representatives in Bujumbura and elsewhere. This is necessary: even with this outreach and communication effort, misunderstandings have at times arisen – which is dangerous to a project like the BLTP, which needs to be transparent and trusted by all national and international actors.

Recommendations to improve the impact beyond the workshop

111. During the first phase of the BLTP (March 2003 – June 2004), the impact beyond the workshop was demonstrated at the individual level through varying degrees of attitude change (and participant’s enthusiasm and empowerment that accompanied it), the improved negotiation, mediation, and project planning skills of many participants, and the relationships built or strengthened among different participants. The follow-up activities helped to support and reinforce the impacts listed above. The EMGI training has had the only visible institutional impact. The BLTP team has worked hard to learn from this phase and from the recommendations of this evaluation. It has taken advantage of new windows of opportunity in the evolving transitional process, particularly within the security reform sector, with its usual high degree of political sensitivity. It is our opinion that the BLTP’s second phase will require a different type of programming and targeting of activities. This will require the BLTP to drop the development project focus (as it already has for the most part), articulate a clear vision of how to get from the current stage to the BLTP’s overall objectives, reformulate what follow-up means for the BLTP “network,” and carefully target new initiatives toward institutions and groups that can easily absorb and use the BLTP’s potential impact.

Move away from focus on development projects

112. As the analysis above clearly indicates, the focus on development projects is not the way to proceed toward greater impact on individuals, their environments, or their institutions. We therefore strongly recommend the project focus be dropped from a

future BLTP project – except if the aims, and selection criteria, of the BLTP were to change significantly. This is also the conclusion the BLTP team itself has come to. After Ngozi I the focus on projects was seriously decreased, and by Ngozi III, at which we assisted, there was nothing left of it. In addition, the three workshops targeted at the military also had not focused on development projects whatsoever.

113. Instead of development projects, the follow-up process needs to present a much wider and more flexible range of “activities,” targeted at different audiences. Some people come to the follow-up meetings for projects, some for the relationships, some for the skills training, some for the hope that things will move forward. Some have a lot of free time, and others not; some live in Bujumbura and others not. It makes sense for the BLTP follow-up process to adapt itself to these different constraints and aims. We give some ideas about how to do this in the section below on reinforcing the network.

Communicate a clearer vision and the steps to get from here to there

114. We believe that the BLTP should have a more proactive vision – something it stands for that goes beyond the process of simply helping to improve relationships between people and includes some specific, clearly articulated, intermediary aims that relate to the notion of leadership in a country that is extremely divided (along ethnic-regional-political as well as socio-economic lines). This would allow the BLTP team to take the lead in organizing events and processes that push the envelope a bit, supporting those participants that are ready for taking the next step, linking up to third players, as well and engaging in national debates. This does not need to be a narrowly political debate, where people have to take positions in the current political conflicts, but can be a vision/consensus building dynamic.
115. The response from WWIC to this statement in the draft of this evaluation was: *“Our vision is to get the Burundians to be able to work together more effectively in advancing the country’s economic reconstruction. Ultimately, a sustainable peace in Burundi will be possible only if the underlying structural issues that have given rise to the conflict are addressed. But this requires, first, that Burundian leaders move away from “blame-throwing” to a joint search for sustainable solutions. The training they are receiving is but the first step in this process; the “end-game” of course must be institutional transformation.”* We agree with this. What we do suggest, however, is that it is now time to move on with the Ngozi I-III participants (as well as the people from the other workshops) and take the next steps.
116. As it stands, there are no clearly articulated intermediary steps between the initial workshops and joint efforts for economic reconstruction, nor are there steps between this and the very big, ultimate goal, of the promotion of sustainable institutions of peace in Burundi. As indicated by us and by the project team, the three Ngozi workshops and their follow-up meetings are just the first steps in the process. The project is now entering its second phase, and clear thought needs to go into articulating intermediate goals and targets, combined with indicators and a more effective

monitoring system. This will involve pushing the envelope of the typical dialogue or training project, but as we have said, this is not a typical project.

117. We are not talking here about significant pressure, which would produce only fake and unsustainable results at best (and major resistance and anger at worst), but rather that the BLTP develops a sense of vision, of where it wants to go, and creates a set of incentives and encouragements to bring people there. This will have to be accompanied by the willingness to be flexible in terms of the number of people involved, the nature of the aims, etc... Without taking the risk to guide the process and to address some of the “real” issues in Burundi (or to create a safe space in which the participants can address these issues on their own) the BLTP risks lowering its aims and missing out on opportunities, in tandem with the participants.
118. The people present at Ngozi I, II, and III may not be the ones who can develop joint efforts for economic reconstruction, or even those who determine Burundi’s trajectory towards institutional transformation and sustainable peace. Some of them may help to contribute to these goals at some point in their lives, but it will certainly not be all of them, nor does it make sense that this group will be able to accomplish these objectives together. Many of them told us themselves that they did not have the power, leverage, or even incentive to make a serious impact at the present time in any of the areas listed above. But, this may well be a group of people who can help to keep the transition, and the country, from falling apart. They have tentacles in all institutions in the country. They constitute a network that shares, more than any other group of such political and social diversity, a sense of trust and openness to mutual discussion. They can be taken further and have a growing impact on a personal, professional, and institutional level. Easy this is not, but as it stands, the BLTP has not clearly articulated any vision on how to try to move in that direction. Nonetheless, this is what many participants and observers told us that the BLTP may in fact be capable of doing. If the BLTP wants to maintain the buy in of its participants, observers, and donors it needs to be clearer about its vision and how it plans to get from here to there.
119. Additionally, the BLTP methodology may be able to help build consensus and trust among people within particular institutions that are trying to make difficult decisions together. The EMGI training is a perfect example of this, and the BLTP team is planning to build on this model in its second phase through institutionally-targeted workshops. These types of workshops will need specialized staff and a revised training module. We discuss these options in more detail in the next section of this report.

