Global Governance and Local Peace explains why International Organizations (IOs), International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs), and state aid agencies sometimes achieve their country-level peacebuilding aims, and sometimes do not. Existing research claims that the country-level behavior of international actors is constrained by bureaucratic dysfunction and the preferences of their headquarters. In reality, the hundreds of IO, INGO, and donor offices established in conflict-affected countries have a high degree of independent decision-making power. Global Governance and Local Peace argues that international peacebuilding performance occurs only when independent staff empower local populations to hold their organization accountable. Without this local-level accountability, intervening organizations are likely to fail at peacebuilding. Their focus on global accountability, alone, undermines their chances at local-level performance. Through in-depth case studies into the behavior of five intervening organizations over a fifteen-year period in Burundi (1999-2014), this book provides an unprecedented examination of the country-level successes and failures of international interveners. Contrary to the existing peacebuilding literature, which focuses on failure, Global Governance and Local Peace shows that intervening organizations can achieve their country-level peacebuilding aims, but only when individual staff sidestep bureaucratic and hierarchical incentives and empower local populations.