Sustain and reinforce the network and bring it closer to the Burundian reality

120. The follow-up workshops have been a crucial mechanism by which the BLTP has sought to maintain and deepen the impacts of the initial workshops. By all accounts, this originality is important and needs to be maintained. Even if no more Ngozi-type workshops are organized, it is important to maintain the investments that were made in the first three workshops. In addition, it may well be possible and desirable to

integrate the participants from the three non-Ngozi workshops into the follow-up dynamics.

121. The challenge of the next phase of follow-up with the network is that the BLTP will not be able to rely on the initial “aha-moment!” that was brought about by the introduction of new tools and approaches to a group of people unused to experiencing them together. It will also not be able to depend on people’s enthusiasm around development projects, which has been shown to deliver few results. The BLTP will therefore have to develop a new way of working with the network and new types of activities. All three Ngozi workshops have already begun to brainstorm about possibilities, and Ngozi I and II participants, who had seriously begun to wonder where the BLTP was taking them, have enthusiastically requested this type of “renaissance.”
122. This network “renaissance” requires a different kind of programming. It requires activities that help to consolidate the gains of the initial workshops and encourage the “leaders” to support one another and hold themselves and each other responsible for leading Burundi into its future. Evidently, the constraints to these types of actions cannot be ignored, and have been amply outlined in this report. The second stage, then, must be developed and implemented with the full understanding and acknowledgement of these challenges –it cannot just live of hope and good intentions. The hopeful language used by the BLTP team helps to keep the energy of the project moving forward is very important in a country where discouragement is rampant. But, this hope must also be accompanied by carefully thought out and strategic activities and programs that help the “leaders” push themselves forward, and build consensus among themselves as they attempt to negotiate a very difficult peace.
123. Thus far, the BLTP team has taken the approach that the Ngozi I-III participants have to decide what the network should be. The BLTP team basically organized some events with some more training, to some extent based on demand from members, but it did not seem to have much vision or momentum of its own. Admittedly, it is very important to back off, to not force people (it will not work in any case), to do things in their place, or to use enormous carrots to create unsustainable results. In short, we agree that the Burundian participants are the ones who have to be in the lead and who need to have ownership of the network. Yet, no network will function without a driving force or a vision of where it wants to go. We believe that the BLTP team has to continue to be the driving force for the network, at the same time as it does as much as possible to ensure the buy-in of the participants (for example, through greater transparency about the BLTP vision, agenda, and future planning). We believe that this will continue to require quite a bit of effort on the behalf of the BLTP team. Participants agreed that they needed the BLTP to move the process forward. So, the team may wish to discuss how it can create some incentives, some gentle pressures, for progress in a specific direction.
124. There also needs to be clear communication between the BLTP team and the participants so that expectations and vision can be clarified. Everyone has a different

idea, and eventually people do want to implement their ideas, so the BLTP has to be clear about how it can help this to happen, or not. The participants need to know what they can expect and what they can't, and what the vision is that they are all working toward.

125. A few suggestions, many of which the BLTP team currently wants to adopt, for the next phase of the network are listed below. In general, we suggest a broadening of the range of options, including general visioning and discussion, resolution of specific dilemmas or conflicts, public or private discussion of current issues, redoing the SIMSOC in a more in-depth and Burundi-specific manner, the organization of purely social activities, visits to the field, discussions with other organizations in Burundi. We also generally recommend that the type of follow-up workshops be diversified with some being 2 days long and others half a day or less; some addressed to all Ngozi I-III participants (and even the non-Ngozi ones as well) and some to specific sub-groups with more specialized interests and aims.

- Provide a relatively comfortable informal environment for a diverse group of leaders to discuss complex issues among a diverse group of leaders (ideally, the BLTP network can provide a place for reverse socialization –to counteract the balkanization that continues to exist between all groups). These meetings should be organized regularly with a frequency and time and place fixed in advance.
- Provide training in relevant areas (Ngozi III requested the following kinds of training: trust/confidence building, integrated solutions to conflict, entrepreneurial skills, continued applied negotiation/mediation/communication training, diversity training, and techniques to stop the spread of rumors. All of these are complex techniques, which the BLTP team has not yet shown to have in its bag of tricks, and which will have to be carefully adapted to the Burundian context in order to be successful.).
- bringing the network together regularly for informal, and hopefully open, discussion without the presence of foreigners; discussions could deal with
- leadership in Burundi and its benefits and responsibilities;
- what a vision of the future in Burundi might look like and some of the challenges that might be faced in getting there (although many doubt that this group could come up with a common vision, most believe that the discussion itself is important);
- possibly bringing in some technical expertise around some of the Burundi's most urgent problems (i.e., elections, DDR, structural adjustment, etc...); and
- helping the network to make the connection between “leaders” and the people that they are supposed to represent by applying the skills that they have learned to communication with the “people”, etc...
- Provide technical support, and a forum for collaboration, for those participants trying to apply BLTP-type tools to their own institutions and their own work;

- Support connections between the BLTP participants and other projects (OTI, RPP, OAG, etc...).
- Morph into a WSP type project, such as the “Institut de Recherche et de Dialogue pour la Paix” in Rwanda, or link with such a project when it comes around?
- Organize visits to the innovative projects of some of the members, using the spirit of the BLTP workshop, i.e., going in not as big shots who come down for a one hour photo op, but as citizens who wish to listen and speak frankly and respectfully (essentially the same sort of idea as we suggested for the core workshop as well).
- Organize follow-up activities that seek to spread the word: joint testimonies on radio, in churches, or schools, for example.
- Divide the BLTP network into groups belonging to the same type of institution. Have each group brainstorm around ways that they could disseminate what they have learned in BLTP in their institution, either by the training approach or by focusing on “hot topics” but by employing the tools and approaches of the BLTP to make the discussions, and hopefully the solutions, more productive.

V. SCALING UP IMPACT: THINKING THROUGH THE ALTERNATIVES

126. During its next phase, the BLTP is challenged to scale up beyond the individual and relational impact on the participants to their immediate and wider environment and institutions. Below, we outline different options to do this, all of which could in fact take place simultaneously and be mutually reinforcing. The BLTP’s current concept paper is already in line with many of the suggestions below, and we support these overall strategic options.

127. *Do more of the same.* Many people suggested that a way to increase the impact of the BLTP was to simply do more of it by training more people --that way you won’t have to deal with the problem of taking it beyond the institutional impact. Build a critical mass of “converted” people, they suggest, who can work together in new ways and make a difference in the negotiations that take place inside and between their organizations. While this is not a bad idea in theory, it is expensive and would not necessarily ensure a much greater impact of the project. It is also clear that the BLTP team itself has no intention of just doing “more of the same” and has already adopted a more targeted approach.

128. *Go higher up.* The BLTP team says that its objective during its first phase was to reach the highest leaders possible –the people with the real power. From what the team told us, there was a definite increase in the level of power held by the participants from Ngozi I to III. Yet, the real top is not being directly reached yet: promises notwithstanding, they tend to back out at the last minute, for a variety of understandable and less clear reasons. Many of the people we interviewed believed

that if one could just reach the “real” power-holders of Burundi (the range being between 5 and 20), one could make a major impact in this hierarchical society.

129. The current concept paper of the BLTP’s next phase shows that the team is interested in pursuing this option if the opportunity presents itself. It proposes a “key players” mini workshop, which would be shortened and held in Bujumbura to accommodate the busy schedules of these “key players”. We believe that this should be seen as the final stage in Phase I of the project, which intended to build relationships between the current political and military leadership and increase their capacity to negotiate with one another for their common interest. The challenge of this workshop is that the level of participants sought may perceive it as a parallel negotiation process; they may have too many political incentives not to participate or engage in more open discussion; and they may be unwilling to undergo the “humbling” or power “equalizing” process that the BLTP takes its participants through because the stakes may seem too high or their ego’s do not allow them. But if one considers it important to try –as many did in our conversations– the following things may help the team to get a bit closer:

- continued communication with the top, as has been excellently done
- Howard Wolpe needs to continue taking the lead
- dropping the training aspect (both in appellation and in content), but maintaining the SIMSOC as well as the attention to communication
- using more secrecy, less visibility
- integration into another, high-level, retreat/activity

130. It would of course be extremely important –even more so than usual– to ensure that such initiatives be coordinated with what the other players in the transition are doing: ONUB (Organization des Nations Unies au Burundi), South Africa, the major donors, etc... If not, the risk that the various initiatives short-circuit and cancel out each other is enormous.

131. *Build on the investment in the initial “Group of 95” and create coherence.* The 95 leaders that were trained in the three Ngozi workshops represent the initial investment of the BLTP, and thus part of its capital. This group has access to a wide variety of Burundian institutions, although they say that they cannot make much an impact on these institutions alone. Some of the participants are themselves trainers or teachers and have the capacity, and many have shown the desire, to integrate the BLTP approach and tools into their own work. There is also the risk that with the next more targeted phase of the BLTP, linkages will not be made between new activities and the capacity of the original 95. The OTI project is a perfect example of this possible lack of coherence and the disenchantment that can be created among the network as a result. Thus, a few ways that the BLTP team could work with the group of 95 toward more coherence are as follows.

132. Help participants to develop strategies to apply the BLTP approach or tools to their own institutions. One possibility, already mentioned, is to support the 10 BLTP parliamentarians in finding ways to bring the BLTP to their institution.
133. Support participants who are trainers or do radio programs to develop a curriculum to integrate the BLTP tools/approach into their work. This could also apply to those who have radio programs and seek to translate the communication tools and role-plays to a format suitable for radio. Many participants have already done this on their own, but have said that additional support and more complete documentation would be helpful.
134. Train participants to be BLTP trainers, which has already begun to take place, or help to train those who wish to be much more skilled negotiators or mediators so that they can themselves help to resolve the conflict.
135. Make a linkage between the new, targeted workshops and the capacities of the already trained members who may already be part of these institutions. Maintaining the buy-in and support of the original group for the next phase is important for the reputation and increased impact of the BLTP, and the investment made in this original group. For example, any new security sector BLTP programs should make sure to seek the buy in of the military that have already been trained (Nairobi, Bujumbura, and Gitega workshops).
136. Support the BLTP members in targeting the next generation of leaders. As discussed earlier, the current BLTP team is primarily made up of the current crop of leaders, many of whom will not be in positions of leadership following the end of the transition outlined in Arusha. While the BLTP project itself does not seem to be going in the direction of training the youth or more civil society members, the BLTP network could do this, and already possesses the relations and framework necessary. Thus, this is another way that the BLTP participants who work with youth and civil society could begin to integrate the BLTP approach/tools into their own institutional or environment.
137. *Burundize the project – facilitation and training.* This contains two related but separate challenges: first, increasing the Burundian capacity to *manage* the project and devolving more power to them to *learn by doing*, and second, increasing the Burundians’ role in the delivery of *training* and technical assistance. Either of these can be done independently of the other, and they do pose different challenges; in the longer run, however, we believe that both ought to happen for a full “Burundization” of the project. We cover the management of the project in the next section.
138. We believe that a significant investment needs to be made in the training of some very high-quality Burundian trainers, who eventually should be as good as the current international team. If this option is accepted, the next phase is one in which training of trainers is crucial. One could imagine beginning this with some of the dynamic ex-participants. Burundians need to receive not only training, but also slowly be put into

positions of execution. Supported by the international team, and hence, through learning by doing and constant feedback, be prepared to take over at the end of the next phase. The recent training of trainers in Paris in July 2004 was a step in this direction, as is the idea of a training institute (although clearly much longer-term) outlined in the new concept paper. In addition, Eugene Nindorera played a much more active facilitation role in the Ngozi III follow-up workshop, which the participants were said to have greatly appreciated.

139. *Target specific institutions.* As discussed previously, in the next stage the project should target specific institutions. Rather than choosing a broad range of Burundian leaders (as was the initial project set-up and the practice of Ngozi I-III), the next phase should probably work more with specific institutions facing specific problems in the transition, and target their decision-making structures/leadership, so as to create rapid impact.

140. The EMGI training is an example of this approach. One important lesson learned with the EMGI training, however, was that the fact that it helped to lead to a breakthrough on the “status of combatants” issue was in large part due to incentives that existed among the EMGI participants to come to an agreement: the BLTP increased their negotiation and communication capacity so that an agreement could more easily be reached, but it could only contribute to success because a number of contextual variables (not controlled by the BLTP) were favorable to it. The important lesson learned here is that the most direct impact will be observed with institutions and decision-making mechanisms that are faced with issues that they need to resolve, and have incentives to do so. This is clearly not the case with every institution in Burundi, and the BLTP team should evaluate this institutional “ripeness” when choosing which institutions to target. The effective application of the BLTP approach to targeted institutions will also require that the BLTP adapt and change its six-day workshop:

- overhaul the workshop content, particularly the second half that focuses on planning and problem solving. The crucial pieces to keep are the communication/negotiation techniques and the SIMSOC, which can then be followed by problem-solving, planning, or technical discussions geared toward the specific institution and the specific issue at hand;
- link the workshop up to immediate follow-up processes (planning, negotiation, decision-making, joint analysis, etc...) within the particular institution that the participants are directly involved in, providing them both with a motive to participate and a dynamic to implement;
- make sure to have the technical expertise on the BLTP staff, or brought in (i.e., development person, planning person, security person, etc...); and
- there would likely be decreased involvement, if not total phasing out, of WWIC after initial start-up. WWIC would act as an incubator of such new initiatives, using training of trainers and technical advice, as is the case with the OTI project.

141. *Mainstream the project (generally)*. This option suggests that the BLTP should seek to influence a number of major players in Burundi to adopt its approach (having clearly defined what the core specificities of this approach are, and having adapted the rest to the particular needs of the new organizational environment) as part of their ongoing operations. One can see different possible actors here. Picking upon the widespread recommendation to train Burundi's youth in such an approach, the Ministry of Education may seem an evident partner. The World Bank is another evident one: an approach like this mainstreamed in its future programming could be extremely powerful in a post-conflict country like Burundi, where trust is scarce, dialogue difficult, fear prevalent. In addition, as suggested by the Army Chief of Staff, elements of the BLTP training could be integrated into the army training methodology to support the integration of the army and understanding among soldiers that were previously at war with one another (CNDD-FDD and the FAB). As said above, the BLTP approach used would have to be specifically adapted to the needs of the particular institution, which in the above-mentioned options goes from mainstreaming the approach into high-level planning to standard training methodologies.
142. The BLTP has adopted this strategy already in one major instance: its influence on OTI's programming for the next two years. As the case of the OTI also shows, the main risk with this strategy is of course the loss of control. If the organization makes wrong decisions, this will reflect badly on the credibility and reputation of the BLTP.
143. *Mainstream the project (within the World Bank)*. The World Bank seemed very open to, and almost excited about, the idea of mainstreaming the BLTP into its own programming. Discussions with World Bank staff revealed the options listed below, most of which would bring the project more into the economic policy-making realm it was originally set up to affect.
- Do a training with the World Bank Country Team to help them figure out how to improve their internal and external communication, analysis, and planning.
 - Target specific sectors in which the World Bank is active (cannot be done in combination with # 1 because of institutional rules, and would have to be done through consultancy contract with government):
 - Agricultural sector: Increase the leadership and planning capacity of agricultural extension agents. Work at the level of the Agricultural associations. Help to develop a process that supports their capacity to effectively use the matching grants that the World Bank will provide. This could be based on some of the work that OTI has done in adapting the BLTP methodology to the colline level, but would, of course, have to be specifically adapted to this purpose integrating agronomists, community development experts and World Bank programming staff. Makes most sense to spearhead at the level of one Province, where a dynamic and interested staff exists.
 - Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: Help the process, which is currently a bit stuck, to move forward and to develop a PRSP that is truly participatory and coordinated. Makes most sense to spearhead at the level of one or two Provinces,

where a dynamic and interested staff exists. If the Bank integrated such an approach, it could do so through its Learning Projects (or in collaboration with one of its research institutions), for this may potentially be a cutting-edge experience in post-conflict economic planning and PRSPs.

- Twitzembere (World Bank community reconstruction project): Work with community-based reconstruction project to actually help to integrate a reconciliation element into the program. At this point the project has assumed that putting different people together, and having them work together, will build reconciliation. But the BLTP tools push this process further and actually help to build relationships among different types of people – providing the cement - to help them work together better.
- Decentralization process: Work with the decentralization steering committee and other interested parties (those implicated horizontally and vertically) to help them to develop a responsive and hopefully effective decentralization strategy and plan. Learn from OTI here, and work with it.

Yet, the BLTP has to be very careful not to overstretch itself. As said above, it is the quality of the work done, and the preparation that goes in, that makes the BLTP good. Mainstreaming BLTP will require that the team go back to the drawing table and figure out what pieces of the training can be combined with the planning tools and processes of the specific organization that it is working with. Here we would recommend taking one project at a time, bringing in people with substantive programming experiences (both from within the specific institution and possibly from without), and taking the time to develop a new “curriculum” that is well thought through and designed to achieve the desired programmatic results.

144. *Apply the BLTP model to other countries.* The World Bank Post-Conflict Unit asked us to consider whether or not the BLTP model could be applied to other country programs. Our response is a qualified yes. The success of its application in other countries depends on staffing, timing, and receptivity.

- The staff. If they do not have the political clout and credibility in of Howard Wolpe and Eugene Nindorera in the specific country that they are operating; as well as a highly professional training team on the level of Liz McClintock and Alain Lempeurer, and a top-notch administrative and programmatic support staff to maintain the momentum beyond the workshops, then it will not work. As we said earlier, this cannot be done on the cheap, at least not initially. *The* key factor is the presence of two well-known, widely respected, experienced and committed leaders (see the next section for more discussion).
- The timing. Project like the BLTP need to be targeted toward times in a peace process when there are incentives for collaboration and people will find themselves around a table trying to figure out how to talk to and collaborate with one another. Many of the participants said that the BLTP would have been very useful prior to and during the Arusha peace negotiations because of the poor

negotiation and communication skills of the people around the table. While this may very well be true and should be considered as an option for other peace negotiations, the fact that people from groups in Burundi now find themselves in the same governmental structures trying to solve problems together has made people very receptive to the tools and approach used by the BLTP. There were times in Burundi's history where you would never have assembled such a diverse group and had such quick impacts on their behavior. International Alert started a dialogue group called the CAP (Compagnie des Apotres pour la Paix) in the mid-90s, which brought together a diverse group of Burundians to try to talk about the way toward peace. Yet, there was much more secrecy surrounding the CAP and it took much longer to achieve the results that the BLTP has achieved in a relatively short amount of time.

- The receptivity. Some claim that one of Burundi's advantages is that it is not very visible on the international scene. A group of Americans running a BLTP-like program in Iraq or Afghanistan would have a very different experience, and the project would most likely have a much narrower degree of success than we have seen in Burundi. Thus, one of the important aspects of BLTP that contributes to its success is that it has a degree of neutrality, and it has been able to bring this diverse group of people to the table without too much suspicion about ulterior motives (although there is always some talk). This is in great deal due to people who are running the BLTP, but also to the relationship between the countries that these people belong to and Burundi. This higher political context must be taken into consideration when deciding whether or not a BLTP-type program could be applied to other countries and contexts.

VI: THE BLTP TEAM: CONCEPTUALIZING AND SUPPORTING THE IMPACT

145. In this section, we address some cross-cutting management issues: how was the project identified? How costly is it, and what does that tell us about sustainability? How can the monitoring and evaluation be improved? And how did the Bank treat this project?

Project identification

146. As with any project, but especially one as sensitive and complicated as the BLTP, preparation is crucial. How one starts usually goes a long way to determining where one ends up. Errors made in the identification (people excluded, reputations acquired, expectations created, misdiagnoses of the problem, etc...) may never be rectifiable.

147. The BLTP was extremely well prepared. Seldom in our careers have we seen a project for which the preparation was so complete and thorough, the buy-in so widespread, and the understanding of the challenge so nuanced. The project has a strong sense of how its contributions relate to the ongoing dynamics and to other donors' activities. It is very politically savvy in informing and including all possible

parties, thus greatly helping its success. The BLTP team clearly made the preparation, and pre-project buy-in, a top priority. The importance of this pre-project preparation, and the continuous updates provided to interested parties (in person or by email) cannot be underestimated. Howard Wolpe and Eugene Nindorera's political clout and understanding of the complex dynamics in Burundi made this type of preparation possible. Their determination to exclude nobody and their capacity to achieve this are crucial for understanding the success and the very existence of the project.

Efficiency

148. The foreign cost of the BLTP is very high. The Burundian cost of the one-week workshops is somewhere in the \$30-50,000 range. The cost of the 2-day follow-up workshops is a bit, but not much, cheaper, as costs in Bujumbura are higher. Most of the cost of the local BLTP office is covered by the OTI grant at approximately \$70,000 per year. This means that all the rest consists of hundreds of thousands of dollars in administration fees, consultancy fees, and travel. Every category of the budget – including not only consultancy costs, but also operating expenditures and workshop expenditures– is primarily composed of the costs of the WWC team (Wolpe, McDonald, Rumeau) plus the two trainers (McClintock + Lempereur). Just moving them up and down is tremendously expensive: after nine months, the category “staff travel air” was already at approximately \$170,000 –more than the Burundian cost of all workshops combined until then.

149. Is the cost worth it? As we said earlier, we have no doubt that the project would not have been successful without Mr. Wolpe's leadership role; it is clear that this leadership could not be exercised without at least some staff to support him in DC. Similarly, the quality of the two trainers is very high as well: it is extremely unlikely that there is any person in Burundi with this level of training experience. In addition, all agreed that the presence of foreigners in leadership roles during the workshop is very useful to avoid typical Burundian dynamics of doubt, mistrust, fear, double entendre, etc... Given these observations, up until this point and in the immediate future the cost of the project cannot be decreased dramatically. There may be some margin for doing more of the management of the project in Burundi, both through the local BLTP staff (although current staff seems to be overstretched already) and through commercial accounting and audit companies. This may eventually reduce the costs of travel and salary of one of the WWIC employees, saving approximately \$100,000, which would still not make a fundamental difference. If one wants a top-quality team of players like Wolpe, Lempereur, McDonald, and McClintock involved, this is the cost. These people *are* the product, and they do not come cheap.

150. Note as well that the project team has managed its budget well, it seems: it has managed to organize a much larger number of workshops and follow-up workshops than initially predicted within the same budgetary envelope –and to raise significant additional funds. It uses its clout on the market of Ngozi well to get good services for a most reasonable amount of money, and in the person of Fabien Nsengimana it has a good local manager.

151. That said, for the longer term, change is clearly possible and necessary, and it needs to go beyond small savings here and there. If –and only if–the BLTP wishes to continue its work beyond the short-term (say another 12-18 months), it needs to begin working on its sustainability, which is, in its current set-up, very low. It may be the team decides that its presence is only required for the short term, as a punctual support to the transition process – not a long-term Burundian presence. In that case, a few more workshops targeted at crucial institutions (top-politicians, more security sector work, other opportunities as they arise) as well as some more work with the current Ngozi I-III group might be enough; afterwards, with a page in Burundi’s history turned, there is no more need for a BLTP. If this were accepted by the WWIC and the World Bank, then there would be no reason to go beyond a second phase or indeed to change anything about the current institutional set-up. If, however, the BLTP has ambitions for medium-term work in Burundi –and there seems to be a demand for just that – its current high cost undermines any attempt at longer-term sustainability.
152. We strongly believe that Howard Wolpe and Eugene Nindorera *both* need to remain involved, at least for the next phase (phase two). While Mr. Nindorera’s contribution to the project is absolutely essential, he cannot shoulder it alone, at least for the time being. The presence of Mr. Wolpe, with his international seal of approval and neutrality, remains necessary for now. Without senior outsider presence, the project may encounter more political obstacles: the local people clearly prefer it that way too. Similarly, rapid replacement of the foreign trainers (McClintock + Lempereur) by locals is not possible either: the quality of training (and thus of the impact) may diminish as less experienced trainers are put in charge too fast. Hence, for the short term, there is no major way of dramatically changing the institutional set-up or cost structure of the BLTP.
153. That said, during phase two, it seems important to train and empower Burundians as successors to the current externally dominated team. If there were to be a third phase, it is likely that its institutional set-up should be very different from the current one: one could imagine a much smaller, lighter, cheaper, and locally controlled organization –possibly a for-profit one. It is important to begin thinking strategically about how to work toward this now. Thus, by the end of phase two, the BLTP must be well on its way to being “Burundized.” This can essentially be done through either, or both, of two above discussed mechanisms: either by mainstreaming the approach into national or international institutions working in Burundi, by transforming the BLTP into a local consultancy company or NGO. Both of these possibilities are of major interest, and they do not necessarily exclude each other. A set of master trainers cum facilitators could establish itself as a for-profit company, providing training and advice and facilitation on demand to institutions in Burundi that seek to adopt the approach in their own work. It makes sense, we believe, to have an enterprise maintaining a BLTP standard approach, with a quality seal of approval, experienced trainers, and a partnership-type link with foreigners.
154. Concretely, the team may wish to discuss the following for the next phase.

- First, a training for trainers needs to be built centrally into phase two, including opportunities for learning by doing, as we discussed earlier. This has already been outlined, although not in detail, in the current concept paper.
 - The US office of the BLTP may consider transferring part of its work to the Burundian office. The salary (+ high travel costs) of one US person could fund a large number of competent local Burundian employees capable of doing much of the organizational work now done from the US out. Or it could fund contracts to Burundian management and audit corporations for technical assistance and audit. Apart from creating more jobs in Burundi, this would have as the advantages of preparing the local team for eventual full take-over of management functions, of getting a better sense of the true Burundian cost of an eventual local organization, etc.
 - This transfer of responsibility should be done gradually with a capacity building element. This should be integrated throughout the second phase of the project. The WWIC team has mastered the marketing, fundraising, and reporting of this project and this should be transferred to local staff
 - At the same time, external involvement might not be entirely phased out, even in a phase III. Much of this will depend on where Burundian politics and society is two years from now –something notoriously hard to predict. Flexibility is required here as well. One radical outcome is a fully Burundian enterprise, with at most occasional TA from a few people of the current foreign team –say, twice-yearly 2-week visits. At the other opposite (stopping short of a continuation of the current set-up) one could envision the BLTP continuing to be the local office of what is still a WWC project, but with a much greater proportion of the management and training being done by Burundians.
155. Evidently, it may make sense give preference to Ngozi I-III participants, as well as current BLTP staff, for any of these positions (management and training), although highly competent and motivated other persons could be considered as well on an exceptional basis. Admittedly, this is all not easy to do: control and oversight and power are lost at headquarters, trust must exist in local people, local senior management must take on more complicated function, etc. Yet, this is what it takes to create local organizations, and the longer the transfer of these functions is delayed the harder they will be to achieve. This cannot be done overnight. It must be prepared, worked on, and learned by doing.

Monitoring and Evaluation

156. The BLTP has very little in the way of formal M&E systems. Your average World Bank project generates more monitoring data in one week than this one did in one year. Baseline data hardly exist, impact measures are unavailable, tracking systems of participants are largely absent, and anecdotal stories provide most of the data for proving success. Much of this is due to the nature of the work: the aims are multi-dimensional and hardly quantifiable, the problems of attribution stunning, the time horizon uncertain but certainly medium to long-term (i.e., beyond the duration of

the project's funding in phase one), the sources of objective verification basically absent. The only more or less quantitative data available are participant evaluations of the workshops, and these are notoriously uncertain sources of data.

157. A good M&E system for projects such as the BLTP is different from, say, one for an infrastructure project: aims are much more changing and dynamics ambiguous; projects need to be much more flexible. In short, then, creating elaborate quantitative systems risks being time-consuming and rather futile. This is not the same as arguing that M&E systems are un-important, however. In this context, two elements are need for a good M&E system: one is a *workplace environment* that valorizes constant gathering and critical analysis of relevant information; and the other is *programming*, setting out explicit intermediary and final aims and expectations.
158. As to the former, a workplace that favors quality M&E and fine-tuning of a project approach would possess some of the following features:
- regular soliciting of feedback by knowledgeable third-party observers;
 - a frank inter-personal atmosphere where critical questions and open discussion are encouraged and rewarded;
 - a constant willingness to re-analyze the local political and social dynamics, and to reflect on how to steer the project in the light of available information; and
 - an open listening atmosphere towards the Burundian participants, who are the people who will ultimately determine the project's impact.
159. The BLTP did well on these variables. We base this judgment on two main factors:
- conversations with the team, individually and in group
 - actual behavior: the project has constantly fine-tuned its approach, whether it comes to the training modules, the follow-up activities, the selection of participants, the spin-off of new target publics and new projects, etc... Even during the time we conducted the evaluation, many changes were introduced to the project as a direct result of our discussions.
160. In short, the BLTP project, while not gifted with the sort of M&E system that ordinarily passes for desirable, seems to have acted as a learning organization, self-critical, flexible, etc. The relation between Howard Wolpe and Eugene Nindorera is crucial in this respect. They both bring complimentary but also very different capabilities and attitudes to the table, and the combination is what makes this teamwork well.
161. Still, the record of the BLTP on the second element of a good M&E system is less good. The project should begin working seriously on a detailed programming system, allowing in turn critical and intelligent monitoring and evaluation by comparing ongoing trends to expected outcomes. All this does not need to be quantitative, but it

does need to be a step beyond anecdotes and feelings; if not, the risk is that people who do not share the teams' feelings can too easily question the entire approach, for success is merely in the eyes of the beholder. It should be linked to the establishment of intermediary objectives (as discussed earlier) and a much clearer idea of the particular objectives of each activity and how those can contribute to the intermediary and final objectives. In the absence of a capability to measure the highest level of impact – on national institutions, on sustainable peace – it may be possible to do a bit more work on measuring participants' actual behavior, the capacity of the network to analyze and find solutions to problems (and possibly to take actions), and specific changes seen in institutional decision-making and process following targeted workshops. Some options are listed below.

162. The most evident and easy step is to better track trainees' participation in follow-up meetings. This is truly easy to develop, and should have existed already. On our request, this was done by Fabien, the project manager, and the results are attached in Annex III.
163. A second possibility is to organize a clear and critical analysis after each follow-up workshops of what went on really, with the Burundian staff in the lead. A lot of what happens during these meetings is illegible to foreigners –code words that refer to old ideological arguments, one-sided remarks that deny other experiences, dismissing remarks that put people “in their place,” use of *langue de bois*. All these are much harder for Mr. Wolpe and the WWIC team to pick up than for the Burundians, and there should be a critical and frank (and entirely confidential) discussion, with the Burundians in the driver's seat, about these matters after each follow-up workshop. The point of doing this exercise is foremost to do the exercise. It forces things out in the open, it obliges frank discussion, something that may be overlooked under the pressures of time and the fact that it is simply easier to maintain polite and pleasant relations without these type of discussions. If some simple record of this can be maintained, it would also allow for some tracking of actual behavior over time.
164. The most difficult, and the most important, is to create some sort of monitoring of the participants' behavior outside of the interaction with the BLTP. The interesting thing to find out here is what one of our interlocutors called the behavior during “unguarded moments” – outside of the workshops, which are in part public performances to the benefit of the BLTP team, but during the rest of life. There are two levels here:
 - the behavior of participants between themselves (some participants told us they were neighbors, yet never once greeted each other or met in between the workshops;
 - other people, however, described inviting workshop members to baptisms, meeting for a drink, etc.) and that with others in their environment (people at work, in the neighborhood). This is of course the hardest to do: it should be simple, qualitative, confidential, open to both negative and positive indications, and so on. The same remark holds here as for the previous – doing it, talking about it, is as important as the actual data that flow from it.

165. As we said earlier, an improved M&E system must be linked to a more proactive and clear programming of the BLTP's own intermediary aims and goals. Setting explicit goals of various kinds would allow monitoring to what extent they are being achieved or not, and what factors support or constrain the desired dynamics. Such a system should be flexible, of course, but provide at least a basis for frank and critical discussion.
166. Many participants also suggested that they should be given the opportunity to evaluate their own application of the BLTP approach/tools at the beginning of each follow-up workshop. This process would help them to get any frustrations out that they are willing to share, be a constant reminder for the BLTP team of progress or the absence thereof (assuming that people would be able to share the negative or non-application stories), and it would support the more formal monitoring processes listed above.
167. Each workshop that is targeted toward a specific institution could also set up its own particular monitoring system based on the establishment of clear objectives (both with and without the participants) of what is hoped to be achieved by the workshop. This will be important in designing the workshop, and in working toward satisfying the expectations of the different people (and institutions) involved. The tools listed above would help to monitor and evaluate the objectives set for each workshop, and the follow-up.

World Bank performance

168. There exists an impressive buy-in among World Bank staff for this project. After all, this is the sort of project that is rather marginal to the Bank: it spends a small amount of money in an institution where moving money is an important career incentive; it deals not with quantitative, economic or infrastructure matters in an institution that generally valorizes exactly such competencies – yet, we found generally a serious interest in, and enthusiasm for, the BLTP among Bank staff. Markus Kostner was from the beginning a strong defender of the BLTP; Ingo Wiederhofer follows it in detail and is clearly very well informed. This reflects a sense that the BLTP does contribute to the World Bank's work, in an original and indirect manner possibly, but nonetheless potentially highly relevant. The breakthrough in the EMGI, for example, to which the BLTP clearly contributed, is of direct importance to the Bank's major involvement in the Burundian part of the MRDP. Interestingly, this workshop itself was actually funded by other donor funding, but this adds to, rather than detracts from, the importance of the BLTP.
169. As said earlier, there is broad enthusiasm among Bank staff in Burundi to use the BLTP approach in some more specific fields of Bank endeavor: agriculture, for example, or education. This reflects the fact that Bank staff generally feels that the approach adds an important complement, missing until now, to dynamics for change in Burundi: it puts some extra oil in the halting machinery of policy-making and political compromise, so to speak. It may enable better dialogue around policies, bringing more people together to develop policies that are more innovative, more

broad-based, more locally owned and thus hopefully more relevant and better implemented. It does so at a relatively low cost.

170. The Post-Conflict Fund set-up is among the lightest management systems the Bank possesses. Essentially, money is transferred to the WWIC, which then has complete management responsibility. WWIC regularly reports, but in a much lighter format than with directly Bank-managed projects, to the Bank. Bank staff has at times asked questions about certain procurement decisions, and these have received satisfactory answers – but overall, the system is light and easy to manage. We did not pursue this matter much, to be honest, but nobody mentioned any problem to us in our many interviews, so one can relatively safely assume that the system worked satisfactorily for all.

ANNEX I: CHRONOLOGY

2003		No.	
March	Ngozi I	34	collaborative decision-making, group problem solving, strategic planning, communications, and conflict resolution
April 15-16	Follow-up workshop 1 for Ngozi I		Review of experience and team- and consensus-building and the development of a common vision.
June 14-16	Follow-up workshop 2 for Ngozi I	23	in how to prepare for and interact with prospective donors and partners
September 23-28	Ngozi II	31	
Sept. 30	Third Follow-Up Ngozi I	21	
November 17-18	Ngozi II First Follow-up	24	
2004			
February 9	Ngozi II Second Follow-up	21?	Data mixed with next workshop
February 10-11	Joint Ngozi I-II Follow-up	38?	Data mixed with previous workshop
May 18-19	Follow-up workshop 2 for Ngozi I & II	33	Includes very part-time participation (a few hours); number of permanently present approx. 15-20. Exercises in negotiation. Discussion of projects.
May 22-29	Ngozi III	30	
June 28-30	Ngozi III First Follow-up		